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THE LAND AND NAVAL FORCES CLAUSE
Dakota S. Rudesill*

Abstract

What is the constitutional textual basis for key
statutes that constrain the national security
apparatus and condition the President’s ability to
direct it – statutes that are neither spending
limitations, nor war declarations or authorizations
for the use of military force (AUMFs), nor militia
laws? There are a series of such statutory
frameworks, including the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), Posse Comitatus Act and its
relatives (particularly parts of the Insurrection Act),
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the
covert action statute, anti-torture laws, and the War
Powers Resolution. The best or at least strong
additional textual footing for these statutes, this
article argues, is Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of
the Constitution. This clause gives Congress the
power “To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” Although
the common assumption is that this Land and Naval
Forces Clause is a single enumerated power, this
article theorizes the Clause as providing Congress
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two powers: a well-recognized Internal Regulation
power over military justice and other internal affairs
of the national security apparatus, and also an
External Government power over operations. This
article analyzes the Clause’s text, counterauthoritarian origins, and its constitutional
interpretation since the Founding Era. This article
argues for the Clause’s constitutional rediscovery
and embrace as primary textual footing for a series
of vital statutory frameworks that govern the
military and the Intelligence Community at the
intersection of liberty and security, and regarding
the use of force and cyber operations. Ultimately,
the Clause’s power is contingent: Congress must use
it and other legal actors must give life to its statutes
and constitutional values for it to be meaningful.
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INTRODUCTION
Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the United States Constitution
provides Congress the power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” This Land and Naval Forces
Clause1 is textually located within the wheelhouse of Congress’s
legislative powers regarding national security. The Clause has been
understood since the Founding to grant Congress authority over military
justice, and it has been cited by the Supreme Court in landmark cases.2
This provision’s full history and significance beyond the military justice
context, however, are unappreciated, in some respects ambiguous, and
insufficiently studied.3
1. There is no consensus on what to call the Clause. The Supreme Court recently referenced part
of it (as explained below) as the “Military Regulation Clause.” See United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S.
387, 394-95 (2013). Other cases simply quote it, or give the Clause different names. See, e.g., United
States v Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 272 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (“Rules and Regulations Clause”) (Baker, J., concurring).
Some scholars reference “the Government and Regulation power.” See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash,
The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers, 87 TEX. L. REV. 299, 332 (2008). Others
reference the “Rules for the Government and Regulation Clause.” See David J. Barron & Martin S.
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV.
941, 1082-83 (2008) [hereinafter Lowest Ebb Part II]. Some practitioners call it the Make Rules Clause.
I term it the Land and Naval Forces Clause to emphasize its subject matter and distinct language versus
other Article I, Section 8 war powers.
2. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006) (Clause cited along with others
providing Congress national security powers, in case rejecting President’s order regarding trials of post9/11 detainees as violation of UCMJ); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-44
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (Clause cited in canonical national security separation of powers case).
3. This article, like other articles focused on individual clauses of the Constitution, employs
common interpretive approaches without being about constitutional interpretation. See Andrew Kent,
Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 843, 857 (2007) (article on Define and Punish Clause not intended to resolve larger originalist
debates); John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1054 (2013) (article on
Necessary and Proper Clause does not endeavor to engage with originalist conversation in systematic
fashion or set out originalist theory). Reserving the interpretive methodological implications of this study
for a future work, this article does close textual and structural analysis, including intratextual work;
considers a range of originalist evidence that bears on Framer understanding and original public meaning
(different methodological focuses between which this article does not choose); gathers and analyzes
relevant parts of the constitutional record, including via empirical analysis of legislative citations and
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This article urges the constitutional rediscovery of this neglected
“cryptic” Clause4 – rediscovery of its text, counter-authoritarian purposes,
constitutional history, and the growing contemporary importance of
statutes written pursuant to it. Relying on the Clause, Congress can
restrain the national security apparatus and the President’s use of it
regarding military justice and discipline, espionage, cyber operations, and
regarding surveillance, interrogation, and other liberty infringements.
The conventional assumption is that the Clause – which we will also
reference as the Forces Clause, or Clause 14 – provides a single
enumerated power.5 This article theorizes the Forces Clause as containing
two powers.
The well-established understanding of the Forces Clause is what this
article conceives as the Internal Regulation power. It provides Congress
authority over the internal affairs of the national security apparatus, from
writing the military’s criminal code to regulating training, organizational,
and personnel matters.6 The “land and naval Forces,” broadly conceived,
include not just the uniformed military, but individuals and organizations
that support and operate in concert with them, inside and also beyond
what is today the Department of Defense.
The Supreme Court has not yet explicitly articulated a second
understanding of the Forces Clause but has invited it. In his canonical
Youngstown (1952) concurrence, Justice Robert Jackson hinted at such a
power.7 More recently, in a case related to Congress’s Internal Regulation
power, United States v. Kebodeaux (2013), the Court edited the Clause’s
text to exclude the term “Government,” focusing the Court’s analysis
instead only on Congress’s power to “make Rules for the . . . Regulation
of the land and naval Forces.”8 This article takes up the Court’s implicit
analysis of doctrinally key cases; and on the basis of all of these addresses the constitutional ethos of the
Clause.
4. The Supreme Court has observed the Clause’s language is “cryptic.” See Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 21 (1957). Professor Prakash remarks that the Clause is “seemingly unremarkable” but
enormously important. Prakash, supra note 1, at 331.
5. Article I provides Congress enumerated powers and implicit subordinate powers necessary for
their exercise. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring) (“The
power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in the President. Both powers
imply many subordinate and auxiliary powers. Each includes all authorities essential to its due exercise.”);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819) (necessity of implied powers); Mikhail,
supra note 3, at 1128-32 (discussing implied and unenumerated powers). My argument is that the Forces
Clause can be understood to provide two enumerated powers that carry such implied and auxiliary powers,
for example to organize and control the sizable civilian intelligence apparatus that supports the “land and
naval Forces.”
6. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767 (1996) (Clause provides Congress
authority to regulate military justice, a power “no less plenary” than others in Article I).
7. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring).
8. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 394-95 (2013) (Forces Clause and Necessary
and Proper Clause allow Congress to require former servicemember convicted of sex crime to register as
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challenge. On the basis of both hints and strong signals in the text,
originalist evidence, and subsequent constitutional record, this article
theorizes the Clause as carrying a second power we can ground in the term
“Government.” What this article terms the External Government power
provides Congress legislative authority to write statutory “Rules”
controlling operations of the national security apparatus that involve third
parties, both at home and abroad.9 Locating this power in the Forces
Clause fills a gap and addresses a reliance interest: this operationscontrolling power of Congress is reflected in a series of longstanding and
important statutory frameworks, and the Forces Clause’s sibling clauses
in Article I, Section 8 are in many instances less easily read to provide it.
These statutory frameworks are in relevant part not appropriations
conditions, nor war declarations or authorizations for the use of military
force (AUMFs) that approve armed conflicts, nor militia laws.
This article makes several contributions to our understanding of the
Forces Clause.
First, this article makes clear that the Forces Clause is an important part
of the national security Constitution.10 The Clause concerns nothing less
than civilian legislative control over the national security apparatus. It
reflects the commitment of the Framers to checks on a chief Executive
and standing military they feared held inherent authoritarian potential.
Second, this article focuses squarely on the Forces Clause and deepens
our understanding of it in its constitutional context. This article analyzes
the Clause’s text, examines its origins and constitutional history to the
present day, and theorizes and explores its dual understandings. In
contrast, to date the Forces Clause has rarely received the thorough
substantive treatment in the legal literature accorded other constitutional
provisions.11 Often, courts and scholars cite the Forces Clause seriatim
sex offender under statute of general applicability not limited to current or former military personnel).
9. Several scholars view the Clause as providing power over not just discipline of “the land and
naval Forces” but over operations as well. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A
BIOGRAPHY 188 (2005) (Clause provides power to limit and proscribe President’s use of force, if not
prescriptively direct it); DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND
CONGRESS 1776 TO ISIS 22-24 (2016) (legislative power in Clause to limit military operations); Randy
E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 140 (2001)
(“Congress has complete power to command or govern the army and navy, not merely the power to
regulate them”); Prakash, supra note 1 (Clause provides Congress power to direct military operations and
control all aspects of the military and war). Cf., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 1197 (4th ed. 1873) (conceiving Clause entirely in its military justice and
discipline aspect); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 155, 159-60 (2005) (denying existence of congressional power to limit
presidential use of the military via statute).
10. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION (1990) (discussing
concept).
11. Other important provisions have been the focus of one or a series of scholarly articles. See,
e.g., Mikhail, supra note 3 (Necessary & Proper Clause); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
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with other constitutional provisions, without distinction.12 Where courts
and scholars have made substantive inquiries, they have illuminated the
Clause in partial fashion. The Forces Clause has been well cited for what
this article conceives as its Internal Regulation power over military
justice, and some originalist scholars have posited what this article
conceives as the External Government power – but the originalists often
stop with the Founding Era.13 All Article I powers relevant to national
security operate in context with Executive powers (especially those of the
Commander in Chief, analyzed under the Youngstown framework), a
general subject that has also received extensive inquiry.14 Without
recapitulating that separation of powers scholarship, this article explores
the work the Forces Clause in particular is doing.
Third, this article provides empirical analysis of citation to the Forces
Clause. The recent legislative record is especially rich, reflecting both
Internal and External theories of the Clause. It also reflects inconsistency
and confusion. In dozens of bills, Members of Congress are relying on
the Forces Clause for legislative authority over Executive branch
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding,
121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008) [hereinafter Lowest Ebb Part I]; Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II,
supra note 1; Kent, supra note 3 (Define and Punish Clause); Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process
Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71 (1974); Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution,
54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 187-94 (1940).
12. For seriatim references, see, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103-357, at 128 (1993) (Conf. Rep.)
(discussing section 654 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, citing the Clause
along with Army and Navy Clauses as constitutional authority for statutory “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
policy banning openly gay and lesbian individuals from the military); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
591 (2006) (example of undistinguished seriatim citation, along with four other Article I, Section 8
provisions); Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L.
& POL’Y. 455, 461-62 (2005) (including Forces Clause in a list of constitutional clauses, “all of which
suggest that Congress was well within its constitutional authority in banning torture”).
13. The judicial originalist treatments are a line of military justice cases. See, e.g., Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767 (1996). Three scholars have given the Forces Clause focused analysis
in originalist works centered on broader topics: AMAR, supra note 9 (discussing Clause in full treatment
of the Constitution’s text and origins); Barnett, supra note 9 (engaging with meaning of the Clause’s term
“Regulation” in article about the Commerce Clause); Prakash, supra note 1 (most extensive academic
originalist analysis to date of the Forces Clause in article about overlapping and exclusive Article I and II
powers). For other scholarly mentions, see, e.g., JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES 268 (2007) (mention of Clause in connection with Posse Comitatus
Act); WILLIAM C. BANKS & STEPHEN DYCUS, SOLDIERS ON THE HOME FRONT 28, 34 (2016) (Clause
mentioned in discussion of law regarding domestic military operations); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL
WAR POWER 7 (2d ed. 2004) (one of 10 listed Article I, Section 8 clauses vesting war powers generally
in Congress); W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION 118 (1992)
(Clause mentioned as potential authority for Congress to regulate covert action); Barron & Lederman,
Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 733 & nn.129-30, 787-88 (courts have construed Clause broadly
regarding internal discipline of armed forces and in Hamdan extended it to detainee treatment; Executive
power theorists ignore key drafting history).
14. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11; Lowest Ebb Part II, supra note 1
(extensive treatment of constitutional clashes of Article I and II powers).
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activities outside of the national security apparatus – authority the Clause
does not provide.
Fourth, this article urges recognition of the Clause as providing the best
or at least strong additional constitutional footing for vitally important
national security statutory frameworks (recognizing that statutes can rely
on more than one textual provision for their constitutionality).15 The
Internal Regulation power is not only the primary textual basis for the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (as is well understood), but
also provides authority, in concert with other Article I clauses, for
voluminous annual authorization acts that regulate in detail the military
and national security bureaucracy. The Forces Clause’s External
Government power, meanwhile, is reasonably and best understood to
provide primary authority for a series of statutory frameworks at the
center of the national security regulatory regime. These include the Posse
Comitatus Act and its relatives (closely linked other laws regarding
domestic use of military regulars, especially portions of the Insurrection
Act), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the covert action
statute, detainee treatment laws (including the statutory ban on torture),
and the War Powers Resolution. These External Government statutes
place limits on how the Commander in Chief may employ “the land and
naval Forces.” These statutes provide “Rules” that resonate with the
Clause’s counter-authoritarian purposes and with the Constitution’s ethos
– its meta-project – of balancing liberty and security in a manner that
protects both.
Fifth and finally, this article contributes to the understudied and related
subjects of intelligence and the Constitution, and cyber operations and the
Constitution. The “land and naval Forces” plainly subjects the large
military intelligence establishment inside the Defense Department to
Congress’s “Rules,” as it does the military’s U.S. Cyber Command. The
Clause should also be understood to give Congress legislative control
over the two independent, non-military intelligence agencies: the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI). Several of the key statutory frameworks that this
article argues can be grounded in the Forces Clause – most notably FISA
and the covert action statute – govern the intelligence apparatus.
Meanwhile, Congress’s growing, bit-by-bit government of cyber
operations finds its best constitutional footing in the Forces Clause, as
well.
Although today the Force Clause’s significance is often lost outside of
the military justice community, it is due for constitutional rediscovery.
This article begins in Part I with a summary of what is settled and what
15. See, e.g., United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387 (2013) (Forces Clause and Necessary and
Proper Clause operate together to provide authority for statute).
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is enduringly less clear about the well-established Internal Regulation
power. Part II analyzes the constitutional record of explicit engagement
with the Clause for evidence of an External Government power. The
Constitution’s text, Founding Era evidence, and subsequent citation
record in the three branches indicate that it is not imperative but is
reasonable to understand the Clause to provide Congress two powers.
With the reasonableness of a dual reading established, Part III focuses
on the important work the Clause should be understood to be doing in the
modern national security legal regime. The Forces Clause should be cited
by courts and other participants in the constitutional law conversation not
only as the primary constitutional textual basis for the UCMJ, but also as
constitutional authority for a series of statutory frameworks governing use
of force, surveillance, and interrogation.
Part IV continues the argument for the Clause’s constitutional
rediscovery. This Part appraises the Clause’s contemporary relevance in
our time of new lawmaking dynamics (including declining congressional
use of its legislative powers, expanding Executive power, and production
of secret law), change in the national security environment and
particularly its growing cyberization, and increasingly volatile politics
and policy. These trends reveal the value of the guardrails provided by
laws written pursuant to the Clause. They make Congress’s ability to
write further such “Rules” more important.
This article’s Conclusion emphasizes that the Clause’s power, like all
powers of Congress, is contingent. Congress must use it, and other legal
actors must give life to its statutes whether or not courts are involved, or
risk its loss. In the national security space, most constitutional citation,
practice, and decisions escape judicial review because of secrecy,
problems of standing, and other judicial doctrines and practical
impediments. Our constitutional order therefore depends on the integrity,
commitment to the rule of law, and knowledge of leaders, legislators,
lawyers, and personnel in the field. Their work – on matters as seemingly
unexciting as Department of Defense personnel management, and as
potentially consequential as covert actions, cyber attack, and nuclear
weapons – will better reflect constitutional values to the extent it is
informed by rediscovery of the dual powers of Article I, Section 8, Clause
14.
In this regard, this article is doing more than simply answering the
Supreme Court’s implicit question in Kebodeaux, correcting Congress’s
misunderstanding of the Clause, and contributing to the constitutional
conversation about the Forces Clause, intelligence, cyber, and other
matters. This article’s analysis is important because enhancing our
knowledge of the Clause deepens appreciation for its constitutional values
of counter-authoritarian legislative control over the national security
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enterprise, an apparatus of colossal resources and power that both protects
and inherently imperils liberty. Deeper appreciation for the Clause in turn
puts the statutes that rely upon it on firmer constitutional footing. Of
course, a statute can rely on an Article I clause even if Congress cites no
clause, if the statute does not reflect the precise language of a clause, or
if the statute’s purpose differs from the spirit motivating a clause’s
inclusion in the Constitution.16 But Congress and other legal actors
strengthen the constitutional standing of statutes when, through citation
and analysis, they ground statutes on constitutional textual provisions that
share the legislation’s animating purposes. In this instance, citation to the
Clause in connection with vital statutory frameworks will underscore the
constitutionality of laws that protect people – here and abroad – from the
ability of the national security apparatus, under presidential direction, to
surveil, covertly influence, interrogate, detain, adjudicate, and kill.
I. INTERNAL REGULATION
The text of the Land and Naval Forces Clause does not mention
military justice, nor military discipline, nor the internal affairs of the
national security apparatus. But it has been clear since the Founding that
the Clause provides Congress expansive power over military justice and
discipline. Questions endure at the margins about the scope of what this
article conceives as the Internal Regulation power regarding some aspects
of military justice, control of the national security apparatus beyond the
military justice system, and in the context of the President’s powers.
In his classic mid-Nineteenth Century Commentaries on the
Constitution, Justice Joseph Story wrote that regarding military justice
and discipline, “[t]he whole power is far more safe in the hands of
Congress than of the executive.”17 The rationale for this power’s
assignment to Congress by the Framers was essentially counterauthoritarian, protecting Americans who serve in (or find themselves in
the hands of) the federal armed forces. Unless the elected representatives
of the people (and at that time the chosen Senate representation of the
state legislatures)18 could control military discipline, “the most summary
and severe punishments might be inflicted at the mere will of the
executive.”19 Military courts were also viewed in the Founding Era as
16. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 564-71 (penalty to compel purchase
of health insurance constitutional as a tax under Art. I, § 8, cl. 1). The “question of the constitutionality
of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.”
Id. at 570.
17. STORY, supra note 9.
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (direct election of Senators), superseding, id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1-2
(selection of Senators by state legislatures).
19. STORY, supra note 9. In two dissents, Justice Story provided further brief comments on his
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less forgiving to defendants than civilian courts.20 Congressional
authority over military courts provided a democratic feedback mechanism
for the people. Although early Congresses tended not to cite the
Constitution chapter and verse, the early Congresses passed military
justice codes using the language of the Forces Clause: the Army “shall be
governed by the rules and articles of war” that Congress writes, and the
Navy is subject to Congress’s “rules and regulations” for its “Better
Government.”21
The subsequent constitutional history of explicit citation to the Forces
Clause in Congress (in connection with the separate Army and Navy
codes and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) that replaced
them in 1950, and related legislation), in the Executive branch, and in the
courts makes clear that Congress’s power over military justice flows
primarily from the Forces Clause,22 and in some circumstances in
connection with other congressional powers.23 The courts continue to
emphasize that the Clause has counter-authoritarian purposes, that

understanding of the Clause. He viewed the power to govern and regulate the armed forces as incident to
the power to Raise and Support Armies and Provide and Maintain a Navy, and that the Forces Clause was
added by the Framers ex abundanti cautela. Similarly, the Declare War power in Story’s view necessarily
includes the Marque and Reprisal and Regulate Captures powers, and these separate enumerated powers
were in like fashion added by the Framers in an abundance of caution. See Brown v. United States, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 151 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting); cf., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
174 (1803) (presumption against surplusage in reading the Constitution). Justice Story also observed that
the Forces Clause’s powers cannot be assumed by states if the federal government does not use them. See
Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 68-69 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting). Story in neither dissent
elaborated on the extent or number of the powers the Forces Clause provides.
20. See 3 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 208 (Yale
Univ. Press 1911) (1819); Gordon D. Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REV. 293, 319 (1957).
21. See An Act to Recognize and Adapt to the Constitution of the United States the Establishment
of Troops Raised Under the Resolves of the United States in Congress Assembled, Act of Sept. 29, 1789,
ch. 25, § 4, 1 Stat. 95, 96 (repealed 1790); An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the
United States, Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1-13, 1 Stat. 112, 119-21. These statutes re-enacted military
justice codes written prior to the Constitution. See Am. Art. of War of 1775 and 1776, reprinted in
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 953-71 (2d ed. 1920). See also WINTHROP, supra, at 2124 (early history of U.S. military justice); An Act for the Better Government of the Navy, Act of Apr. 23,
1800, ch. 33, 2 Stat. 45. For other notable code statutes that used the language of the Clause in their
enacting clauses, see Am. Art. of War of 1806, § 1; and Am. Art. of War of 1874, § 1342, reprinted in
WINTHROP, supra, at 976, 986. Use of the terms “Government” and “Regulation” likely reflects
overlapping definitions of the terms (see Part II.A in main text).
22. See discussion the record of citation to the Clause in the three branches, discussed in Part II
infra; Uniform Code of Military Justice, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 109 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 801- 946 (2016); earlier military justice codes cited in supra note 21; Loving v. United States, 517 U.S.
748, 767 (1996) (authority over military justice flows from Forces Clause); WINTHROP, supra note 21, at
17 (military justice codes are enacted pursuant to Forces Clause).
23. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1957) (“limited and extraordinary” circumstances
exist in which non-military person is effectively part of the military, and in those instances military
jurisdiction rests not on the Necessary and Proper Clause expanding the reach of the Forces Clause, but
on the Forces Clause plus the larger grant of war powers being operative); and infra notes 30-31.
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statutes written to it overcome presidential action, but also that Congress
may delegate and shares its authority with the Executive.24
Several issues are well-settled. For example, the question of whether
the Bill of Rights applies to military justice was resolved in the twentieth
century. Beyond the Fifth Amendment’s carve-out of “cases arising in
the land or naval forces” regarding grand juries, the Constitution is
textually not clear about whether the Bill of Rights protects service
members from actions by the political branches, especially pursuant to the
Commander in Chief and Forces Clauses. Congress by statute, and the
civilian appellate court that handles military justice appeals, provided and
sometimes exceeded several guarantees of the Bill of Rights, and then the
Supreme Court endorsed the Bill’s application as well, with allowance for
specific aspects of military service and the separate military justice
system.25 Even though the Bill of Rights applies generally and doctrine
continues to evolve, the Supreme Court emphasizes that Congress retains
“primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of
[service members] against the needs of the military.”26 Statutes written
pursuant to the Forces Clause “ordering military affairs” are entitled to
the “highest deference” by courts.27
Additionally, it is now well-settled that the reach of military
jurisdiction is grounded in the status of the defendant, in two broad
categories. One category includes prisoners of war, other alleged enemy
fighters, or other persons in the hands of the military in the field.28 A
24. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 765-68.
25. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1987) (collecting rights affected by statute
pursuant to Forces Clause); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976) (right to counsel protects service
members, operating differently in the military justice system); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 202-03
n.30 (5th Cir. 1975) (UCMJ statute and courts “extended the constitutional rights of servicemen beyond
those accorded to civilians,” for example regarding notice and discovery). The Supreme Court applied
the Bill of Rights to service members after many years of doubt, conflicting dicta, and originalist
argument. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (Bill of Rights applies with allowances for
military context); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142-43, 146-47, 149, 152-55 (1953) (dicta endorsing
Bill’s application); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 137-38 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring)
(skeptical dicta); Henderson, supra note 20, at 293-94 (discussing conflicting jurisprudence and arguing
that Framers did believe the Bill should apply); Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of
Rights: The Original Practice I, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23-32 (1958) (arguing Framers did not intend Bill
to apply, presenting originalist evidence about service member access to counsel).
26. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 767 (quoting Solorio, 483 U.S. at 447).
27. See id. at 768.
28. Enemy fighters (and certain other accompanying personnel) can be prosecuted in military
courts inter alia for violations of the laws of war under several articles of the UCMJ. See UCMJ, arts. 2,
18, 21 (2016) (see 10 U.S.C. §§ 802(a)(9), 802(a)(13) (prisoners of war)), 818(a) (general courts-martial
jurisdiction “to try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal”), 821
(military commissions, provost courts, and other military tribunals may try offenses under statute or the
law of war). Also, enemy fighters may be prosecuted under the Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948c) (2009)) (“Any alien
unprivileged enemy belligerent is subject to trial by military commission as set forth in this chapter”). See
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second category includes persons formally or functionally in the federal
“land and naval Forces.”29 Generally, to minimize the scope and use of
military jurisdiction beyond those in uniform, the Supreme Court has
made clear that civilians generally may not be subject to military justice
if the civil courts are open and operating.30 Civilian dependents of
military personnel generally may not be court-martialed pursuant to the
Forces Clause, even when they murder service members.31 As a general
matter, neither may former service members.32 Civilian employees and
military contractors are also usually not subject to court martial.
Beyond its core grant of authority to Congress over the U.S. military’s
criminal code as applied to current U.S. military personnel, there is both
clarity and some ambiguity regarding the wider sweep of the Internal
Regulation power.
It is clear that the Forces Clause provides Congress expansive power
to regulate the internal affairs of the military apparatus beyond military
justice. That is, to set personnel policies and to control the supporting
bureaucracy (originally the Departments of War and the Navy, and today
also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006) (President bound to follow Congress’s statutes on
military justice and detainees written pursuant to the Forces Clause and other Article I, section 8 clauses).
29. The Supreme Court sees military status as reflecting the “natural meaning” of the land and
naval forces referenced in the Forces Clause and the Fifth Amendment. After a doctrinal experiment with
service-connection of the offense, the status of the defendant has for three decades been the test instead.
See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439-41 (1987) (military status), overturning O’Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (service connection); but cf., Solorio, 483 U.S. at 456-57 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that military status is an overbroad test). Some courts will finely parse definitions of
being “in” the military or “the land and naval Forces.” See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 269
(C.A.A.F. 2012).
30. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 131 (1866). In a concurrence with three others,
Chief Justice Chase engaged with the Forces Clause, asserting that the Clause provides authority for
military trial of military personnel without a jury, but also that “soldiers or civilians, unless in cases of a
controlling necessity,” may not be tried absent an act of Congress. Id. at 139-40 (Chase, C.J., concurring);
but see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590-93 & n.23 (2006) (reserving question of whether Chief
Justice Chase was correct that President has independent authority to convene military commissions).
Chief Justice Chase wrote that Congress could have authorized military trial of a civilian, but pursuant to
the Declare War and Army Clauses, not the Forces Clause. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 13942. See also Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1878) (“hostility of the American people to any
interference by the military with the regular administration of justice in the civil courts” was well known
at Founding).
31. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 19-23 (1957) (plurality) (on rehearing, Court holds that Forces Clause does not provide court-martial
authority over civilians who murdered their service member spouses while posted overseas, because of
protections of Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
32. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (limiting military justice
jurisdiction over civilians to “least possible power adequate to the end proposed,” a test not met regarding
former service member who is therefore a civilian “entitled to have the benefit of safeguards afforded
those tried in the regular courts”); see also McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281,
285 (1960). However, Congress pursuant to the Forces Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause may
require former service members to register as sex offenders. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S.
387, 393-95 (2013).
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the Department of Defense).33 Congress has done this detailed regulation
throughout the republic’s history, from First Congress laws “for
regulating the Military Establishment” to frequent congressional citation
to the Clause in recent decades in connection with legislation concerning
military property, organization, awards, personnel benefits, and service
conditions, including sexual orientation stipulations.34
Because the Clause has often been cited seriatim and undistinguished
with other clauses, or no clause has been cited at all, however, it is less
clear precisely how much of this personnel and bureaucratic regulation
authority comes particularly from the Forces Clause and how much is
shared with or flows instead from its sibling clauses in Article I, Section
8, especially the powers to raise and support Armies and to provide and
maintain a Navy.35 Similarly indeterminate vis-à-vis the powers rooted
in other clauses are the precise contours of the powers regarding
conscription that the courts have also traced in part to the Forces Clause,
and organizing forces raised through enlistment or conscription.36
33. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (Clause allows the Congress “plenary
control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment, including
regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military discipline”); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210,
232-33 (1981) (Clause provides Congress authority over military retirement pay that can preempt state
divorce rules); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 890 (1961) (Clause and its
Article I, Section 8 siblings allow Congress to control access to military installations).
34. For detailed regulation of the military in the Founding Era, see, e.g., An Act for Regulating
the Military Establishment of the United States, Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, §§ 1-13, 1 Stat. 119, 121
(creation and detailed organization of army subject to “such rules and articles” of war written by
Congress); An Act for Continuing and Regulating the Military Establishment of the United States, and
for Repealing Sundry Acts Heretofore Passed on that Subject, Act of Mar. 3, 1795, ch. 44, §§ 4, 9, 1 Stat.
430, 430-31 (it is “a condition of the enlistments of the cavalry, that they shall serve as dismounted
dragoons, when ordered to do so”; troops on western frontier get additional rations of “two ounces of flour
or bread, and two ounces of beef or pork” plus salt); An Act to Provide a Naval Armament, Act of Mar.
27, 1794, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 350 (authorizing naval force with specified numbers of ships, canon, and crew,
and ration stipulations varying by day of the week); An Act to Amend the Act Intituled [sic] “An Act to
Amend and Repeal, in Part, the Act Intituled An Act to Ascertain and Fix the Military Establishment of
the United States, Act of May 22, 1798, ch. 46, § 2, 1 Stat. 557, 557 (regarding pay and duties of a named
officer with the rank of Major); An Act for the Better Government of the Navy, Act of Apr. 23, 1800, ch.
33, § 1, arts. II, IX, 2 Stat. 45, 45-46 (military justice code also stipulating religious services and
prohibiting the stripping of clothes from crew of captured ships). Distinguishing the authority that flows
from the Forces Clause versus the Army and Navy Clauses is especially challenging in legislation passed
by early Congresses because Founding Era legislators were often both in the same laws regulating federal
armed forces and legally creating or blessing them under the new Constitution. Similarly, some of the
provisions in the military justice codes concerning detainees, including the 1800 naval code supra and the
modern UCMJ, could find primary or additional footing in the Captures Clause. For legislation providing
detailed regulation of the armed forces in recent years, see Parts II.C.1, III.A.2, and IV.B below.
35. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 12-13. These clauses are usually referenced here as the Army
Clause and Navy Clause, and are also known as the Raise and Support Armies Clause and the Provide
and Maintain a Navy Clause.
36. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 343-44, n.16 (1990) (authority for drafting
National Guard personnel into the Army of the United States provided by the Army, Navy, Forces, Declare
War, and Necessary and Proper Clauses, and statutes enacted pursuant to them, such as 39 Stat. 211 §
111, (1916), operating separately from but in connection with the Militia Clauses); Rostker v. Goldberg,
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Another frontier of the Internal Regulation power involves whatever
authority the Clause provides over “the land and naval Forces” beyond
the Army and Navy (and their outgrowths, the Air Force and Marine
Corps).
An exception to the ban on court martial of non-military personnel,
based in Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ, operates where civilians so closely
accompany and operate with the military in the field during times of
hostilities that they become effectively part of the military.37 The
Supreme Court has indicated that this military jurisdiction flows from
Forces Clause authority and in some instances from the operation of other
powers in the Constitution, as well.38 Article 2(a) of the UCMJ also
provides military jurisdiction over several categories of individuals who
are outside the uniformed military but so closely associated that they can
in the judgment of Congress be punished by court martial as such. These
persons at the penumbral edges of “the land and naval Forces” include
retirees entitled to pay, retired reservists receiving military hospital care,
non-military prisoners serving sentences imposed by court martial – and
also members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
the Public Health Service, “and other organizations, when assigned to and
serving with the armed forces.”39
A number of important parts of the national security apparatus have

453 U.S. 57, 59-60, 80 (1981) (rejecting Due Process challenge to a male-only draft registration under the
Selective Service Act, on the basis of the Forces, Army, and Navy Clauses); Arver v. United States, 245
U.S. 366, 377 (1918) (Selective Draft Cases) (wartime conscription authority found in Army, Navy,
Declare War, Necessary and Proper, and Forces Clauses). The Court does not clarify whether the Forces
Clause provides some authority for conscription itself, or for merely regulating it. Id. It is also
indeterminate precisely how much Forces Clause authority operates more generally in connection with
the Army and Navy Clauses. See, e.g., An Act for Regulating the Military Establishment of the United
States, Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, §§ 1-12, 1 Stat. 119, 119-21 (1790) (size, organization, pay, clothing,
rations, oath, and other stipulations for U.S. land forces).
37. See UCMJ, art. 2(a)(10), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2016). This exception has roots in early
American military justice codes, which were following the pre-Independence British Articles of War. See
Art. of War, sec. XIV, art. XXIII (1765) (British); Am. Art. of War, art. XXXII (1775) (first American
articles of war); UCMJ, art. 2(10) (1950) (first UCMJ); id. art. 2(10), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2016)
(modern article); see also WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 941, 956 (reprinted Articles of War).
38. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1957) (plurality); United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 269
(C.A.A.F. 2012) (civilian contractor accompanying U.S. military in Iraq could be tried under UCMJ art.
2(a)(10)); id. at 272-76 (Baker, C.J., concurring) (agreeing that civilian contractor defendant was
sufficiently “in the armed forces” for purposes of UCMJ, but emphasizing that war powers of the Congress
and the President beyond the Forces Clause needed to be implicated – as here – for an extraordinary
extension of military jurisdiction over a civilian during hostilities).
39. See UCMJ art. 2, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2016) (persons subject to UCMJ). See also UCMJ, art.
5, 10 U.S.C. § 805 (2016) (“This chapter applies in all places”). See also Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000) (persons “employed by or accompanying the Armed
Forces outside the United States” may be tried in the civilian Article III courts for crimes outside the
United States, providing a commonly used alternative to military jurisdiction in UCMJ art. 2(a)(10), 10
U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2016)).
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supported federal regulars40 since the Founding, and are regulable under
the Forces Clause. Examples include the naval auxiliary (the modern
Coast Guard), the intelligence community, privateers (the Founding Era’s
glorified pirates and perhaps today’s contractors), and the bureaucracy
that aids former military personnel.41 Such an understanding would be
consistent with the Coast Guard’s inclusion under military justice
jurisdiction, along with the other federal personnel and contractors
accompanying and aiding the armed forces.42 Notably, the vast majority
of U.S. intelligence agencies, personnel, and funding have been housed
within the Department of Defense and its predecessors, and are frequently
regulated by Congress through the same policies and legislation.43 The
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) – although civilian entities – are nevertheless
closely associated with the armed forces: their funding flows through
Department of Defense appropriations, the CIA supports military
operations analytically, and CIA officers often accompany the military in
the field.44 Also, Congress in our time has frequently invoked the Clause
as constitutional authority for bills concerning the Department of
Veterans Affairs (for more on the Clause in Congress, see Part II.C
below).45 Ultimately, the Forces Clause’s authority over “land and naval
Forces” beyond the military and Pentagon is logical and well established
– if not precisely demarcated.
Finally, the extent of Clause’s Internal Regulation power in relation to
40. “Regulars” in military parlance means the primary, often standing, armed forces, as
distinguished from militia or other reserve forces, and supporting auxiliaries (e.g., intelligence, medical).
41. One could add militia to this list. However, the two Militia Clauses immediately following
the Forces Clause can be read to provide similar and separate powers over the militia, as discussed infra
in Part II.A.
42. See UCMJ art. 2(a), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2016).
43. See, e.g., the annual National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), discussed in Parts III and
IV.
44. See Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 241, 25862 (analyzing Congress’s process for providing funding for intelligence and other classified activities).
Regarding Congress’s powers over intelligence, the context is textual ambiguity: the term is not in the
Constitution. General skeptics of Article I power over intelligence point to Federalist 64’s observation
that in the context of treaty negotiations persons possessing “useful intelligence” will be more comfortable
sharing it with the President than Congress. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay). But that is not a
full argument against the ability of Congress to control the intelligence instrument via statute. Instead, it
points toward restricting confidential information flows to Congress. That may impinge on congressional
oversight, but does not defeat the entire notion of congressional regulation of intelligence. On the other
hand, there are powerful accountability and self-government reasons to allow the elected representatives
of the people to control the intelligence apparatus. There is by now also the precedent of thick practice:
a longstanding record of Congress legislating regarding the intelligence apparatus, annually and
repeatedly. See Part III infra for further discussion.
45. See, e.g., H.R. 558, 112th Cong. (2011) (renaming Department of Veterans Affairs medical
center), 157 CONG. REC. H552 (Feb. 8, 2011) (statement of Rep. Neugebauer). For additional discussion
of the constitutional record regarding citation to the Clause, see Part II.C below.
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the powers of the Executive branch is reasonably well established, but
continues to be defined.
Under Professor Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash’s originalist
construction of Article I and II war powers, Congress’s rule-writing
powers under the Clause include exclusive authority over military justice;
concurrent “regulation” power with the President over training,
procedures, maneuvers, deployments, uses of force, and treatment of
prisoners; and also concurrent power over types of war, escalation and deescalation thereof, and war objectives.46 Prakash assembles evidence that
the Framers understood that Congress has sole rule-writing power
regarding military justice, and that Congress would always prevail over
the Commander in Chief wherever their directives regarding training,
discipline, or maneuvers might conflict.
This view is attractive. It reflects the Constitution’s commitment to
civilian and legislative control over the military. It reflects the conduct
of the archetypical Commander in Chief – George Washington – who
perceived authority to act regarding military justice and discipline, but
also an obligation to obey Congress.47 Prakash’s view significantly aligns
with the authoritative analysis of the constitutional record compiled by
Professors David Barron and Marty Lederman, who conclude that the
President is bound by statute regarding military justice but at the very
least always retains what they term the superintendence role: the
Commander in Chief sits atop the military chain of command.48 Without
revisiting their extensive work, it suffices to note the reliability of their
broad conclusions that Congress and President acting together put the
Commander in Chief’s power at its apex,49 the President may act
regarding the internal affairs of the national security apparatus when
Congress is silent,50 and the President generally must observe legislated
limitations provided they do not negate the Constitution’s positioning of
the President at the head of the military chain of command.51
46. See Prakash, supra note 1, at 328-50.
47. For example, troops under Gen. Washington’s command took British prisoners, and
Washington convened a military tribunal in 1780 in the face of silence in the American Articles of War
about whether a British officer could be tried in military court for being a spy. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 590-92 (2006). Washington carefully followed Congress’s often detailed directives even
when he disagreed. See BARRON, supra note 9, at 9-13 (congressional instructions on confinement
conditions).
48. See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11; Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb
Part II, supra note 1.
49. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (upholding President’s definition of
aggravating factors in military capital case pursuant to delegation of authority from Congress pursuant to
Forces Clause).
50. See supra note 47.
51. There is reasonable disagreement about whether constitutional questions are raised by a statute
dating to the Civil War Era that restricts the ability of the President to relieve a commissioned officer in
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The Supreme Court endorsed this Youngstown-grounded view of
shared power in wartime regarding military justice and detainees in the
landmark national security separation of powers case Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld (2006).52 The Court invoked the Forces Clause and Justice
Jackson’s famous Youngstown concurrence in rejecting the military
commissions President George W. Bush created after the 9/11 terrorist
attacks as at odds with the UCMJ. But Hamdan’s citation to the Clause
was seriatim with other Article I, section 8 powers, without specific focus
on the Clause itself.53 The result is continued doctrinal ambiguity at the
margins of the Clause’s ambit. Hamdan implicated both Congress’s core
Internal Regulation power over military justice and the External
Government power regarding treatment of detainees captured during
military operations. But the extent of the powers rooted in the Forces
Clause, as distinct from those provided by other provisions of Article I,
section 8 remains imprecise.54 Similar uncertainty surrounds the extent
of the President’s independent powers to convene military commissions
absent legislation.55 The Hamdan Court sided with Congress in this clash
of Article I and II powers regarding military justices and specifically
military commissions, but questions about how completely Congress’s
Internal Regulation power overcomes a defiant Commander in Chief will
continue to arise. Against the backdrop of expansive congressional power
and judicial deference, answers to the questions raised here will continue
to evolve through the ongoing interaction among the branches of
peacetime without a court martial. See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II, supra note 1, at 111112 (questioning constitutionality); Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1349, 1400 (2012) (Forces Clause and First Militia Clause provide authority for the statutory
restriction).
52. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-44 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
53. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591.
54. The Supreme Court has made clear that the Forces Clause, along with other clauses, provides
Congress rule-writing authority regarding not just the most common example of military justice, the court
martial, but also regarding a more extraordinary wartime tribunal, the military commission. See Hamdan,
548 U.S. at 590-96 & n.23. However, the courts have treated the authority to convene military
commissions differently. In addition to reserving the question of the President’s independent authority to
convene military commissions (see id. at 590-93 & n.23), the Supreme Court has signaled that Congress’s
authority to grant the President power to convene military commissions flows mainly from the Declare
War and Army Clauses, because the adjudicative work done by commissions is incident to war and
commissions can adjudicate matters (from war crimes by enemy forces to quotidian crimes committed by
residents of territories occupied and administered by the U.S. military) not usually tried by court martial
or outside court martial jurisdiction. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590-92 & n.21, citing Ex parte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139-40 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring) (speculating that the Forces Clause provides
authority, but grounding it in Declare War and Army Clauses), and WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 831
(seeing authority for military commissions primarily in Declare War and Army Clauses, but noting that
the Define and Punish Clause can provide authority as well). See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28
(1942) (emphasizing authority in Define and Punish Clause, operating in connection with Forces Clause
rules).
55. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590-93 & n.23.
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government.
II. EXTERNAL GOVERNMENT
In quoting what it termed the Military Regulation Clause in the
military justice-related case United States v. Kebodeaux, the Supreme
Court without explanation edited Article I, section 8, clause 14 down to
Congress’s power to “make Rules for the . . . Regulation of the land and
naval Forces.”56 This Part takes up the Court’s implicit reservation of the
meaning of the omitted textual term “Government” and the implication of
a second power.
A word about the scope of our inquiry is in order. This analysis does
not seek to revisit separation of powers doctrine generally. It does not ask
whether Congress has, from any source, the power to limit the President
in national security matters through non-appropriations statutes. The
principle that statutes can bind the President is a precept of the
Youngstown-informed majority view of separation of powers, as it is of
the minority congressionalist separation of powers view that Congress
almost always wins. Only the minority presidentialist view – that the
winner is almost always the Commander in Chief – disputes the binding
power of statute generally. Congress’s ability to legislate hard law
regarding national security is well understood to flow from multiple
provisions of Article I, Section 8 (e.g., Define and Punish, Declare War,
Captures, Marque and Reprisal, Army, Navy, and Militia Clauses),57 the
Constitution’s structure and spirit, and from the gloss of constitutional
history. The Forces Clause may provide some authority too for militia
laws and authorizations for the use of military force (AUMFs) blessing
war-scale armed conflicts, but this analysis generally sets them aside
because they find their primary constitutional textual footing in the Militia
and Declare War Clauses, respectively.58
This Part explores the case for locating an External Government power
in the Forces Clause, capable of binding the President and the national
security apparatus via statutes that are not appropriations, militia laws,
nor war authorizations. This Part also explains why locating an External
Government power in the Clause is reasonable even if the Supreme Court
has not yet clearly and squarely articulated it, given the Constitution’s text
and structure (discussed in Part II.A), the Clause’s origins and counterauthoritarian purposes (discussed in II.B), and the constitutional history
of clear citation to the Clause in the three branches (discussed in II.C).
This body of constitutional evidence does not demand the conclusion that
56. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 394-95 (2013).
57. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10-13, 15-16.
58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, 15-16.
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there is an External Government power flowing from the Forces Clause,
but does suggest that a dual-power reading of the Clause is reasonable and
indeed attractive.
A. Text
Constitutional analysis begins with the text and structure of the
document.
Close reading of the document’s terminology and
organization indicates that the Forces Clause is distinctive and clearly
provides Congress with the power to bind “the land and naval Forces.” A
fair reading employing usual textual tools discerns dual powers in the
Clause, ones that this article theorizes as Internal Regulation and External
Government powers. Finally, it is reasonable to understand the ambit of
the phrase “the land and naval Forces” to extend beyond the military and
its justice system.
The interpretive principle that each part of the Constitution ought to be
presumed to be doing distinct work is well established, often articulated
as a rule or canon against surplusage.59 The Supreme Court has said that
this presumption applies to the Forces Clause.60 A similar intratextual
principle is that differences and similarities in language in the
Constitution should be presumed to be meaningful.61 These principles are
not ironclad rules but do inform reasonable inferences about the meaning
words may bear.
Here, when read alongside its siblings and other provisions of the
Constitution, and with the benefit of Founding Era dictionaries, the text
of the Forces Clause provides strong indications of the distinctiveness and
power of the lawmaking authorities it grants to Congress.
59. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible,
unless the words require it.”).
60. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549-50 (2012) (in discussion of
meaning of “regulate” in Commerce Clause, observing that if the Forces Clause is read to allow creation
of the military it would render the Army and Navy Clauses superfluous); cf., United States v. Stanley, 483
U.S. 669, 682, & n.6 (1987) (Forces Clause is a specific grant of power to Congress, but one that is
superfluous if one reads the Necessary and Proper Clause broadly enough to embrace its powers).
61. Intratextualist analysis is common, with proponents and critics. Compare Akhil Reed Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999) (argument for intratextualist reading) and Adrian
Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113
HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000) (critique endorsing clause-focused interpretation over an intratextualism that
assumes coherence and consistency in the Constitution), or William M. Treanor, Taking Text Too
Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 487 (2007) (critique emphasizing instead constitutional drafting history). See also Eugene Volokh,
Words That Have Different Meaning in Different Parts of the Constitution, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug.
7, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/08/07/words-that-have-different-meaning-in-different-partsof-the-constitution/ (assume consistent usage in Constitution subject to rebuttal by originalist contextual
evidence). This article’s analysis includes both intratextualist analysis and focus on the words, origins,
and constitutional history of a particular provision.
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The Clause is situated inside the primary fount of Congress’s
legislative authorities: Article I, Section 8. This section has, at its core, a
potent grant of national security powers. The Forces Clause – Clause 14
– is preceded by four sibling clauses also concerning the military and
foreign affairs. Clause 10 gives Congress the power to define and punish
“Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against
the Law of Nations”; Clause 11 allows Congress to declare war, grant
letters of marque and reprisal to privateers, and make rules regarding
captures; Clause 12 accords the national legislature the power to raise and
support armies; and Clause 13 says Congress may “provide and maintain
a Navy.”62 Immediately following Congress’s Clause 14 power to “make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”
are two other sibling military clauses, the dual Militia Clauses. Clauses
15 and 16 empower Congress to take the militia out of the hands of the
states for federal purposes, and to control their composition, training, and
operations when on federal duty.63 The Militia Clauses are followed by
another sibling military clause, Clause 17, which enables Congress to
purchase and control land from the states “for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.”64
Earlier powers in Section 8 are relevant to national security as well,
particularly the powers to tax and spend for “the common Defence and
general Welfare, borrow money, and regulate commerce.”65 Article I,
Section 8 concludes with a buttressing and gap-filling Necessary and
Proper Clause, enabling Congress to “make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers”
and all other powers of the federal government and its components.66
In short, the Forces Clause benefits from powerful placement and
association, and uses distinct terminology suggesting it is doing distinct
work in the document. Notably, whereas the Army and Navy Clauses
provide authority for creation and upkeep of national military forces, and
the Declare War and Marque and Reprisal Clauses allow Congress to
endorse the use of force, the Forces Clause uses different language –
language that is facially about the imposition of legal controls.
The specific terminology of the Clause clearly indicates this controlling
power may be executed through binding law.
The word “rule” in Samuel Johnson’s oft-cited 1755 dictionary67 is
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10-13.
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15-16.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1-3.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
67. Founding Era dictionaries cited in this article described as “the most useful and authoritative”
by Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, A Note on the Use of Dictionaries, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 419, 42325 (2013), include 2 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
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defined as “Government; empire; sway, supreme command.”68 The
Clause’s “Rules,” therefore, would be embodiments of state power,
obligating compliance.69 Elsewhere in the Constitution, the term has
similarly strong implications. For example, in the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clauses, “Rules and Limitations” reference provisions of the
Constitution itself – as binding a law as the republic can create.70 Each
house of Congress “may determine the Rules of its Proceedings” – a
legislative self-government power the Constitution does not qualify.71
Congress has the power to “establish a uniform rule of naturalization” –
power over immigration.72 The Captures Clause and Territory Clause
also use the word “Rules” to hand Congress legislative power, in the latter
instance regarding territories that in the republic’s early years
geographically dwarfed the states.73 Finally, note that the Seventh
Amendment, part of the Bill of Rights, references “the rules of the
common law.”74 Everything the Constitution’s text tells us, in sum,
clearly indicates that when Congress makes “Rules” pursuant to Clause
14 it is making hard law.
A common Founding Era dictionary defined “govern” as “to rule,
manage, look to, take care of.”75 “Government” as a noun elsewhere in
the Constitution, references the entire U.S. government, a public
institution with power to make law.76 In the Second Militia Clause,
(London, 1775); NATHAN BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (London, 25th
ed. 1783); THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (12th ed.
1760); SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1755); NOAH WEBSTER,
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828). See also, e.g., District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 646-48 (2008) (citing JOHNSON for term “bear arms”).
68. JOHNSON, supra note 67. See also 2 ASH, supra note 67 (Rule as noun defined as “An
inftrument [sic] by which lines are drawn or meafured [sic]; a precept, a canon; regularity, propriety of
behavior; government; sway, dominion”; as a verb, rule means “to manage, to govern,” and “To have
power, to have command”).
69. For use in another Founding Era context, see, e.g., Sims Lessee v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425,
430 (1799) (surveyor must follow “laws and rules of government”).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2-3 (the passage “Rules and Limitations” in clause 3 references
requirements for passage of a bill in clause 2).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The Captures Clause is universally
understood to concern captures of ships and goods, and is interpreted by many commentators and the
Supreme Court also to provide authority over captures of people. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 590-91 (2006) (Captures Clause listed seriatim among several Article I powers in case concerning
war prisoners); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch.) 110, 126 (1814). But see John Yoo,
Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1201-02 (2004) (Captures Clause concerns only
property).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Variation in capitalization ought not be regarded as significant.
Usage during the Founding Era was inconsistent and stylistic. See Denys P. Myers, History of the Printed
Archetype of the Constitution of the United States of America, 11 GREEN BAG 2d 217, 239 (2008).
75. BAILEY, supra note 67.
76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17-18; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; id. art. IV, § 4; id. amends. I, XII,
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“governing” indicates congressional power to control the militia when
called into federal duty.77
Distinguishing “Government” and “Regulation” is challenged by
overlapping definitions from the Founding Era. The 1783 edition of
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined “govern” as to “regulate, to
influence, to direct . . . to manage, to restrain,” while another dictionary
of the time defined “regulate” as “to set in order, to govern, direct, or
guide.”78
The Clause’s term “regulate” occurs at two other places in the
Constitution of 1789 in usages that signal lawmaking power: Congress
has the power to “regulate Commerce” and “regulate the Value” of
money.79 “Regulate” takes adjectival form in the Second Amendment,
which provides a right to bear arms in relation to “a well regulated
militia.”80 Meanwhile, a dictionary from near the end of the Founding
Era included as its second definition to “put in good order; as to regulate
the disordered state of a nation or its finances.”81 All of these intratextual
and dictionary references support the same original public meaning of the
Clause’s language: power to make “the land and naval Forces” orderly
and subject to legislated policies and standards.82
XXIII.
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
78. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, 7th ed. 1783);
BAILEY, supra note 67, quoted in Prakash, supra note 1, at 331 n.168. Professor Randy Barnett argues
that Congress did not adopt the understanding of “regulation” that includes “government.” Barnett
grounds this conclusion about the Commerce Clause’s term “regulate” in the Forces Clause’s terminology.
See Barnett, supra note 9, at 140. This is circular reasoning, however, if one looks to the Commerce
Clause to understand the Forces Clause.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 5. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)
(“regulate” in the Commerce Clause means “to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed”).
Professor Barnett’s review of the records of state constitutional ratification debates shows that, in
“stunning uniformity” the references suggest “regulation” meant “subject to a rule” or “make regular,”
but not the extinguishing of something pre-existing or otherwise created. Barnett, supra note 9, at 142.
Cf., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme
Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 972-73 (2003) (“regulation” in Article III, section 2 Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction context “connotes adjustment, but not radical change”). In the Commerce Clause context,
Barnett maintains that the original public meaning of “regulate” therefore would not sustain the federal
government extinguishing domestic commerce. Barnett, supra note 9, at 146. For our purposes, we can
observe that Barnett’s research suggests that the Forces Clause’s “Regulation” term was generally
understood by the people to mean disciplining the military but not extinguishing it – power Congress
instead had under the Army and Navy Clauses, the Army Appropriations Clause (a sub-clause of the Army
Clause), and the general Appropriations Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 13; id. art. I, § 9, cl.
7.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. II. For a modern originalist construction, see District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 597 (2008) (“the adjective ‘well-regulated’ implies nothing more than the imposition
of proper discipline and training,” citing Johnson’s dictionary of 1783).
81. WEBSTER, supra note 67.
82. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory
of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 751 (2009) (original public
meaning is leading originalist theory).
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Despite the overlapping meanings of “to regulate” and “to govern” in
Founding Era dictionaries, the Forces Clause may be fairly read to use
these words with regard to two enumerated powers, ones that we can –
consistent with the Court’s recent parsing – associate separately with the
Clause’s dual active words “Government” and “Regulation.”83
First, the Forces Clause’s language supports an inference of two
powers because clauses akin to the Forces Clause, that have multiple key
terms, also provide multiple powers. The two active words at the core of
Clause 14 are “Government and Regulation.” Clauses 12 and 13 of
Article I, Section 8 each have one word suggesting creation of military
forces, and another word about upkeep (“raise and support Armies” and
“provide and maintain a Navy”).84 The two active terms are doing
different things. Similarly, Professor Randy Barnett finds a parallel
between the Forces Clause and Article III, Section 2, which provides the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction “with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make.” Barnett sees in
“Exceptions” a power of prohibition lacking in “such Regulations,” in
part based on the same meaningful variation or rule-against-surplusage
rationale that inferentially distinguishes the Forces Clause’s
“Government and Regulation” terms.85
In contrast, other clauses that authorize a single action typically have a
single verb or other active word. The Declare War Clause is one example.
The Commerce Clause is another, and its verb – “regulate” – is present in
the Forces Clause, along with a second active word. Lacking reason to
dispute application of the presumption against surplusage, textually we
can reasonably infer two powers in the Forces Clause.
Additionally, the theory that the Forces Clause contains two powers is
buttressed by the language of its sibling in Article I, Section 8, Clause 16,
the Second Militia Clause.86 Clause 16 authorizes two kinds of federal
legislative work. One is “organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia,” to include making state appointment of officers and state training
of the militia subject “to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” The
other power in Clause 16 is “governing such Part of [the militia] as may
be employed in the Service of the United States.”87 The first passage
clearly gives Congress power over the Internal Regulation of the state
militias, while the second concerns something else and uses the same

83. In the Clause, “Govern and Regulate” are nominalizations – verbs made into nouns by their
usage, but still retaining an active implication in context.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-13.
85. Barnett, supra note 9, at 140. Among scholars, Barnett gets the closest to associating the two
distinct powers separately with the words Government and Regulation.
86. Accord Prakash, supra note 1, at 331 n.171 (clauses provide “much the same power”).
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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“govern” terminology found in Clause 14 in connection with the militia
being “employed” by the federal government. It is easy, therefore, to infer
that this second part of the Second Militia Clause is about controlling
operations of the militia beyond the gates of the fort. It is also easy to see
resonance with the linguistic structure of the Forces Clause. Clauses 14
and 16 textually read not just as parallel military clauses but as
symmetrical fraternal siblings, providing both Internal Regulation and
External Government powers over different parts of the military
establishment. Clause 14 allows congressional management of the
standing federal “land and naval Forces” addressed in predecessor
Clauses 10 through 13, while Clause 16 allows congressional
management of the federalized militia addressed in Clauses 15 and 16.
Finally, it is reasonable to read the Forces Clause’s text to extend
beyond military justice and discipline, and indeed, beyond the uniformed
military.88
The Forces Clause uses the expansive language of making “Rules” for
“Government and Regulation” in place of specific mention of military
justice. The Clause also does not include any of the terminology found
elsewhere in the Constitution that concerns adjudications: court, crimes,
trial, prosecution, testimony, punishment, etc.89 The Clause’s general
phrasing likewise reaches beyond the more specific terms in the Second
Militia Clause of “organizing, arming, and disciplining.”90
88. The Fifth Amendment has language similar to the Forces Clause, with potential intratextual
implications. The notion that the Forces Clause’s authority over “the land and naval Forces” is largely
parallel to, rather than overlapping, with the authority over the militia discussed in the Militia Clauses in
Article I, section 8 is supported by the interpretive rule that every provision is doing distinct work, by the
different language in the clauses, and by the language of the Fifth Amendment, which excepts from its
general grand jury requirement “cases arising in the land or naval forces, or the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. No separate reference to the militia
would be necessary if the militia were understood by the Framers to be part of the land and naval Forces.
On the other hand, note that the Fifth Amendment’s exception to the grand jury requirement
for “cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia” potentially could suggest that “land and
naval Forces” in the Forces Clause means only the military, because of the good reasons not to expand
military justice and its lack of grand juries and other defendant protections beyond the military. However,
UCMJ jurisdiction has long included the Coast Guard, an entity beyond “Armies” and “a Navy.”
Additionally, military jurisdiction is not exclusive – current and former service members, (then and now)
in many cases face criminal liability in civilian courts in which the protections of the Bill of Rights apply
in full. Third, as noted in Part I, from the first American Articles of War to the modern UCMJ, some nonmilitary personnel closely associated with the armed forces have been subject to military jurisdiction. A
plausible interpretation is that the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury carve-out for “cases arising in the land
and naval forces” has instead meant (and means) cases prosecuted through the military justice system, not
any case involving members of “the land and naval Forces” as more fully understood in the Forces Clause.
89. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (liability for “Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment”
despite impeachment); id. art. III (references in article concerning the judiciary); id. amend. V (grand
juries with exception for cases arising in the “land or naval forces”; criminal cases); id. amend. VII (trial
by jury); and id. amend. VIII (cruel and unusual punishments).
90. The Second Militia Clause’s term “disciplining” was described by one of its drafters to mean
“penalties, and every thing necessary for enforcing penalties.” That suggests a military justice meaning
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Additionally, the words “land and naval Forces” are facially broader
than the “Armies” and “a Navy” referenced in Clause 14’s immediate
sibling clauses. Notably, in its modern doctrine the Supreme Court
has said that the “natural meaning” of “the land and naval Forces” is
the uniformed military – but has done so in its military justice
jurisprudence, where there are good policy reasons to limit military
penal authority and the question of the Clause’s scope beyond military
justice is not presented.91 One can agree with the Court that civilian
spouses and children of military personnel should not be subject to
court martial for quotidian crimes and still read the Clause’s text more
comprehensively for congressional control over the larger national
security apparatus. The Clause could reasonably be read to give
Congress legislative power over other “land and naval Forces”:
privateers granted letters of Marque and Reprisal, a coast guard
auxiliary to the Navy, and the irregular forces such as spies and
saboteurs who had operated covertly in connection with the Army and
Navy regulars since the War of Independence.92 Other people
professionally assisting the Army and Navy sensibly could be subject
to Congress’s “Rules,” such as civilian personnel employed in
supporting (and not merely related to) current and former military
personnel – either directly as federal employees or as contractors.93 Of
course, all of these categories of land and naval forces outside the
regular uniformed military could be subject to Congress’s
management under other Clauses, as well (e.g., the Coast Guard under
the Commerce Clause, and all under the Necessary and Proper Clause).
But that does not exclude them from the ambit of the Forces Clause,
that may not have meant as much as the Forces Clause’s term “Regulation” might embrace. See 5
JONATHAN ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 464-65; 2 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 385; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, 16. If
the drafters meant that the Forces Clause would involve only military justice and discipline, it is
reasonable to think they simply would have repeated this term from the Second Militia Clause.
91. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 (1957). But see Kinsella v. United States ex rel.
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960) (suggesting potential broader scope).
92. See Kent, supra note 3, at 915-16 & nn.330-32 (“relatively uncontroversial” that the Forces
Clause could operate regarding privateers authorized to fight for the United States under the Marque and
Reprisal Clause, and their captures, governed under the Captures Clause).
The First Congress federalized colonial lighthouses and authorized a fleet of 10 cutters to
enforce tariff laws – the precursors of the modern Coast Guard. See Historian’s Office, U.S. COAST
GUARD, http://www.history.uscg.mil/./history/articles/h_USCGhistory.asp (last updated Dec. 21, 2016).
93. One might also add the militia, when on federal duty, in a supporting role to legislation enacted
pursuant to the Militia Clauses. As part of its work via the Militia Clauses to make the militia standardized
and interoperable with the active component, Congress could subject the militia to “Rules” written for the
active force pursuant to Forces Clause. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 343-44 (1990)
(discussing militia laws and foundation in Clauses 14 and 16).
An alternative or additional source of regulatory power over the personnel beyond those the
army and navy is the Necessary and Proper Clause. But that regulation is reasonably accommodated here,
and, therefore, reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause is necessary.
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as well, nor does that mean that the Forces Clause is not the strongest
constitutional footing for related statutory “Rules.”
In short, the words and structural placement of the Forces Clause
provide strong signals and support reasonable inferences as to its original
meaning. The document’s words set parameters for the meaning the
Clause can bear.
Nevertheless, the text is not sufficient for a full understanding.
Originalist interpretation is improved by contextual analysis, to include
evidence bearing on historical context, purposes, drafting history, and
Founding Era practice.94 All inform our sense of how the Framers and
the public would have understood the Clause. Having established that the
Constitution’s text reasonably suggests both Internal Regulation and
External Government powers based in the Clause, and that the Clause
provides legislative authority beyond the uniformed military and its
justice system, we turn to the Clause’s origins.
B. Origins
The Land and Naval Forces Clause reflects the republic’s commitment
to the prevention of tyranny through civilian control of the military, the
rule of law, separation of powers, and checks and balances.95 Among the
organs of government, military forces and especially standing forces
under the command of a single leader present inherent authoritarian risk.
A tyrannical leader imperils the liberty of the people and their capacity
for self-government, and also the rights of the People who serve in the
armed forces. The powers provided by the Forces Clause to the elected
representatives of the People are, therefore, a limitation on executive
power and a check against military dictatorship, reflecting a separation
and sharing of military powers in the Constitution that in England were
first held exclusively by the crown.
This Part reviews the origins of the constitutional text analyzed in Part
II.A. This discussion primarily focuses on the emergence of an External
Government power associated with the Forces Clause. Because the
External Government and the more well-established Internal Regulation
94. “[Q]uestions about the locus of authority over national security and the use of the armed forces
should start not from ‘clause-bound interpretation’ of particular constitutional provisions, but from an
overall understanding of the Constitution of foreign affairs. Individual clauses must be read in light of
the overall constitutional structure” and purpose. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY
OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 154 (2002).
95. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 613-14 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The
doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency
but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but by means of the
inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to
save the people from autocracy.”)).
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understandings are associated with the same Clause, however, this
analysis necessarily references them both in tracing its origins. This
section of Part II also identifies key questions about the Clause’s meaning
that will be explored through review of the constitutional record in Part
III.C below, and Parts IV and V that follow.
1. British and American Origins
The Federalist and other Founding Era documents are replete with
references to ancient Greece and Rome96 and their ultimate loss of
liberty.97 Equal to the Framers’ fear of foreign threats was their concern
about tyranny at the federal level, or at the state level because of a weak
union (such as under the Articles of Confederation) that would lead to
constant strife among the states.98 Benjamin Franklin’s famous
observation that the Constitutional Convention had yielded “a republic, if
you can keep it” spoke to the Framers’ hopes and fears.99
The English experience loomed large. The Framers were disturbed by
competition in England between crown and parliament regarding control
over the military. In English antiquity, the king held virtually all relevant
powers: to raise military forces, fund them through taxes, discipline them,
command them in battle, and issue edicts with the force of law. Authority
migrated to Parliament in response to abuses of authority, foreign military
misadventures, and growing republican sentiment, evolving to a condition
of shared power.100
The Magna Carta of 1215 established in principle Parliament’s
supremacy.101 Four centuries later, the Petition of Right of 1628 objected
to military exercises infringing on the rights of the people in language
later echoed in the Declaration of Independence of the American
colonies.102 The Parliament acquired independent authority to raise
armies, and the legislature’s own forces fought and defeated those of the
96. Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists wrote under Roman pseudonyms.
97. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 18 (James Madison & Alexander Hamilton) (examples of weak
ancient confederations); THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison) (“the liberties of Rome proved the
final victim to her military triumphs”). See also CARL J. RICHARD, GREEKS AND ROMANS BEARING
GIFTS: HOW THE ANCIENTS INSPIRED THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2008).
98. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison) (danger of inter-state conflict); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton) (war among states would be frequent and violent); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton) (constant state or threat of war imperils liberty).
99. See 3 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 85.
100. For survey of English constitutional history regarding the domestic role of the military, see
BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 15-19.
101. See English Translation of Magna Carta, para. 61, BRITISH LIBRARY, bl.uk/magnacarta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation.
102. See Eng. Petition of Right, art. VI (1628), http:// www.constitution.org/eng/petright.txt; THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 11-13 (U.S. 1776).
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king in the English Civil War of the 1640s. After restoration of the crown
in 1660, concern about military abuses informed the English Bill of
Rights’ ban in 1688 on a peacetime standing army without the consent of
Parliament.103 The Bill of Rights more generally subordinated the
crown’s use of the sword to the laws of Parliament, which by the purse
by the Seventeenth Century.104 By the time of the American Revolution,
the crown retained primary authority mainly over diplomacy, and the
ability to direct the armed forces abroad. At home, law enforcement and
military matters were generally separated.105
Expanding parliamentary control over the law and over the armed
forces included greater legislative regulation of military justice and
discipline. The longstanding practice from the 1200s to 1600s had been
for the king to issue articles of war specific to a particular campaign.
These rules concerned military justice and the conduct of the campaign,
and included rules on the treatment of prisoners and non-combatants.
These articles typically expired at the end of the war or campaign.
Reflecting the defaults of civilian authority and no standing army, the
common law and civil courts otherwise had jurisdiction over offenses by
military personnel.106 In response to crises of the 1600s, including brutal
military justice against soldiers and civilians during the English Civil
War, Parliament after the Bill of Rights had the ability to control military
justice. Parliament generally left most crimes by soldiers in peacetime to
the civil courts, but the Mutiny Acts allowed for court martial for mutiny
and sedition.107 This decision by Parliament was facilitated by grudging
recognition that Britain needed a standing army in peacetime, and by
agreement that the army needed to be strictly disciplined (to include
punishment for political disorder: mutiny and other challenges to civil and
military authorities). The record in the 1600s and 1700s shows an
iterative series of moves by Parliament and the crown to adjust the scope
of crimes punishable by military justice, the severity of punishments, and
the allocation of shared power over the military. Parliament also provided
implicit and explicit legislative sanction for the crown to control military
justice and discipline abroad.108
“Abroad” included the American colonies, where objections to British
Army abuses were a catalyst of independence. The colonists complained
103. See Eng. Bill of Rights, § 6 (1689), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp.
104. See id. §§ 4, 6; WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND
THE POWER OF THE PURSE 11-17 (1994).
105. See BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 15-19.
106. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 760-62 (1996) (citing WINTHROP, supra note 21,
at 17-18); 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 413 (1765); MATTHEW HALE,
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 25-27 (1713).
107. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 762-64.
108. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 764-76; WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 18-21.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/1

28

Rudesill: The Land and Naval Forces Clause

2018]

THE LAND AND NAVAL FORCES CLAUSE

419

of general warrants and other writs that authorized invasive searches, and
of harsh military justice imposed on colonial militia and civilians.109 The
Declaration of Independence criticized the King for making “the military
Independent of and superior to the Civil Power.”110 The colonists
assailed, in essence, executive elevation of the military – and indeed, a
standing army in peacetime – over American civil authority.
The language of the Forces Clause is evident in the new nation’s
earliest legal authorities. To counter the potential for tyranny, they
provided for legislative control of the military’s operations, discipline,
and commanders.
On June 14, 1775, the Continental Congress called for a military force
from several colonies to be raised, and stipulated an enlistment oath
pledging soldiers “to conform, in all instances, to such rules and
regulations, as are, or shall be, established for the government of the
army” (emphasis added, here and hereafter).111 The Continental Congress
then appointed a committee of five, including George Washington, to
draft “Rules and regulations for the government of the army” – American
Articles of War, which were enacted later that month.112 Three days later,
on June 17, Congress commissioned Washington as General and
“Commander in chief [of] the army of the United Colonies,” and required
him to “regulate [his] conduct in every respect by the rules and disciplines
of war . . . and punctually to observe and follow such orders and
directions” from the Congress or a committee thereof.113 The Continental
Congress’s approach to Washington’s service as Commander in Chief
during the War of Independence would range from micromanagement
(with congressional delegations at times in the field issuing directives) to
grants of expansive power.114 Washington carried his congressional
109. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 Ind. L.J. 979, 989-993, 1002 n.131 (2011).
110. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); for general discussion see BANKS &
DYCUS, supra note 13, at 5.
111. 2 JOUR. CONT. CONG. 90 (1775) (emphasis added, here and hereinafter).
112. 2 id. at 89-90. These first Articles of War were enacted on June 30, 1775. Id. at III.
113. 2 id. at 96.
114. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY: GEORGE WASHINGTON 93 (2004) (congressional
delegations at the front, giving Gen. Washington orders). In winter and spring 1776-77, while driven
from the national capital in Philadelphia, Washington was invested by Congress “with full, ample, and
complete” powers to raise and equip the national army; the takings power; and power “to arrest and
confine persons who refuse to take the continental currency, or are otherwise disaffected to the American
cause . . . .” 6 J. CONT. CONG. 1045-46 (Dec. 27, 1776). Some commentators then and since have
characterized this as Washington’s “dictatorship.” See e.g., Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia
Ratifying Convention, June 5, 1788, reprinted in PATRICK HENRY, III PATRICK HENRY 485; Virginia
Convention Debates, June 9, 1788, IX DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 1058 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990); Brian Logan Beirne, George
vs. George vs. George: The Commander-in-Chief Power, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 285 (2008).
Dictatorship was a time-limited power that the republican Roman Senate would, in a moment of peril,
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commission in his pocket throughout the war, took considerable time
communicating with the Continental Congress, and carefully followed its
guidance.115
In June 1776, the Continental Congress appointed John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, and three others to a “committee on [British] spies”
and directed them to revise the Articles of War of the prior year.116 Like
the 1775 code, the amended Articles contained “rules and regulations”
for the army.117 The Articles did not simply regulate the military
internally and reorganize the Articles, but via a resolution added at the
end also concerned detainees: court martial and potential capital
punishment for espionage.118 These Articles of War were with some
adjustments based on British rules, and were amended and re-affirmed
under the new nation’s constitutions – the first of which was the Articles
of Confederation.119
2. First Iteration: The Clause in the Articles of Confederation
Article IX of the 1778 Articles of Confederation was a long and
disorderly compilation of enumerated powers is analogous to Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, and contained the Forces Clause’s first
iteration. Article IX granted the Confederation Congress “the sole and
exclusive right and power of . . . making rules for the government and

confer for a short period on a single leader, most famously Cincinnatus. Washington’s style of leadership,
retirement from command of the Continental Army, and later retirement from the presidency drew
comparisons at the time to the self-restrained Roman general and farmer. See RON CHERNOW,
WASHINGTON: A LIFE 444, 457 (2010).
115. See BARRON, supra note 9, at 6-17; CHERNOW, supra note 114, at 456 (Washington parted
with the commission only when surrendering it to the Continental Congress at the end of the war); Barron
& Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 774-80.
116. WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 22 (directive to the committee). See also 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 224-25 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1856) http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a3_3_1-2s9.html (reporting on June 5, 1776, Continental
Congress Committee on Spies resolution that all persons in the colonies owe allegiance and are guilty of
treason if levying war against the colonies or adhering to the British crown, and urging colonial
legislatures to pass laws for their punishment).
117. See Am. Art. of War of 1775, art. I; Am. Art. of War of 1776, § I, art. 1, reprinted in
WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 953, 961.
118. The resolution was passed Aug. 21, 1776 (and ordered printed after the revised Articles
approved the prior day), and evolved over time as discussed in WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 765-71. See
also Am. Art. of War of 1775, art. XXVIII (court martial of soldiers giving intelligence to the enemy);
and Am. Art. of War of 1776, § XIII, art. 19 (court martial and potential capital punishment for
“Whosoever” gives “intelligence to the enemy”), reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 955, 967.
119. See WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 17-23. See also United States v. Lee, 4 C.M.R. 185 (A.B.R.
1952). The Articles of War were amended under the Articles of Confederation, most extensively in 1786.
See WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 972-75 (reprinted 1786 amendments to the Articles regarding military
justice). For re-enactment of the Articles by the First Congress under the Constitution, see Act of Sept.
29, 1789, supra note 21.
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regulation of . . . land and naval forces, and directing their operations.”120
The Constitution’s Army, Navy, and Militia Clauses had ancestors in
the Articles of Confederation, as well. The Navy Clause was most
similar: Congress, under the Articles, could “build and equip a navy” for
the nation.121 But ground forces were handled differently. Congress
could merely “agree upon the number of land forces, and . . . make
requisitions from each state for its quota” of army regulars, who would
proceed to locations as directed by Congress pursuant to two Marching
Clauses.122 State legislatures shared officer appointment power with
Congress,123 but the legislatures alone would “raise the men, and clothe,
arm, and equip them, in a soldier-like manner, at the expense of the united
states,”124 which was dependent on the states for money.125 Reflecting
profound fear of tyranny, the Articles of Confederation had no
independent Executive. Instead, the Articles allowed Congress to appoint
various subordinate officials, including “commanders in chief” to lead the
armed forces.126 The Articles provided little legal basis for a standing
national army in peacetime.127 And indeed, the Confederation Congress
had trouble getting funding from the states for the armed forces, and
rejected Washington’s recommendation of creation of a small standing
national army to secure the frontier in cooperation with state militia.128
The Articles envisioned “a firm league of friendship” of sovereign, free,
and independent states that would bear the primary burden for the
confederation’s defense.129 The Articles accordingly bound the states to
“always keep up a well regulated and discipline militia, sufficiently armed
and accounted” with ready stores.130 With permission of Congress, the
120. ART. OF CONFED. OF 1781, Art. IX. Because the Articles are punctuated so inconsistently and
not well organized, one can reasonably wonder how much language one should regard as part of the
Articles’ version of the Forces Clause. In expanding order, one could include in the Clause just the
“government and regulation” passage; also the “directing their operations” passage; or add language
before a semicolon but after a dividing dash (“-“) on officer appointment and commissioning. The best
approach is to exclude officer appointment, recognizing that the Articles often divide clauses with
semicolons. For similar construction of the Clause, see, e.g., BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 28. Note
also that the Articles make three references to Congress’s power to direct forces. In addition to the Forces
Clause, at two other places Article IX states that land forces provided by the states “shall march to the
place appointed, and within the time agreed on” by Congress.
121. ART. OF CONFED. OF 1781, art. IX.
122. Id.
123. Id. arts. VII, IX.
124. Id. art. VI.
125. Id. art. VIII (“a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states” as directed by
Congress, under the “authority and direction of the legislatures”).
126. Id. art. IX.
127. Id.
128. BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 29.
129. ART. OF CONFED. of 1781, art. II, III.
130. Id. art. VI.
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states could have their own warships and armies in times of peace and
independently wage war.131
What did the Forces Clause mean in the Articles?
Intratextual and intertextual analysis shows that the Articles of
Confederation used the term “regulate” and its variations in a manner akin
to the Constitution, equally suggestive of lawmaking power. (The term
“government” appeared only in the Forces Clause in the Articles). The
Confederation Congress could regulate currency, post offices, and trade
with Native Americans.132
Congress could also regulate statecommissioned vessels of war and state-issued letters of marque and
reprisal after a war declaration by Congress.133 “Rules” established what
“shall be legal” in the capture and disposition of adversary vessels and
their contents.134
The powers conferred by the Forces Clause and the larger power to
decide to go to war were neither laterally separated nor shared powers at
the national level under the Articles of Confederation, because there was
no separate executive.135 But they were differentiated. This was done
mechanistically through a supermajoritarian voting threshold. The Forces
Clause, like most other legislative powers, could be exercised by simple
majority vote of the states in Congress, with each state having one vote.
In contrast, nine of the thirteen states had to vote for Congress to exercise
the Articles’ powers to declare or “engage in a war,” in addition to the
related matters of marque and reprisal, raising national military forces,
appointing commanders in chief, approving treaties and alliances, and
appropriating funds.136
131. Id. arts. VI, IX. Art. VI provided permission in the form of a general ban on states having
warships and regular land forces in peace or engaging in war, with an exception for congressional
authorization. A further exception is that states could engage in war if “actually invaded by enemies” or
if made aware of imminent attack by Native Americans “and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of
a delay till the united states in Congress assembled, can be consulted.” States could also commission
warships and grant letters of marque and reprisal without a congressional war declaration, “unless such
state be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so
long as the danger shall continue, or until the united states in Congress assembled shall determine
otherwise.” Similarly, the Articles allowed Congress to give the states permission to engage in
international diplomacy; enter into international alliances and treaties; and, enter into “any treaty,
confederation, or alliance . . . between them.”
132. Id. arts. IX, VI.
133. Id. art. VI.
134. Id. art. IX.
135. In contrast, power over regulars was shared with the states under the Articles, due to the
dependence of the national government on troops, equipage, and money from the states, and the
national/state shared authority over appointment of army officers. In another contrast with the
Constitution, under the Articles the national government had no textual power over the militia. The
Articles’ sole reference was its Article VI requirement for the states to maintain militia and keep them
ready.
136. ART. OF CONFED. OF 1781, art. IX. The nine-state supermajority threshold would not have
been adjusted if the confederation had grown to fourteen or more states with the accession of Canada to
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Internal Regulation and External Government powers and the Forces
Clause’s counter-authoritarian purposes were evident. As noted, the
Confederation Congress via amendment re-enacted the Continental
Congress’s Articles of War and controlled military operations.137 The
Articles’ Forces Clause gave Congress complete control of these national
forces, including the power of “directing their operations.”138 Two
Marching Clauses stipulated that the Congress could command stateraised forces to “march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed
on” by Congress.139 Powers under the Forces Clause and the two
Marching Clauses could be delegated to committee.140 As implemented
during the War of Independence, this arrangement (and Washington’s
famous self-restraint)141 ably functioned in counter-authoritarian fashion:
the country did not succumb to authoritarian rule or revert to monarchy.
But Washington, other commanders, and many other observers were
frustrated by the often slow, questionable, and cumbersome commandby-legislative-committee.142
3. Second Iteration: The Clause in the Constitution143
a. Transition from Articles of Confederation to Federal Constitution
The Articles’ command structure was one of its several national
security deficits.144 Congress could not compel the states to provide
the Articles, or admission of other states with the permission of nine states. Id. art. XI. It was one of the
Articles’ many defects that, due to the specification of nine states, if the confederation grew larger than
eighteen states new states could be admitted even if a majority of states were opposed.
137. See supra note 119 (1786 amendments to Am. Art. of War of 1776); Gregory E. Maggs, A
Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for Determining the Original Meaning of the
Constitution, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397, 404-05 (2017) (examples of Confederation Congress
management of military and diplomatic matters, including direction of forces to protect against Native
Americans).
138. Id. art. IX.
139. Id.
140. Id. art. X.
141. Washington famously squelched discussion among his officers of mutiny against Congress,
resisted calls for him to become king, and surrendered his commission and the presidency voluntarily.
One biographer puts it well: “His instincts were the antithesis of a demagogue’s: he feared his own
influence and agonized over exerting too much power.” He labored to set precedents of restraint.
CHERNOW, supra note 114, at 442, 434-36, 455-56.
142. See BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 30.
143. A short-lived third iteration of the Clause was its inclusion in the Confederate States of
America’s 1861 Constitution, modeled on the U.S. Constitution. The Clause appeared there in identical
location and form (capitalization varied). See CONST. OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, art. I,
§ 8, cl. 14.
144. In addition to the pieces on national security discussed in footnotes below, see THE
FEDERALIST NOS. 3-5 (John Jay), 6-7 (Alexander Hamilton). For arguments generally by the
Constitution’s advocates against the Articles and for the revised union, see THE FEDERALIST NOS. 15-17
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troops or money for a national military. The national government could
not command the largest military forces: the state militias. There were
threats to the union and threats of disunion: the British, French, and
Spanish empires, in addition to Native American tribes, threatened from
the outside, and might be emboldened by American military weakness
and play separately armed states off against one another. Hamilton
warned in Federalist No. 8 that the country under the Articles faced
disunion, which risked large standing state armies and “War between the
States.”145 These would engender a continual state of fear and alarm,
empowering state executives and their militaries and inevitably
undermine democracy and the rights of the People.146 Even so, concern
about a tyrannous national government continued to run deep. The
Framers’ solution was a “large republic,” with a federal government
strong enough to protect the country’s security and obviate the need for
militarized states, and sufficiently limited to protect liberty.147 The
Constitution mitigated risks associated with a national chief executive and
a national army via internal structural limits on federal powers (via
separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism) and
potentially enforceable legal limits (memorialized during the Founding
Era in the Bill of Right’s protection of the rights of the people and the
states).148
The Forces Clause was carried forward into the Constitution by way of
an amendment to the original draft of the Committee of Detail, without

(Alexander Hamilton), 18-20 (James Madison & Alexander Hamilton), 21-22 (Alexander Hamilton).
145. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton).
146. See id.:
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent
love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and
property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger,
will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions
which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length
become willing to run the risk of being less free.
In the context of public skepticism of standing armies, Hamilton smartly argued in No. 8 against the state
standing armies that would result from disunion. Knowing that a national army could be created under
the Constitution, he also argued that a national army would not necessarily be required. Instead, the union
could primarily rely on its national navy and federalizable state militia, and the military efficiencies of a
union’s scale and distance from Europe. Ultimately, Hamilton argued that, the country would need a net
smaller military as a union than in dis-union. In other essays, he made the case for a national government
able to raise a national army and direct state militias. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 24-29 (Alexander
Hamilton).
147. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison) (regarding a large republic).
148. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny”). For scholarly discussion
of the internal and external limits, see AMAR, supra note 9; BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 7; see
generally PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE (2009); U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
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comment or debate.149 Or, at least most of the Clause survived: the phrase
“directing [military] operations” was omitted. This “directing” language
reappeared nowhere else in the new document. Two proposals that would
have given it to the Constitution’s new Executive were defeated.150 Other
changes included deletion of the Articles’ Marching Clauses, which also
had given Congress directive power.151 Meanwhile, a commander in
chief was no longer one or more appointees of the Congress, but rather an
identity of the new President.152 Congress could create peacetime forces
including a Navy and Armies raised directly from the people.153 Congress
could pay for them itself via federal taxes and appropriations, but would
have to act affirmatively every two years to fund the Army or it would
disappear.154 Congress now had the power of “calling forth the Militia,”
of “governing” it on federal duty, and of “organizing, arming, and
disciplining” it.155
b. Implications Generally
What were the implications for the Forces Clause in the Constitution?
First, the Clause, along with new congressional powers to create and
fund regular federal forces and put state militias on federal duty,
continued to reflect the counter-authoritarian ethos of the Founding Era,
despite creation of the Executive. These powers were not handed to this
new Executive, nor to states that the Framers worried could lose their
“republican form of government.”156 The Forces Clause stayed with
Congress.
If anything, the Clause now mattered more. The Constitution’s new
149. See 5 ELLIOTT, supra note 90, at 443; 2 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 330 (the Clause “was
added from the existing Articles of Confederation”); Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note
11, at 786.
150. These were the New Jersey Plan (a multi-member Executive could “direct all military
operations”) and Hamilton’s plan (a “supreme Executive authority” would “have the direction of war
when authorized or begun”). For discussion, see Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 13,
at 787-88.
151. The other textual change to the Clause – different capitalization – is unimportant. See Myers,
supra note 74.
152. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. The usual original understanding and
practical reality is that the military is part of the Executive Branch. Another view is that the military is a
sort of fourth branch under the Constitution, a national rather than Executive agency. See Geoffrey S.
Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, The Political Balance of Power Over the Military: Rethinking the Relationship
Between the Armed Forces, the President, and Congress, 44 HOU. L. REV. 553 (2007).
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-13.
154. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
155. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15-16.
156. The First Militia Clause allowed the federal government to take the militia away from a state
that had lost its “republican form of government” or was on its way. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (Second
Militia Clause); see also id. art. IV, § 4 (Guarantee Clause).
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Executive – a head of state chosen nationally, with the power to veto
Congress’s acts and the authority to command a national military that the
national government could raise and fund on its own157 – heightened
concern about tyranny at the national level.158 That in turn enhanced the
importance of the checking power provided by the Forces Clause and its
Article I siblings.
Second, Congress’s new authority over the militia buttressed the
significance of work done pursuant to the Forces Clause. Regulation of
militia discipline pursuant to the Second Militia Clause would happen in
the context of Congress’s regulation of national regulars under the Forces
Clause. These powers could be synergistic.159 Congress now had
independent authority to craft an interoperable, standardized American
military, composed of both regular and reserve components.
Third, the Internal Regulation power over military justice and
discipline clearly survived the Clause’s transfer to the new Constitution.
There are no indications in the Founding record that the power lapsed, or
now stemmed from any other clause.
However, few signals about the scope (much less definitions) of the
terms “Government,” “Regulation,” and “land and naval Forces” were
provided beyond the intratextual clues in other provisions of the
document.
c. Implications: External Government Power
The new Constitution also did not plainly state its implications for the
External Government power. Did the power survive, and if so, in what
form? While partly circumstantial and inevitably incomplete, overall the
Founding Era evidence is consistent with a reading of the Forces Clause
that conveys to Congress an External Government power.
To begin, what should we make of removal of the Forces Clause’s
prescriptive power in the Articles of Confederation of “directing
operations,” the deletion of the other Marching Clauses, and the creation
157. Professors Barron and Lederman note that the method of choosing the President and the
presentment requirement enhanced the power of the President and reduced the risk of legislative micromanagement. See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 791-92. Making it harder to
govern and regulate, in the face of an independent Commander in Chief, made such work the Congress
did accomplish by statute all the more important.
158. See, e.g., “An Old Whig,” Essay V, PHIL. INDEP. GAZETTER (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in 3 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 17, 37-38 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (Constitution’s new President has
dangerous powers, having such an elected king risks tyranny).
159. Congress’s use of this synergistic power facilitated the evolution of the U.S. military into a
“joint force” of interoperate active services and reserve components. The U.S. Army, for its part,
conceives itself as a “total force” – a team of active, reserve, and National Guard (organized militia)
personnel. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, DIR. 2012-08, ARMY TOTAL FORCE POLICY 1 (Sept. 2012).
Today’s “total force” sees the Guard deploy abroad on a regular basis.
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of a new President with the identity of Commander in Chief?
Presidentialist scholars argue that the result was a complete transfer of the
power of military direction to the President, in preclusive form: Congress
could not limit it by statute.160 Professors Barron and Lederman respond
persuasively that the evidence supports no consensus about whether
Congress or the President would have “direction” power.161 As noted, the
Constitutional Convention considered and rejected two plans that would
have given it explicitly to the Executive. Instead, the Framers dropped
“direction” from the document entirely.162 Deletion of the Marching
Clauses supports no clear inference: their omission flowed from
replacement of state power to raise armies with federal power.163
Hamilton in Federalist No. 69 mentioned a “direction” power residing
with the President. However, Hamilton was likely referencing mainly the
Commander in Chief’s position at the top of the military chain of
command, for this reason: Hamilton also wrote that such direction was
subject to law the same as were governors regarding state military forces
under several state constitutions.164 Madison similarly was at best
equivocal, and if anything leaned toward the Forces Clause. In his
Constitutional Convention notes (in one of the scant mentions of the
Commander in Chief Clause there), Madison wrote that “direction” was
to be an “executive function.”165 Yet after the Clause was added and the
entire document completed, Madison told the Virginia ratifying
convention that Congress had “the direction and regulation of the land
and naval forces.”166 Note Madison’s substitution of the word “direction”
for the textual term “Government” in his quotation of the Forces Clause.

160. See Richard Hartzman, Congressional Control of the Military in a Multilateral Context: A
Constitutional Analysis of Congress’s Power to Restrict the President’s Authority to Place United States
Armed Forces Under Foreign Commanders in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 162 MIL. L.
REV. 50, 72-76 (1999); Oversight Legislation: Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 100th
Cong. 179-81 (1987) (written response to question for the record to Charles Cooper, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice), cited in Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra
note 11, at 788 n.323.
161. See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 787-89.
162. These were the New Jersey Plan (a multi-member Executive could “direct all military
operations”) and Hamilton’s plan (a “supreme Executive authority” would “have the direction of war
when authorized or begun”). See 1 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 242, 244, 292.
163. Compare ART. OF CONFED. of 1781 art. IX, with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
164. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (the President had “nothing more than the
supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces” but this power was no greater than
found in one of several state constitutions that stipulated that military direction was subordinate to the law
of the land).
165. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 319.
166. See 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1282
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds. 1993). “The record of the Virginia ratification debates is
the only one in which are preserved significant remarks of the ratifiers concerning the provisions of the
Constitution relating to the armed forces.” See Henderson, supra note 20, at 301.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

37

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1

428

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

Madison’s usage naturally supports association of “Government” with a
continued legislative congressional power over operations – and indeed
continuation of a congressional prescriptive power. Taken together, the
evidence from Hamilton and Madison suggests that Congress, through its
Forces Clause authority, could at the least limit operations ordered by the
President.
Professor Akhil Amar sees this view of the External Government
power as reasonable, and in his originalist work goes a step farther. He
adds that statutes “proscribing certain uses of the military may be easier
to justify than laws prescribing highly specific uses of armed forces in
certain tactical situations” – general rules over “the particulars of actual
battle command.”167 Professors Barron and Lederman disagree, seeing
such distinctions as conveniently attractive but unsupported by the
originalist evidence and dodging the question of whether Congress can
govern all land and naval forces operations, or if some irreducible
minimum of Commander in Chief power remains.168 An alternative view
postulated by Professor Amar has been developed by Professor Prakash:
concurrent authority for the President and Congress over military actions,
but Congress wins if they disagree. The President can act without
statutory authorization in times of peril, but must observe legislation
enacted pursuant to the Forces Clause that not only limits but also
commands the Commander in Chief and military.169 The Prakash study,
however, relies in significant part on Founding Era statutes that textually
are not directive but rather permissive.170
167. See AMAR, supra note 9, at 188 (original emphasis omitted).
168. See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 750-60.
169. See AMAR, supra note 9, at 188; Prakash, supra note 1, at 336-37.
170. For example, Professor Prakash writes that Congress “ordered the military . . . to occupy parts
of disputed territory in Florida” in 1811. See Prakash, supra note 1, at 336-37. However, the statute’s
text is merely permissive. An Act Relative to the Occupation of the Floridas, Jan. 15, 1811, 3 Stat. 471,
reads in full in relevant part: the President is “authorized, to take possession of, and occupy, all or any
part of the territory [of West Florida], in case an arrangement has been, or shall be, made with the local
authority of the said territory, for delivering [the territory to the United States], or in the event of an
attempt to occupy the said territory, or any part thereof, by any foreign government; and he may . . .
employ any part of the army and navy of the United States which he may deem necessary” (emphasis
added). The Act goes on to authorize, but not direct, the President to govern the territory if taken. (This
statute was one of four initially unpublished statutes that represented a late Founding Era experiment in
secret law. See Rudesill, supra note 44, at 256-57). Prakash, supra note 1, at 337, also analogizes
Congress’s power to order the use of force under the Forces Clause to its power to command the use of
force via war declarations, but note that here again the text is permissive and authorizing, not directive.
See An Act for the Protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United States, Against the Tripolitan
Cruisers, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 129 (1802) (declaring war against the Barbary Pirates, authorizing the use of naval
force “as may be judged requisite by the President,” and authorizing captures and commissions to
privateers); An Act Declaring War Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the
Dependencies Thereof and the United States of America and Their Territories, ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755 (1812)
(President “is hereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force” and issue letters of marque and
reprisal (emphasis added)).
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Reading more into statutes than they can bear, however, does not mean
that the presidentialist view of Professor John Yoo and others is correct.
Professor Yoo contends that the original understanding of the
Constitution was that the Congress in a regular statute cannot place
operational limits on how the President may employ the armed forces.
Presidential exercise of power to protect national security is limitable only
by denial of funding, removal of the President through electoral defeat or
impeachment, or via politics – which is to say, presidential selfrestraint.171 Without engaging with the Forces Clause, Professor Yoo
categorically denies an External Government power.172
This
presidentialist viewpoint remains a minority view among scholars and
jurists, however, because it is so at odds with the balance of originalist
evidence.173
It is not necessary for our purposes to revive in full the extensive
originalist conversation. Suffice to underscore the following. First, the
plain text does not dictate an understanding of the Commander in Chief
Clause as providing a preclusive power that overcomes the Forces Clause
or any other part of Article I. On the contrary, the textual phrase
Commander in Chief referenced a top military officer who in both the
British and American contexts had always been subject to legislative
control.174 Second, the power the presidentialist interpretation would
171. See YOO, supra note 9. Yoo makes an exception even to Congress’s power of the purse.
Congress cannot in Yoo’s view defund some unspecified uses of the military because Congress cannot
via statute abrogate the Commander in Chief power. This view is challenged by inclusion in the
Constitution of a hard two year limit on the availability of appropriations for the army, debate in the
Founding Era about whether the nation needed any standing military force, and by Congress’s refusal to
provide President Washington with more than a tiny force. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton) (a federal army “dangerous to liberty” will be unnecessary if
the federal government can employ the militia for national defense); BARRON, supra note 9, at 43-49.
172. Professor Yoo’s view was reflected in U.S. government arguments during the George W. Bush
Administration in which Yoo served at the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel. See
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, for the Attorney General (Nov. 2, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/olc/legacy/2011/03/25/johnyoo-memo-for-ag.pdf (redacted declassified memorandum on
President’s authority to order surveillance despite FISA statute); Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Re: Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) to Military
Detention of United States Citizens (June 27, 2002); Memorandum from John C. Yoo & Robert J.
Delahunty, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President & William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Dep’t of Defense, Re: Authority for Use of Military
Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States (Oct. 23, 2001).
173. See generally Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11.
174. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Commander in Chief would have “the
supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the
Confederacy” with powers inferior to those of the British King and many state governors); See BARRON,
supra note 9, at 24 (strange for the Framers to use a term for a legislatively controlled officer “to signal
their desire to depart from this history and free the president from all checks when it came to the conduct
of war”); Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 785-86 (“the evidence indicates a
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provide to the President is so colossal as to have required the Founding
generation to abandon almost completely its deep fear of tyranny and
skepticism of executive and military power.175 Of course, it did not. Their
acceptance of a national Executive and potential national army was
reluctant at best, had to be defended during ratification, and was
understood to be cabined by a strong Congress with a long list of
enumerated lawmaking powers, in addition to federalism and individual
rights (later made explicit via the Bill of Rights).176 Third, at the least,
the presidentialist understanding of the Commander in Chief Clause – and
perhaps of the Forces Clause, too – would be expected to engender intense
debate that would have been reflected in the records of the Constitutional
Convention. Yet the Conventions records show no assertions that the
Constitution would free the Commander in Chief from regular statutes on
military operations, laws of the kind the Continental and Confederation
Congresses frequently passed. Indeed, the Convention records show little
discussion of this new presidential identity at all – and no debate
regarding the Forces Clause.177 Rather, as mentioned, the Convention
considered and rejected plans to give “direction” of the armed forces to
the executive.
Finally, taken as a whole, the Founding Era constitutional history does
not support the implication of the presidentialist view for our purposes:
that the Constitution terminated the External Government power the
Congress possessed under the Articles of Confederation. The opposite
conclusion is demanded by the balance of the evidence presented by
Professors Barron and Lederman. Their analyses provide the most
comprehensive scholarly study of presidential and military action
contrary to the express or implied will of Congress – Youngstown
Category 3 – from the Founding through the George W. Bush
Administration.178 The history of the Constitution as applied – “gloss
which life has written” on the cryptic constitutional text – shows that
Washington and other Founding Era presidents did not make the sort of
relatively well-developed understanding that a ‘Commander in Chief’ could be subject to legislative
control even as to tactical matters of war”).
175. Justice Jackson makes this point memorably. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
176. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); BARRON, supra note 9, at 18-33.
177. There “was no recorded discussion urging or suggesting any significant change” from the
condition under the Articles of Confederation, which was commander in chief subordination to, and
superintending the execution of military operations in accordance with, the will of Congress (emphasis
added). Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 785-86.
178. See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II, supra note 1; BARRON, supra note 9. Barron
and Lederman’s study includes restrictions pursuant to other Clauses as well, including the
Appropriations, Army and Navy, Militia, Commerce, Captures, and Marque and Reprisal Clauses. Even
so, their study does review evidence concerning law rooted in the Forces Clause: statutes restricting
internal and external military activities not concerned with matters governed by other Article I clauses.
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expansive, preclusive claims of Commander in Chief power that are
common now, and indeed such claims were rare before the mid-twentieth
century.179 From Congress’s restriction of the 1790s undeclared war with
France to a naval war forward, there is “surprisingly little Founding-era
evidence supporting the notion that the conduct of military campaigns is
beyond legislative control and a fair amount of evidence that affirmatively
undermines it.”180 Professors Barron and Lederman find firm originalist
support only for what they term a preclusive superintendence power of
the Commander in Chief. That is, Congress cannot replace the President
as head of the armed forces that Congress can create and fund (or not),
short of removal from office after impeachment. The precise outlines of
what presidential superintendence powers survive attempted statutory
limitation or direction at the Commander in Chief’s “lowest ebb” remain
blurry – but ultimately the ebb is lower and the blur is smaller than
claimed by presidentialists.181
An interpretive challenge is posed by the fact that a number of statutes
that explicitly or implicitly cabin Commander in Chief authority may
readily find constitutional grounding in multiple Article I provisions. For
example, statutes authorizing and limiting aspects of the undeclared naval
“quasi-war” with France involved action by private U.S. vessels against
commerce benefitting France, and implicated the Captures, Marque and
Reprisal, and Commerce Clauses, in addition to the Declare War Clause
(if one understands the Declare War Clause to allow statutory forestalling

179. See Barron and Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II, supra note 1, at 951-52 & 947-48, quoting
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Regarding constitutional gloss, see also
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 411 (2012) (examining acquiescence in inter-branch relations); BAKER, supra note 13, at 36-38
(gloss of practice vital to Constitution’s meaning as applied); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 527 (2003) (some in Founding generation expected that a “fixed”
meaning of ambiguous constitutional provisions would develop via interpretation and practice); KOH,
supra note 10, at 70 (1990) (quasi-constitutional custom reflects norms); Michael J. Glennon, The Use of
Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 144-46 (1984) (practice
valuable in inter-branch interactions).
Scholars have also found that Presidents until World War II did not tend to make the nowcommon claim of independent authority to deploy forces whenever the President concludes it to be
necessary for national defense (versus only in times of imminent peril that do not allow time to get a
statute through Congress). Indeed, the opposite was the case: Presidents often disclaimed such unilateral
authority and instead requested it from Congress. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2013). See also Peter M. Shane, Rebalancing War Powers: President Obama’s
Momentous Decision, SHANE REACTIONS (Sept. 1, 2013), https://shanereactions.wordpress.com/2013/09/
(discussing Obama Administration’s later aborted pursuit of congressional authorization to use force
against Syrian regime in context of constitutional history and argument about war powers).
180. See Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II, supra note 1, at 965-72; Barron & Lederman,
Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 696.
181. Accord Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring) (unclear what exactly the
Commander in Chief power involves but “[i]t undoubtedly puts the Nation’s armed forces under
presidential command”).
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of general war). Of course, power to govern operations may reasonably
flow from multiple constitutional clauses. The question for us is the
nature the External Government power flowing particularly from the
Forces Clause.
A few points are in order. First, as in the Internal Regulation context,
the Clause’s External Government powers can act in concert with other
clauses by providing congressional “Rules for . . . the land and naval
Forces” as they execute activities and policies authorized under those
separate provisions of the Constitution.182 Through the Forces Clause,
Congress can control the Army that Congress can create under the Army
Clause (also known as the Raise and Support Armies Clause; see Part
III.B.1 below regarding the Posse Comitatus and Insurrection Acts). To
take another example, the Secretary of the Navy’s orders to privately
owned (“public”) armed ships – operating against shipping with France
during the “quasi-war” pursuant to statutory authority stemming from the
clauses mentioned above – implicated Congress’s External Government
authority under the Forces Clause because the vessels were at that
moment functionally part of the “naval Forces” engaged in hostilities at
the order of a military department.183
Second, one can imagine situations in which the other national security
clauses in their natural meaning require more stretching if they are to
apply. One example is relying on Commerce Clause authority for statutes
that are really about governing military intelligence collection targeting
U.S. persons (see Part III.B.2 below regarding the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA)). Similar stretching would be reliance on the
Necessary and Proper Clause for statutory limits on military deployments
into harm’s way without congressional authorization (see Part III.B.5
below regarding the War Powers Resolution).
Third, a richer understanding of how the Clause has operated will be
facilitated by examination of how it has been explicitly construed by the

182. Other operative clauses include the Army, Navy, Declare War, Commerce, Captures,
Guarantee, and even Marque and Reprisal Clauses. Regarding the latter, see Kent, supra note 3, at 91516 & nn.330-32 (“relatively uncontroversial” that the Forces Clause allows Congress “to regulate…prizes
and other aspects of private naval raiding and warfare,” which was often a cause of or prelude to full-scale
war and therefore needed to be controlled by Congress).
183. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 170, 171 (1804). This case did not cite the Forces
Clause but could have. During the undeclared naval war with France, the Congress in 1799 banned
commercial voyages to France and authorized the President to order the Navy to seize ships sailing for
France. The Court ruled that President Adams’s instructions to the Navy to seize U.S. ships going to and
from France were invalid because they went beyond Congress’s authorization regarding naval operations.
Implicated here could be congressional power under the Commerce Clause, the Declare War Clause, the
Forces Clause, or all three – but none were cited by Chief Justice John Marshall. He also did not cite
Article II, nor the presidentialist argument that this presidential power cannot be constrained. But
Marshall did make clear that Congress does have what we conceive as an External Government power,
whatever its textual basis in the Constitution.
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branches after the Founding Era, how the branches have implicitly acted
pursuant to it, and how the Clause is especially salient relevant today. It
is these subjects to which we now turn, respectively, in Parts II.C, III, and
IV.
C. Constitutional History: Citation to the Clause in the Three Branches
Moving beyond the Founding Era, this Part continues our review of the
constitutional record by analyzing evidence of the Clause’s explicit or
otherwise clear citation and interpretation by each branch of the federal
government. Because the Internal Regulation power is well established,
this section focuses primarily on citations suggesting an External
Government power. Discussion of references consistent with an Internal
Regulation power are included for context. Reviewing the constitutional
record for explicit reliance on the Clause reveals several patterns across
the three branches.
First, all three branches – as one would expect – have clearly
understood the Clause to provide an Internal Regulation power. They
have frequently invoked it regarding its core concern, military justice.
There is also evidence of additional Internal Regulation authority, to
include personnel benefits for current and former personnel, and to
regulate the broader national security apparatus beyond the Department
of Defense and its predecessors. Frequent reliance on the Clause over
many years for its Internal Regulation power is readily explained not just
by wide acceptance of the existence of an Internal Regulation power, but
by considerations of scale and function. The military justice system
handles thousands of cases every year. These proceedings generate
constitutional questions. Also, throughout the republic’s history a
considerable number of voting Americans have served in the land and
naval forces, worked in its bureaucracy, or otherwise interacted with it,
regularly generating legislative, administrative, and judicial action.
Finally, it is the responsibility of the organs of government to manage the
immense and expensive national security apparatus and continually
modify it in response to the evolving security environment.
Second, explicit interpretation of the Clause to carry an External
Government power has been rarer. Among the three branches, a
congressional power rooted in the Forces Clause over national security
operations is most often evident in citations to the Clause by Congress
itself.184 Engagements with the Clause by the Justice Department and by
Justice Jackson in his landmark Youngstown concurrence have in the
Article II and III branches kept open the doctrinal door to the External
184. Of course, Congress also produces vastly more bills, reports, and statements in the
Congressional Record per year than the Justice Department and Supreme Court produce opinions.
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Government understanding allowed by the Constitution’s text and
supported by the originalist record.
The third pattern is citations that do not clearly reflect either theory of
the Clause or are unexplained. The record is replete with undifferentiated
seriatim citations to the Forces Clause along with other clauses.
Sometimes they merely suggest federal or congressional national security
powers generally. Most interestingly, review of the constitutional record
shows that many Members of Congress and their staffs in our time
misunderstand the Clause.
As scholars have found in surveys of citations to other clauses that
provide more than one power to Congress, the Article I, II, and III
branches have not engaged with the Forces Clause in a holistic manner.185
The Executive branch has been especially reluctant in published opinions
to acknowledging an External Government power in the Clause. Of
course, such a power would constrain its ultimate organizational client,
the President, regarding military operations, and the Executive branch has
tended to endorse stronger views of Executive power in more recent
constitutional history. All three branches, however, have now recognized
the Forces Clause to provide Congress legislative authority regarding
treatment of captured personnel.
Detainee issues straddle the
Internal/External line, implicating both military justice rules and
operational interactions with third parties who are not part of the U.S.
national security apparatus.
This section examines the record of the Clause’s explicit or clearly
implied interpretation. This is in contrast with the work done in Part III,
to follow: identification of statutory frameworks that ought to be
interpreted to find constitutional footing in the Clause. This Part’s three
branch review proceeds in order of each branch’s placement in the
Constitution.
1. Legislative Branch
a. General Record
Since the Founding it has been common for legislation to be proposed
and passed without citation to the specific constitutional authority upon
which it relies.186 Of course, some statutes by their topic – such as a war
185. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 3, at 861 (interpretations of the Law of Nations Clause by the three
branches often partial, inconsistent, or shallow).
186. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 1, at 345 (noting this phenomenon regarding Founding Era
legislation concerning use of force). As noted in the Introduction, this practice continues today, and it is
well-settled court doctrine that such citations are not necessary for a statute’s constitutionality. Citations
do, however, help us understand statutes and the Constitution, and strengthen statutes by rooting them
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declaration – or plain text are obviously grounded in specific
constitutional language. In the case of the Forces Clause, legislation
concerning operations has incorporated the Clause’s terminology,187 as
have the texts of military justice codes throughout the republic’s
history.188
Digitized records show 556 explicit references to the Clause in the
Congressional Record from 1789 to 1997, 205 references in committee
hearings from 1824 to 2011, and 83 references in committee reports since
1817.189 Bills and resolutions have been comprehensively digitized for
the most recent decades, and show 47 references in legislative text over
the two decades from 1989 to 2012. Congress’s reference rate exceeds
that in Supreme Court opinions and available Justice Department
opinions.190
A large number of legislative references reflect an Internal Regulation
power that extends well beyond military justice. For example, committee
reports and Senate floor statements concerning amendments to the
Military Selective Service Act – registration for the draft – invoked the
Clause, in addition to the Army and Navy Clauses.191 In 1993 and 1994,
during House discussion regarding the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law that
more firmly with the Constitution.
187. For example, see An Act Authorizing the Employment of the Land and Naval Forces of the
United States, in Case of Insurrections, Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (governing presidential
employment of federal forces domestically); see also Part III.B.1 infra (discussing Insurrection Act). To
provide another example, during the run-up to the War of 1812 the Senate passed a resolution that
authorized the President to employ armed merchants and privateers in protecting commerce. The
resolution additionally authorized the President to “issue instructions which shall be comfortable to the
laws and usages of nations, for the government of the ships which may be employed in that service”
(emphasis added). See 21 ANNALS OF CONG. 2022 (1810). One understanding of the resolution is that
federally authorized armed merchants and other privateers became part of the Clause’s “land and naval
Forces,” subject to Congress’s stipulations regarding the “Rules” governing their operations. That
additional authority to protect commerce and enlist the non-government ships may have also come from
the Commerce and the Marque and Reprisal Clauses, respectively, is of no matter. To this list one could
add the Define and Punish and Law of Nations Clauses. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
188. See Am. Art. of War (1776); Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies of
North-America (1775); An Act for the Government of the Navy, Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 24, 1 Stat.
709; An Act for the Better Government of the Navy, supra note 21; Am. Art. of War (1806); Rules and
Regulations for the Government of the United States Navy (1862); Uniform Code of Military Justice,
supra note 22 (see especially delegated power to services to issue regulations such as in 10 U.S.C. §
6011). The Navy Code of 1800 in Article 37 over-rode Commander in Chief orders regarding officer
dismissal.
189. Differences in time frames are due to differences in databases, which continue to develop as
additional congressional materials are digitized. Details on file with author.
190. Data sets on file with author. Many of Congress’s references are in legislative history –
statements, reports, and unenacted bills. Depending on one’s view of legislative history, these materials
can have large or small influence on our understanding of the law. In contrast, the Article II and III branch
opinions discussed infra have legal force (the former only within the Executive branch).
191. See S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 159-61 (1980) (bill would be constitutional under Army, Navy, and
Forces Clauses); 126 CONG. REC. 13880-82, 13896 (1980) (statements of Sen. Warner & Sen. Hatfield).
Original Act was known as the Elston Act, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (1948).
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would bar gay and lesbian Americans from openly serving in the Armed
Forces for a decade and a half, supporters emphasized the plenary and
exclusive power that the Clause provided to Congress to make rules about
the organization, personnel policies, and discipline of the military.192
Similarly, legislation cited the Clause as authority for Congress to require
military recruiter access to higher education institutions, and to bar
veteran military burial benefits to sex offenders.193
A smaller but significant number of references reflect an External
Government power, stemming from the Clause or from the Clause en bloc
along with other war-related clauses. For example, over the past half
century, the Clause has been invoked in Congress regarding authorization
for use of force generally and in Iran, setting goals for military
involvement in Yugoslavia, requiring cessation of hostilities in Libya, and
barring U.S. troops from serving under United Nations or foreign
command.194
b. Current Practice: Statements of Constitutional Authority
A House rule change allows systematic analysis of citation to the
Clause during the three most recent completed Congresses (112th to
114th, 2011-16). This analysis shows frequent references consistent with
both the Internal Regulation and External Government understandings,
on a range of subjects. Frequent citations to the Clause for a rulemaking
power over the entire U.S. government, however, suggests that Congress
frequently misunderstands the Clause.
When Republicans assumed the majority in the U.S. House at the start
of the 112th Congress, they created what became Rule XII(7)(c). It
requires that all legislation introduced in the House must be accompanied
by insertion of a statement of constitutional authority into the
Congressional Record.195 The new rule reflected a campaign promise of
192. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571,
107 Stat. 1547, 1670-73 (1993).
193. See H. Con. Res. 36, 109th Cong. (2005) (access to higher educational institutions); H. Con.
Res. 354, 109th Cong. (2006) (access to higher educational institutions); H.R. 5564, 110th Cong. (2008)
(veteran burial benefits).
194. See S. REP. NO. 90-797 regarding S. Res. 187, 90th Cong. (1967) (introduction of forces into
hostilities); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No 106-65, 113 Stat. 512
(1999) (setting goals for military intervention in Yugoslavia); H.R. 4797, 109th Cong. (2006) (U.S. forces
under foreign command); S. Con. Res. 13, 110th Cong. (2007) (use of force against Iran); H.R. 1212,
112th Cong. (2011) (requiring halt to use of force in Libya).
195. U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., Rule XII(7)(c) (2016), http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/houserules.pdf. The rule makes such statements for legislation received from the Senate optional at the
discretion of the Chair of the House committee of jurisdiction. See Rule XII(7)(c)(2). I found no
examples.
Extensive effort has been made to ensure that the data set constructed for this empirical study
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greater textual fidelity to the Constitution, and particularly to an
originalist view focused on narrow reading of federal powers.196
Members (often via staff) decide which provisions to cite.197 Members
are not required to consult any person or office, including non-partisan
providers of legal advice on Capitol Hill.198
The constitutional authority statements are not analyses of whether a
bill or resolution would be constitutional if enacted. Rather, they are
simply bare citations to provisions of the Constitution.199 They do not
include explanations of what powers the constitutional provisions provide
to Congress. The statements usually cite specific clauses. Sometimes
they cite to Article I, Section 8 as a whole.
Empirical analysis and close reading of constitutional authority
statements pursuant to Rule XII(7)(c) and their related bills and
resolutions provide a window into how Congress currently understands
the Clause.
In the three completed Congresses since the rule’s advent (totaling six
years), the Clause was cited in constitutional authority statements as
grounding for 236 bills and joint resolutions in the House that could
become law. As indicated in Table 1, below, Congress cited the Clause
at a consistent rate, between 75 and 81 times per Congress. Congress
cited the Forces Clause about two and a half times as often as the betterknown Army Clause (91 citations), but only about one-fifth as frequently
as the Commerce Clause (3,615 citations) upon which so much federal
regulatory activity depends.

reflects comprehensive and systematic review of Congress’s citation habits. The data can be regarded as
reasonably accurate, even if it potentially may not include every citation to the Forces Clause in
constitutional authority statements during the three Congresses studied. This is due to lack of uniformity
in how Members of Congress word the statements they file in the Congressional Record. Members are
not consistent in their names and description of constitutional clauses, quotes of their text, nor in their use
of numerals (e.g., Arabic vs. Roman) to cite particular sections and clauses.
196. See Republicans in Congress, A Pledge to America: A New Governing Agenda Built on the
Priorities of Our Nation, the Principles We Stand for, and America’s Founding Values (2010),
http://gop.gov/resources/library/documents/pledge/a-pledge-to-america.pdf.
197. Members and staff can use a standard form when filing the statement of constitutional
authority. Interview with Judiciary Committee Counsel, Aug. 16, 2016 (notes on file with author). Based
on general practices in Congress on a variety of matters, we can be confident that in some offices the staff
file bills and statements under the Member’s name without the Member actually reviewing the filing
firsthand or being aware of them. This is how decisions about bill introduction, cosponsorships, Member
signatures on Dear Colleague letters, and issuance of press releases are frequently handled.
198. These include Senate Legal Counsel, House General Counsel, the Senate and House
Legislative Counsel offices, and the House and Senate Parliamentarians.
199. For discussion, see Marc Spindelman, House Rule XII: Congress and the Constitution, 72
OHIO ST. L. J. 1317 (2011); KENNETH R. THOMAS & TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41548, SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND HOUSE RULE XII, CLAUSE 7(C) (2011).
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Table 1. Citations to Land and Naval Forces Clause in
Congressional Record Constitutional Authority Statements Pursuant
to House Rule XII(7)(c)
Total
Citations
to
Forces
Clause

Citations
to
Commerce
Clause

Citations
to (Raise
&
Support)
Army
Clause

Total 200
Bills &
Resolutions
Introduced that
could become law

24

81

1,241

35

6,845

0

24

75

1,183

31

6,016

1

0

42

79

1,191

25

6,634

5

1

90

235

3,615

91

19,495

Reflecting
Internal
Regulation
Understanding

Reflecting
External
Government
Understanding

Reflecting Both
Int. Reg. &
Ext. Govt.
Understandings

Reflecting a
General
National
Security
Understanding

Reflecting a
General
Government
Rulemaking
Understanding

52

2

2

1

45

4

2

30

6

127

12

Congress
112th
(2011-13)
113th
(2013-15)
114th
(2015-16)
TOTALS

We can reasonably infer that the Internal Regulation understanding
was evident in 127 total citations, versus only 12 citations for the External
Government power. Recent legislation introduced in the House under
Republican majorities, in other words, relies on the Clause to control
internal discipline 10 times more often than it does to control the
operations of “the land and naval Forces.”
What explains these patterns? Introduction of legislation that would
find footing in the Internal Regulation understanding does not necessarily
reflect a view that the External Government understanding cannot
alternatively operate. Members of Congress frequently introduce
legislation concerning the internal administration of the military and
Defense Department because such a massive bureaucracy and its complex
(and often perilous) activities impact the country and so many voters. A
large number of these issues are addressed each year in the massive
annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the enormous
Department of Defense Appropriations Act (DODAA). In contrast, the
operational uses to which the military is put tend to be higher level
national security policy questions that emerge less frequently, on which
Congress commonly defers to the President, and therefore on which
200. In “bills and resolutions that could become law,” I include legislation originally introduced in
the House that could satisfy bicameralism and presentment and become the law of the land. This includes
bills (H.R.) and joint resolutions (H. J. Res.). It excludes simple (one chamber) resolutions (H. Res.) and
concurrent resolutions (H. Con. Res.), because the former could control only one chamber and the latter
could govern only the two chambers of Congress internally, but not anything outside Congress – including
not the “land and naval Forces.”
See Advanced Search for Legislation, Govtrack.us,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/browse?congress=112
(112th
Cong.);
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/browse?congress=113
(113th
Cong.);
and
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/browse?congress=114 (114th Cong.).
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Congress is less likely to legislate.
As one would expect, the Clause has been heavily cited in connection
with military justice, the undisputed core of the Internal Regulation
power.201 However, Congress has been citing the Clause for legislative
powers over military justice less often than in connection with bills
regulating the organization, property, and personnel matters of the
Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs. Most commonly, these
measures concern personnel benefits and military awards.202 House
Members also invoked the Clause quite often regarding former military
personnel203 and federal property.204 In other words, Congress does not
at all seem to regard the Internal Regulation power as narrowly limited to
military justice and discipline, nor “the land and naval Forces” narrowly
limited to current military personnel.
Consistent with the External Government understanding, the Clause
has been invoked in support of legislation that would ban combat use of
cluster munitions, condition use of lethal force against U.S. citizens (such

201. See, e.g., H.R. 2227, 113th Cong. (2013), 159 CONG. REC. H3014 (June 3, 2013) (concerning
criminal investigation of sex-related offenses).
202. See, e.g., H.R. 237, 112th Cong. (2011) (concerning military housing benefits), 157 CONG.
REC. H136 (Jan. 7, 2011); H.R. 4201, 112th Cong. (2012) (concerning child custody rights for military
personnel), 158 CONG. REC. H1366 (March 16, 2012); H.R. 5792, 112th Cong. (2012) (require a report
on ending exclusion of women from ground combat), 158 CONG. REC. H2812 (May 16, 2012); H.R. 5459,
113th Cong. (2014) (concerning award of the Medal of Honor to a particular individual), 160 CONG. REC.
H7455 (Sept. 11, 2014).
203. See, e.g., H.R. 168, 112th Cong. (2011) (concerning services to veterans), 157 CONG. REC.
H42 (Jan. 5, 2011) (constitutional authority statement); H.R. 169 (concerning services to veterans).
I have scored several citations as consistent with the Internal Regulation understanding that
regulate beyond a narrow understanding of “the land and naval Forces” as meaning only the uniformed
military. Because they so clearly support the military, a fairly easy scoring decision is presented by
legislation concerning civilian employees of the Defense Department. See, e.g., H.R. 1642, 113th Cong.
(2013), 159 CONG. REC. H2159 (2013) (concerning civilian employees and security clearances). Other
bills for which Members of Congress invoke the Clause, however, begin to push at its limits. For example,
several bills would prohibit disruption of a military funeral, relying on authority to “Govern and Regulate
the land and naval forces” to regulate public interactions with events involving not simply former
personnel but indeed deceased military personnel. See H.R. 961, 112th Cong. (2011), 157 CONG. REC.
H1619 (March 8, 2011); H.R. 3755, 112th Cong. (2011), 157 CONG. REC. H10015 (Dec. 20, 2011). One
is certainly sympathetic to efforts to protect the dignity of funerals for slain service members, but the
Commerce Clause, and the Army, Navy, or Militia Clauses might be more solid constitutional textual
hooks. Similarly, these might be better bases for legislation regulating non-government employment of
National Guard personnel. See H.R. 1811, 112th Cong. (2011), 157 CONG. REC. H3219 (May 11, 2011).
The Army, Navy, and Appropriations Clauses might be more appropriate constitutional textual bases for
legislation to ensure that states that receive specified federal funds must consider training received by
former military personnel when granting particular licenses. See H.R. 6008, 112th Cong. (2012), 158
CONG. REC. H3975 (June 21, 2012).
204. See, e.g., H.R. 5478, 113th Cong. (2014) (concerning limitations on transfers of Defense
Department property), 160 CONG. REC. H7617 (Sept. 16, 2014). It is not clear, but perhaps these citations
reflect a view of the Forces Clause as not providing primary regulatory authority over government
property – see instead U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (military property clause); id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2
(Territory and Property Clause) – but instead over personnel and bureaucracies that manage it.
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as via armed drone), amend the War Powers Resolution, direct removal
of U.S. forces from Iraq and Syria, and authorize the Army to move
against marauding invasive species in the Mississippi River.205 Here
again, the data does not show Congress in recent years understanding the
Forces Clause narrowly.
This analysis’s most unexpected finding is that Congress has in recent
years frequently cited the Clause in a way that is novel in constitutional
history: for the proposition that the Forces Clause provides Congress a
general government rulemaking power, not limited to “the land and naval
Forces.” These citations (90 over three Congresses) occurred at nearly
three-fourths the rate of those reflecting an Internal Regulation
understanding, and at a much higher rate than those reflecting External
Government power. Many of these citations have supported legislation
that does not reference national security activities or agencies. For
example, the constitutional authority statement in connection with a bill
that would bar the Federal Communications Commission from pursuing
new internet regulations cited the Commerce Clause and “Clause 14 of
Section 8 to make rules for the federal government.”206 Other recent bills,
relying on the Clause’s power “To make Rules for the Government,” have
concerned the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the federallydesignated Appalachian Region.207
What accounts for these abundant, unexplained, and unprecedented
citations to the Clause? The lack of argument in the legislative record –
or anywhere else – for this view of the Forces Clause suggests that these
citations are strategic at best. On this legislative history alone, intent to
205. H.R. 881, 113th Cong. (2013) (banning cluster munitions), 159 CONG. REC. H816 (Feb. 23,
2013); H.R. 137, 114th Cong. (2015) (imposing procedural requirements on targeting U.S. citizens), 161
CONG. REC. H43 (Jan. 6, 2015); H.R. 560, 114th Cong. (2015) (amending War Powers Resolution
regarding funding for U.S. military operations; note that this legislation would also readily find a
constitutional textual hook with the Appropriations and Army Appropriations Clauses), 161 CONG. REC.
H639 (Jan. 27, 2015); H.J. Res. 57, 114th Cong. (2015) (directing removal of U.S. forces from Iraq and
Syria), 161 CONG. REC. H4431 (June 16, 2015); H.R. 4146, 112th Cong. (2012) (authorizing Army action
against Asian Carp), 158 CONG. REC. H1209 (March 6, 2012).
Other citations support legislation that might be consistent with either the Internal Regulation
or External Government understanding, or both. For example, the Clause was cited in connection with a
bill concerning the military budget. See, e.g., H.R. 413, 112th Cong. (2011) (concerning military budget,
a subject that might in strict terms be related only to the Appropriations, Navy, and Army Clauses, but in
a more holistic reading may also implicate the Internal Regulation or External Government understandings
of The Forces Clause), 157 CONG. REC. H470 (Jan. 25, 2011).
206. See H.R. 96, 112th Cong. (2011), 157 CONG. REC. H44 (Jan. 5, 2011). The bill does have an
exception for national security, but again note that the constitutional authority statement excludes the
Clause’s reference to the “land and naval Forces.”
207. See H.R. 5491, 114th Cong. (2016); 162 CONG. REC. H3914 (June 15, 2016) (constitutional
authority statement also cites to the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, regarding bill authored
by then-Rep. Mick Mulvaney (R-SC), who now leads the Office of Management and Budget (OMB));
H.R. 101, 112th Cong. (2011), 157 CONG. REC. H44 (Jan. 5, 2011) (adding counties to the Appalachian
Region).
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create a new understanding of the Constitution is difficult to infer.208 A
significant number of Members and staff in Congress may misunderstand
the Clause.209
In sum, review of the overall record since the Founding and empirical
analysis of the House legislative record in recent years show
congressional engagement with the Forces Clause across the republic’s
history – indeed more frequent reliance upon it than the better-known
Army Clause. In addition to citing the Forces Clause in ways that
understand it to reach beyond current federal regular military personnel,
Congress’s engagement has reflected both Internal Regulation and
External Government understandings.
2. Executive Branch
As in the Legislative branch, it is impossible to review every legally
meaningful construction of or cite to the Forces Clause generated inside
the Executive branch.
Justice Department opinions, Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Statements of Administration Policy on
legislation, and other opinions remain incompletely digitized and
inconsistently published.210 Additionally, the Executive branch is the
least transparent branch regarding the legal authorities it produces.
Despite the Federal Register Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the
Freedom of Information Act, and other sunshine laws, the Executive
branch has many opportunities to avoid publication. The Attorney
General and the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), for
example, write the “law of the Executive branch” and choose to publish
some of their opinions, but are not legally required nor expected to publish
all of their precedential opinions.211 Military courts publish only some of
208. If we presume that Congress does not hide elephantine changes to regulatory schemes in
statutory mouseholes (see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)), surely it
does not hide major changes to constitutional law in Congressional Record mouseholes, either.
209. This novel reading would have other problems. Such a highly flexible reading of the
Constitution would cut against the purpose of the House Rule in tethering legislation tightly to enumerated
powers. It might make the Necessary and Proper Clause redundant. Also, the power to “make Rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval Forces” cannot plausibly mean “make Rules for the
[entire] Government” without making “regulation of the land and naval Forces” redundant.
210. Regarding Office of Management and Budget Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) on
legislation, for example, the main database reaches back about 30 years. However, there are no documents
for many years and only a handful for some others. Dozens of SAPs are typically issued every year as
legislation moves through Congress. Many concern national security bills.
211. See David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for
Attorneys of the Office Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 1 (July 16, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf
(OLC
exercises delegated Attorney General authority to provide “controlling advice to executive branch
officials” and should anticipate publication but publication is not a legal requirement) [hereinafter
BARRON OLC BEST PRACTICES MEMO].
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their opinions, and internally binding legal interpretations by department
and agency offices of general counsel – a vast body of legal opinion – are
generally unpublished. Additionally, the President, OLC, other Justice
Department offices, and other agencies generate legal authorities that are
classified. Together with unclassified but unpublished legal authorities,
these classified documents are a capacious body of Executive branch
secret law.212 One would anticipate that citations to the Clause – a
national security authority – are to be found therein.
Based on available legal authorities, it is clear that the Justice
Department in its branch-binding opinions has tended to cite the Clause
less often than Congress or the Supreme Court. But as in the other
branches, the vast majority of citations are consistent with an Internal
Regulation understanding. In the 36 published Attorney General and
OLC opinions that have cited the Clause since the Founding, all but a
small handful have reflected the Internal Regulation understanding.213 As
in the other branches, seriatim citations to the Forces Clause and other
Article I clauses are also frequent.214
Analysis of published Justice Department opinions shows a clear
trajectory that mirrors the evolution of national security separation of
powers doctrine more generally: a strong reading of Congress’s Internal
Regulation power under the Clause through the early 1900s, followed by
a growing but not uniform presidentialist lean thereafter. OLC at the end
of the first decade of this century re-admitted more room for the Clause
to operate, and indeed to operate with dual powers.
In opinions citing the Forces Clause through the first decades of the
1900s, Attorneys General repeatedly sided with the Clause over the
powers of the President and other Executive officials. Attorneys General
rejected presidential and administrative action to disturb or revise the
decisions of courts martial regulated under Forces Clause authority.215
212. See Rudesill, supra note 44, at 283-300.
213. In Attorney General opinions issued between 1822 and 1947 that cite the Clause, 27 of 29
reflect an Internal Regulation understanding. Several other Attorney General opinions from the 1800s
and 1900s engage with the Insurrection Act that incorporates the Clause’s terminology, or with Congress’s
power to regulate the military, without explicitly mentioning the Clause or other Article I powers. In
seven available OLC opinions written between 1947 and 2018 that cite the Clause, virtually all reflect an
Internal Regulation understanding, with relatively recent embrace of an External Government
understanding at least regarding detainees (discussed subsequently in this Part of the article). See U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, https://www.justice.gov/olc (last visited Sept. 2018).
Review of the OLC site has been supplemented by searches on Hein, Westlaw, and Google.
214. See, e.g., Navy Regulations, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 413, 414 (1862) (citing Army, Navy, and
Forces Clause powers regarding the power to fix ranks); Martial Law, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 365, 371 (1857)
(cited Article I powers do not address martial law).
215. See Court Martial – Amendment of Record, 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 23 (1900) (Secretary of War
cannot alter or act inconsistent with court martial regulated under Articles of War passed pursuant to
Forces Clause); Case of Fitz John Porter, 17 Op. Att’y Gen. 297 (1882) (President cannot annul findings
of court martial and renominate officer for former Army rank because inconsistent with Articles of War).
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Another line of separation of powers opinions rejected presidential
promulgation of a general code of regulations absent congressional
authorization pursuant to the Clause, and sided with the Clause’s power
to write binding “Rules” regarding mustering troops, officer and cadet
appointments, ranks, and terms of service.216 A strong view of
congressional power was also reflected in the single published Justice
Department opinion during this time that cited the Clause in a way that
reflected an External Government understanding not involving military
justice: a Prohibition-era decision by the Attorney General that the
President may not use the Navy to enforce the law absent an act of
Congress.217
By the late Twentieth Century, the Justice Department was citing the
Clause less frequently, and in a manner consistent with a strong view of
Executive power. Most references to the Forces Clause in available OLC
documents in recent decades were issued by the Reagan and George W.
Bush Administrations. They engaged with the Clause in the process of
advancing their presidentialist view of separation of powers. During the
Reagan years, the head of OLC argued to Congress that the Forces Clause
did not provide authority to Congress to govern military operations
because the phrase “and directing their operations” in the Clause’s
antecedent in the Articles of Confederation was shorn during the
Constitutional Convention. OLC also indicated that Congress could use
Forces Clause powers regarding the discipline of personnel involved in
military operations and covert actions, but that no Article I power could

216. See Mustering Regulations, 26 Op. Att’y Gen. 6, 7-8 (1906) (Secretary of War cannot add
volunteers to Army without statutory authority pursuant to Forces and Army Clauses); Navy Regulations,
10 Op. Att’y Gen. 413, 414 (1862) (power to fix ranks is legislative and resides in Forces Clause, in
connection with Army and Navy Clauses); Navy Regulations, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 10, 12 (1853) (former
President Fillmore’s general code of Navy regulations – spanning military justice, discipline, and other
matters – was an invalid exercise of Article II powers in view of statute and Congress’s power under
Forces, Army, and Navy Clauses, cited as a single Article I, section 8 provision). For opinions giving
precedence to the Forces Clause’s authority regarding military appointments over the President’s in
Article II, see Naval Service – Desertion – Pardon, 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 225, 227 (1918) (presidential
pardon of court martialed and separated service member does not remove disqualification for service
under statute enacted pursuant to Army, Navy, and Forces Clauses); Discharge from Military Academy
– Re-Appointment, 17 Op. Att’y Gen. 67, 68-69 (1881) (President cannot re-appoint discharged military
academy cadet in defiance of statute based on Clause authority); cf., Relief of Fitz John Porter, 18 Op.
Att’y Gen. 18, 26-27 (1884) (Congress’s expansive power to regulate appointments by the President
comes from the Forces Clause and perhaps also from one or more of the Declare War, Army, and
Necessary and Proper Clauses, but Congress cannot tell the President which specific individuals to
appoint). As in many legal authorities created by the Legislative and Judicial branches, in these opinions
the multiple clauses cited are not distinguished. However, the Forces Clause is the common element, and
it and its language are emphasized in several of the opinions. See, e.g., id.
217. See Use of Naval Forces in the Enforcement of the National Prohibition Act, 33 Op. Att’y Gen.
562 (1923). This opinion invoked the Forces and Navy Clauses, and implicitly endorsed a Forces Clause
connection to the Insurrection Act, discussed in Part III.B.1 infra.
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constrain “actual military operations.”218 OLC again articulated this view
regarding deployments during the George W. Bush Administration.219 In
the years following the 9/11 attacks, OLC maintained that the Clause
provides authority for court martial and other discipline of U.S. personnel
and for prosecution of enemy fighters in military commissions. However,
due to “the President’s power to successfully prosecute war” under
Article II, the Bush-era OLC also maintained that the Forces Clause’s
power does not include writing laws on interrogation, military
commissions, or other aspects of detainee treatment “considered an
integral part of the conduct of military operations.”220 The Bush-era OLC
added that the Forces Clause does not provide Congress power over rules
of engagement in military operations.221
As the first decade of this century drew to a close, the Justice
Department changed course, re-admitting more room in OLC doctrine
for the Internal Regulation power and re-opening the door to an External
Government power of unspecified extent. In an extraordinary move
during the last week of the George W. Bush Administration – timing that
suggests reluctance to do it earlier – OLC withdrew or qualified the
contents of a slate of post-9/11 opinions and announced that OLC had
changed its interpretation of the Clause. While emphasizing the context
of broad presidential authority, OLC stated that the Forces Clause would
thereafter be understood by OLC to provide Congress “a basis to establish
standards for, among other things, detention, interrogation, and transfer

218. Oversight Legislation: Hearings on S. 1721 and S. 1818 Before the S. Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 100th Cong. 84-85 (1987) (statement of Charles Cooper, Assistant Att’y Gen., OLC); Barron
& Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II, supra note 1, at 1083 (discussion).
219. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Deputy Counsel for the President, Re: Constitutional Issues Raised
by Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations Bill 282 n.2 (Nov. 28, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2001/11/31/op-olc-v025-p0279_0.pdf.
220. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Counsel to the President, Re: Legality of the Use of Military
Commissions to Try Terrorists 244 (Nov. 6, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/
opinions/2001/11/31/op-olc-v025-p0238.pdf; (Clause provided authority for establishment of military
commissions, which Congress could then use under its Define and Punish Clause authority to try
violations of the law of war, but could not intrude on presidential power); Memorandum from John C.
Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for William J.
Haynes II, General Counsel of the Dep’t of Defense, Re: Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful
Combatants
Held
Outside
the
United
States
13
n.13
(Mar.
14,
2003),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-combatantsoutside
unitedstates.pdf; (preclusive power of President’s authority to prosecute war successfully); Memorandum
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William
J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dep’t of Defense, Re: The President’s Power as Commander in Chief to
Transfer Captured Terrorists to the Control and Custody of Foreign Nations 4-6 (Mar. 13, 2002) (similar
Executive power arguments), https://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memorandum03132002.pdf [hereinafter
OLC DETAINEE TRANSFER MEMO].
221. See OLC DETAINEE TRANSFER MEMO, supra note 220.
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to foreign nations” of detainees.222 (OLC also recognized the Captures
Clause as another source of such authority, and the Define and Punish
Clause as a source of authority for military commissions to try war crimes
and to criminalize torture in accordance with international law.)223 Here,
the OLC can be understood to endorse a vision of shared congressional
and presidential power over the “land and naval Forces.” Although OLC
could still refract separation of powers issues through an Article II lens in
a manner favorable to its authorities and to its highest-ranking principal,
the President, OLC was leaving behind strict presidentialism in national
security separation of powers.224 OLC now disagreed with its earlier view
that the Clause’s powers are limited to military discipline.225
Even so, OLC did not take the opportunity to articulate a holistic theory
of the Forces Clause. Nor did OLC discuss whether it saw any Clause
authority over military operations beyond detainee matters, an
intersection of the Internal Regulation and External Government
powers.226 Ultimately, as the Bush Administration departed, the Justice
Department was responding to President Bush’s signing of legislation on
interrogation and military commissions that restricted his powers and to
the Supreme Court’s seriatim citation to the Forces Clause and other
Article I, Section 8 powers in Hamdan (2006), in which the Court upheld
the UCMJ statute over a contrary wartime presidential order.227
3. Judicial Branch
Review of federal court opinions shows frequent seriatim citations in
which the Forces Clause has been invoked for general federal or
congressional war powers, or for a specific power, without differentiation
from its Article I, Section 8 siblings and other clauses cited.228 Many
citations involve little or no analysis of the Clause’s meaning.229 Yet, as
222. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Re: Memorandum for the Files, Status of Certain OLC
Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, at 5 (Jan. 15, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memostatusolcopinions01152009.pdf.
223. See Bradbury memorandum, supra note 222, at 4-5.
224. See BARRON, OLC BEST PRACTICES MEMO, supra note 211 (guidance on alignment of OLC
advice and administration preferences).
225. See Bradbury memorandum, supra note 222, at 5.
226. See id.
227. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006); Bradbury memorandum, supra note 222,
at 2.
228. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591; Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 712 (1893) (Clause
one of many national security powers of the federal government); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 890 (1961) (Clause cited without differentiation with others in Articles I and II
for authority for the political branches to regulate access to military installations).
229. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 173-76 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
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noted in the earlier textual analysis, the Supreme Court has said that the
Clause is subject to the presumption against surplusage in reading the
Constitution.230 Where courts have engaged with the Clause’s meaning,
the pattern in the other branches holds: the Clause is well cited for its
Internal Regulation understanding. Additionally, the Court has signaled
an External Government understanding, without articulating a holistic
dual-power theory of the Clause. The Clause and its statutes are often
discussed by the courts in connection with the Clause’s counterauthoritarian purposes.
The Internal Regulation understanding of the Clause is reflected in a
long line of cases in the Article III federal courts and the civilian federal
military appeals courts – the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF), and its predecessor, the Court of Military Appeals (CMA),
Article I courts created by Congress.231 The Internal Regulation
understanding is clear or implied in 50 of 62 Supreme Court majority or
plurality opinions citing the Clause.232 The CAAF and CMA citations
concern military justice, at issue in the majority but not entirety of Article
III court references reflecting an Internal Regulation understanding. The
Supreme Court has deeply engaged the Clause’s origins and meaning, the
harshness of military justice and the President’s control over it, and the
scope of military court-martial jurisdiction.233 The Court’s jurisprudence
reflects concern about the “dangers of autocratic military justice” to the
rights of soldiers and civilians, both foreign and domestic.234 It has
described the President’s power as Commander in Chief in the context of
ultimate legislative control over the military, and emphasized the
Constitution’s separation of military and civilian justice.235 The courts
have given clear signals that the Internal Regulation power extends
beyond current military personnel.236
(passing reference to the Clause as authority for the military to create a hospital for mentally ill service
members).
230. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549-50 (2012).
231. The CAAF, like the CMA before it, is a civilian appellate court between the military services
and the Supreme Court. It is an “Article I” court, with judges appointed for terms. Its jurisdiction is
limited to military justice. The CAAF discretionarily reviews the work of the courts of the military
services headed by uniformed military judges. A denial of review by the CAAF, which occurs in the vast
majority of cases, is not an endorsement of the service court’s legal reasoning. Service court decisions
are rarely invoked by the CAAF as controlling unless endorsed by the CAAF.
232. Data set on file with author. The Clause is cited in 17 concurrences and dissents.
233. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767 (1996); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S.
435, 439-48 (1987).
234. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 765-66.
235. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23-28 (1957). This is a plurality opinion, but the sentiments
strongly stated and quoted here are well reflected in military justice jurisprudence. See, e.g., Loving, 517
U.S. at 765, 767-68 (the Framers distrusted “not courts-martial per se, but military justice dispensed by a
commander unchecked by the civil power in proceedings so summary as to be lawless”).
236. In addition to the discussion that follows here in the main text, see, e.g., supra note 33 (Clause
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In a decision that reflected Congress’s UCMJ rules and spurred OLC’s
expansion of the Executive branch’s understanding of the Clause’s reach,
the Supreme Court in Hamdan interpreted the Clause to provide Congress
legislative power regarding treatment of the enemy. In this post-9/11
case, the Court invalidated a presidential order for military commission
trial of a detainee as a violation of the UCMJ. The Hamdan Court
underscored that even in wartime military matters the President may not
disregard a properly enacted statute.237 Such authority comes from
Congress’s powers under the Declare War, Captures, Army, Define and
Punish, and Forces Clauses.238 One could see the limitation power upheld
in Hamdan as flowing en bloc from the cited clauses, together with the
gloss of historical practice. A more textual approach would distinguish
the particular authority provided by each clause in support of the UCMJ.
For example, the Define and Punish Clause is operative regarding
criminal charges, while the Forces Clause’s Internal Regulation power
provides authority for all relevant aspects of the military justice system.
However, power over detainees straddles the Internal Regulation/External
Government conceptual line. Hamdan stands as a rejection of the
Commander in Chief’s attempt to defy Congress’s governance of his use
of the military instrument in wartime regarding third parties (detainees).
Regarding both internal military matters and external operations
(wherever such congressional powers originate), separation of powers
doctrine holds generally that the President and Congress have overlapping
and ultimately shared power.239 Both the Article I and II branches receive
heightened deference regarding national security.240 Regarding military
provides Congress authority over military retiree pay and access to military installations).
237. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 & n.23 (2006). See also Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 25-28, 47 (1942). The Quirin Court invoked the Forces Clause along with other Art. I and II
provisions that provide the federal government with war powers that make constitutional a military
commission trying U.S. citizen as enemy combatants, but in Quirin the Court did not “inquire whether
Congress may restrict the power of the Commander in Chief to deal with enemy belligerents,” as it did in
Hamdan. For discussion of Hamdan, see, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief,
and the Separation of Powers after Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933 (2007)
(observing that after landmark Hamdan decision reflecting formalism in constitutional interpretation,
greater attention must be paid to specific congressional powers).
238. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591.
239. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (the Constitution “enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with those of Congress”).
240. Regarding Congress, see Loving, 517 U.S. at 768 (Supreme Court gives “Congress the highest
deference in ordering military affairs”); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (citing Clause as
one of several Article I, Section 8 provisions providing powers over military warranting judicial deference
because of lack of judicial competence on military matters). Regarding the President, see United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-24 (1936) (framing the “sole organ” theory of
presidential power in foreign affairs); cf., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 208392 (2015) (noting that while there is formidable presidential power in foreign affairs, “it is essential the
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justice, the Courts have stated that Congress’s authority under the Clause
is “plenary” and “at its apogee,” and in context of the Commander in
Chief means that “Congress, like Parliament [at the Founding], exercises
a power of precedence over, not exclusion of Executive authority.”241 The
Supreme Court has blessed congressional delegations of power to the
Commander in Chief in military justice cases, use of force, and other
national security and foreign affairs matters.242 The Court has held that
the President also has some independent power to act alone in the absence
of legislation,243 and has stood by its doctrinal position that Congress
cannot direct the armed forces.244 But the courts have also long made
clear that the Commander in Chief is subject to explicit and implicit
legislative restriction.245 Since the mid-Twentieth Century, the Court’s
doctrine reflects the influence of Justice Robert Jackson’s Youngstown
concurrence, which places the President at the height of authority when
acting consistent with statute, in a zone of twilight when acting when
Congress has not, but able to rely only on whatever authority Congress
cannot deny the President when the Commander in Chief acts contrary to
the express or implied will of Congress.246 As discussed above in Part
II.B, Professors Barron and Lederman present a strong case that the extent
of that preclusive Commander in Chief power is quite limited, but this
question remains contested by practitioners and scholars.
For our inquiry, Justice Jackson’s canonical concurrence is especially
salient. It provides the strongest jurisprudential signal from the Supreme
Court that what this article theorizes as an External Government power
can be rooted in the Forces Clause.
The Forces Clause, Justice Jackson wrote, may allow Congress “to
some unknown extent impinge upon even command functions” of the
Commander in Chief.247 The President’s powers are akin to those
congressional role in foreign affairs be understood and respected.”).
241. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 441, 446, 447 (1987) (also listing the Army and
Navy Clauses as putting congressional power at its apogee); Loving, 517 U.S. at 767 (1996); Coleman v.
Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1878).
242. See, e.g., Loving, 517 U.S. at 756-60, 767-68 (1996) (Forces Clause authority over military
justice may be delegated); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (post-9/11 AUMF authorized force
and triggered President’s war powers); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp, 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
(upholding delegation of power to President regarding arms trade).
243. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (upholding blockade of Southern States
instituted by President Lincoln without ex ante legislative authorization or declaration of war).
244. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592 (“Congress cannot direct the conduct of
campaigns”) (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139-40 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring)).
245. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 170, 171 (1804).
246. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
For key analyses, see Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11; Barron & Lederman, Lowest
Ebb Part II, supra note 1; Heidi Kitrosser, It Came from Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and
Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (2010); KOH, supra note 10.
247. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring). These should be read broadly
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possessed by “the topmost officer of the army and navy,” who is subject
to statute. Justice Jackson invoked the Commander in Chief’s limitation
by the Clause in an alarming External Government context: seizure of
civilian industry within the United States for military supply, pursuant to
the Commander in Chief power and in defiance of the stated or implied
will of Congress. In this regard, Justice Jackson emphasized Congress’s
enactment of statutes barring law enforcement by the military but
authorizing enforcement of certain rights (laws that in the next Part we
address as the Posse Comitatus Act and its domestic relatives).248 The
Justice framed his discussion of the Clause in counter-authoritarian terms.
These statutes reflect the Constitution’s policy of congressional control
of “utilization of the war power as an instrument of domestic policy,” one
crafted by Framers who “knew what emergencies were, knew the
pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they
afford a ready pretext for usurpation.”249 “No penance,” Justice Jackson
warned, “would ever expiate the sin against free government of holding
that a President can escape control of executive powers by law through
assuming his military role.”250
Justice Jackson’s opening in Youngstown of a doctrinal door to a Forces
Clause carrying an External Government power perhaps explains the
Court’s unexplained edit of the Clause’s text to exclude the word
“Government” in 2013 in the Kebodeaux military justice-related case.251
Nevertheless, courts have not yet explicitly stated that the Clause includes
multiple powers. “[D]oubts . . . about the extent of Congress’s power
under Clause 14” persist.252
Uncertainty is perpetuated by how infrequently the courts review
separation of powers issues in national security. Barriers to adjudication
include secrecy and the classification of information about military and
intelligence activities, together with standing, justiciability, state secrets,
and executive privilege doctrines.253 These factors were evident in Laird
abroad and narrowly at home. Id. at 645.
248. See id. at 644-45 & nn.12, 13. Justice Jackson mentions the Third Amendment and Militia
Clauses between discussion of the Forces Clause and citation to these statutes on domestic use of the
military. However, the Third Amendment is inapposite to these statutes and Jackson observes that the
Founders saw the militia as the primary federal instrument of military power. These statutes do not rely
on these other constitutional provisions because they do not concern quartering of troops, and to the extent
they govern federal regular forces. In this regard, as Justice Jackson’s discussion implies, and as Part
IV.B discusses, these statutes rely instead on the Forces Clause.
249. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 644, 650 (Jackson, J., concurring).
250. See id. at 646.
251. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 394-95 (2013).
252. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 441 (1987).
253. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (petitioners lack standing to challenge
FISA Amendments Act provision because they cannot show surveillance by classified program); Dep’t
of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (judicial deference regarding classification); United States v.
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v. Tatum, a 1972 case in which the Court ruled that petitioners lacked
standing to challenge military surveillance within the United States.254
Justice William O. Douglas in dissent stated his belief that Congress
lacked constitutional authority to write legislation that would allow such
military operations – and addressed his claim specifically to the Forces
Clause.255 Justice Douglas wrote that the Clause is a “grant of authority
to the Armed Services to govern themselves, not the authority to govern
civilians.”256 It is significant in this context that six years later, in the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Congress created
a framework statute for national security surveillance of U.S. persons
within the United States.257 As discussed in the next Part, Congress
understood that this intelligence collection would be carried out in
significant part by the Defense Department’s National Security Agency
(NSA) – and provided a thick set of rules to govern this libertyimplicating activity of “the land and naval Forces.”
It is to statutory frameworks based on the Forces Clause that we now
turn.
III. THE CLAUSE REDISCOVERED: CONSTITUTIONAL FOOTING FOR
STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS
The prior Parts have explained that the Constitution’s text, the
Founding Era evidence, and the constitutional record of explicit citation
reasonably allow a dual reading of the Forces Clause. This Part sets forth
the considerable and important work that the Clause can, and indeed
should, be understood to be doing in the modern national security legal
regime. The Clause’s role is in some instances explicit but in many others
it is implicit, because the Clause has not always been recognized as
authority for the constitutionality of a series of important laws.
Understanding that statutes are on firmer footing the closer they are tied
to the Constitution’s text, and that legislation can rely for authority on
more than one clause, this Part maintains that the Clause – via its Internal
Regulation and External Government powers – provides the best or at
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (qualified executive privilege); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)
(state secrets privilege). See also Dellums v. Bush, 752 F.Supp. 1141, 1144 n.4 (D.D.C. 1990) (Members
of Congress had standing in suit to prevent President from using military force but case, which cites Forces
Clause, not ripe).
254. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (petitioners lack standing to complain of chilling of free
speech).
255. See id. at 16-19 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Marshall,
also cites the Army and Navy Clauses but focuses on the Forces Clause.
256. Id. at 18-19.
257. Seven days before the Laird decision was decided, the Court invited Congress to provide
national (“domestic”) security surveillance warrants. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (“Keith”), 407
U.S. 297, 322-24 (1972).
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least additional strong constitutional textual footing for a set of statutory
frameworks at the heart of the national security legal regime.
The source of Congress’s authority to legislate regarding the
intelligence apparatus has been insufficiently explored by scholars and
practitioners to date. This Part argues that the Clause provides legislative
authority for several of the statutory frameworks Congress uses to govern
and regulate the Intelligence Community (IC). The IC today is a
sprawling enterprise of 17 elements with a roughly $70 billion annual
budget. It supports, extends beyond, and can operate in the field with or
independently of the uniformed military and Department of Defense.258
Nine IC elements are within the Department of Defense and its military
services, six others are located in the cabinet Departments of Energy,
Justice, Homeland Security, State, and the Treasury, and two agencies are
entirely independent: the CIA, and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI).259
For Congress and for Americans generally, there is a reliance interest
at stake: these statutory frameworks that govern the military, its
bureaucracy, the IC, and their contractors have long been in force,
implemented, and reflective of the Clause’s counter-authoritarian
placement of ability to control “the land and naval Forces” with Congress.
Passage, implementation, interpretation, and amendment of these statutes
have contributed to the Constitution’s practice gloss for many years.
These statutes are not necessarily unconstitutional without the Forces
Clause. Arguments for their constitutionality can be advanced on the
basis of gloss or on the basis of their necessary incidence to other
enumerated powers in Article I. But this Part’s argument is that the
Clause provides the best or at least strong additional constitutional footing
for these statutory frameworks, and in so doing reinforces their
constitutional legitimacy and their power to bind the Executive branch
even in the face of presidential disagreement.

258. See Exec. Order No. 12,333 (1981), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,470 (2008), § 1.7
(Intelligence Community Elements). For budget figures, see MICHAEL E. DEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R44381, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SPENDING: TRENDS AND ISSUES 8-9 tbl.1 (2018) (national
and military intelligence programs for fiscal 2017 totaled $73 billion), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/
R44381.pdf.
259. The Defense Department IC elements include the Defense Intelligence Agency, National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency (NSA), and
the intelligence arms of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. The conventional understanding that
the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security in times of peace and part of the
Department of Defense in times of war is simplistic. In times of peace (and undeclared war), many
Department of Defense and military authorities govern the Coast Guard.
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A. Internal Regulation
1. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
Little more needs be said about the UCMJ, the framework statute for
military justice.260 It is undisputed that the Clause provides Congress
authority to write it. The Second Militia Clause provides additional
authority for the UCMJ as it pertains to the militia, and other provisions
– such as the Army, Navy, and Necessary and Proper Clauses – also
provide supplemental constitutional authority to the extent a military
justice code is naturally incident to having a military. However, the
UCMJ is all the more legitimate constitutionally – and more clearly able
to withstand a contrary Commander in Chief – because this body of
military rules is so tightly linked to the Forces Clause. The Commander
in Chief’s ability to intervene in military justice matters such as defining
offenses, trial procedures, and punishments is circumscribed. These
aspects of this framework statute reflect the legislative control and
counter-authoritarian purposes of the Forces Clause by protecting against
any potentially abusive discipline of the part of the American people who
serve in the land and naval forces.
2. National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs)
The annual NDAA is one of the longest, most detailed, and
multifarious bills passed by Congress every year.261 It authorizes
spending subject to appropriations, and sets policy for the Department of
Defense, the military services, the multi-agency Military Intelligence
Program (MIP), and nuclear weapons activities of the Department of
Energy. It concerns everything from organization of the national security
apparatus to training to personnel benefits. Taken together, we can
understand the NDAAs as comprising a framework statute, one that is
regularly updated and that builds upon the National Security Act of
1947.262 In addition to the Forces Clause, NDAAs commonly include
provisions that can find primary or secondary textual footing in the
Common Defense, Commerce (in relation to the Coast Guard and
counter-drug activities), Army, Navy, Militia, Forts and Magazines,
260. See 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2016).
261. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 ran 970 pages of
enacted bill text. It had a joint explanatory statement of the conferees (the final legislative report
associated with the bill) that totaled 572 pages. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000 (2016); H. Rept. No. 114-840, 114th Cong. (2016) (joint
explanatory statement of the conferees).
262. See National Security Act, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (reorganizing national
security apparatus after World War II). Much of the Act is codified as amended in titles 10 and 50 U.S.C.
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Necessary and Proper, and Appropriations Clauses. Congress uses
NDAAs to amend the UCMJ, most recently in a significant revision in the
NDAA for 2017.263 The NDAAs in recent years often include provisions
regarding detainees – an issue at the intersection of the Internal
Regulation and External Government powers264 – such as the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 and recent prisoner-related amendments to the
9/11 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).265 Finally,
although most of the Forces Clause work done in the NDAAs reflects the
Internal Regulation understanding, the NDAA is also a vehicle for
changes to the law that govern military operations and rest on the External
Government understanding of the Forces Clause. Provisions regarding
counter-terror kill/capture operations and cyber attack are two recent
examples, discussed below.266 The NDAAs are, in short, intensively
doing the work of the Forces Clause. The power of the NDAAs as legal
instruments is reinforced by their grounding on the Clause and alignment
with its purpose of subjecting the national security apparatus to law
written by the elected representatives of the people.
B. External Government
The following statutory frameworks constitute much of the core of the
national security legal regime. They are not funding restrictions, war
declarations or authorizations for the use of military force (AUMFs)
blessing armed conflicts, nor militia laws. Neither are they caught up in
creating and sustaining the federal military. They instead reflect exercise
of the External Government power of the Forces Clause: congressional
limits on the operations of the “land and naval Forces,” reflecting counterauthoritarian purposes.
1. Posse Comitatus Act and Domestic Relatives
The Clause is sometimes mentioned as authority for the Posse
Comitatus Act (PCA).267 A full explanation has not been offered,
however, of the work the Forces Clause should be understood to be doing
263. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. 114-328, §§ 5001-5542,
130 Stat. 2000, 2894-2968 (2016) (Military Justice Act of 2016).
264. The Captures, Law of Nations, and Declare War Clauses are also implicated by these
provisions.
265. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§
1801-07, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574-2614 (2009) (Military Commissions Act of 2009); National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §§ 1021-22, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562-64 (2011)
(detainee provisions).
266. See Part III.B.3 and Part IV.B infra.
267. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012); BAKER, supra note 13, at 268 (Clause as authority for PCA).
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in providing for the constitutionality of the PCA and what we can think
of as its domestic relatives.
The Posse Comitatus statute has unfortunate origins as an effort to
curtail use of federal Army regulars in the post-Civil War occupied South
to protect the new Fifteenth Amendment right of emancipated AfricanAmericans to vote, in the face of violent resistance.268 In its modern
incarnation, the PCA has become what Professors William Eskridge and
John Ferejohn conceive as a “super-statute”: its importance goes beyond
the statute books and commands normative force in the public mind,
structuring understandings about the nature of law and government
authority.269 The PCA is widely understood to stand for separation of
military and law enforcement activities, and against the idea of military
government. Indeed, the PCA has so powerfully shaped perceptions of
statutory limits on domestic military operations that senior military and
civilian leaders responsible for acting pursuant to it often misunderstand
it.270 In reality, the PCA’s amended text now operates as a default ban on
active duty federal armed forces engaging in law enforcement, unless
some other law provides such authority.
The PCA is neither a war declaration nor major force authorization, it
is not about commerce, and it limits the federal military, not the militia
(in its organized modern form, the National Guard) on state duty.271 Its
ties to the Forces Clause are plainly evident in the legislative history: the
PCA was a response to use of Insurrection Act (see below) statutory
authority that referenced “the land and naval forces,” and one of the first
drafts of the PCA used the same Forces Clause terminology.272
Ultimately the provision that passed had a standing restriction related to
use of the Army, in addition to a funding ban, and was enacted as part of
an appropriations act.273 In modern form, the PCA is not an
appropriations restriction. It also does not find an easy hook in the
Guarantee Clause (Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution); the PCA is
not authorizing federal troops to intervene in states to guarantee their
268. Posse Comitatus Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1385 (2012)).
269. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001).
270. See, e.g., BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 92 (general in charge of troops deployed to deal
with 1992 Los Angeles riots misunderstand PCA and Insurrection Act).
271. The PCA has been interpreted to apply to militia (the modern National Guard) while on federal
duty. See United States v. Gilbert, 165 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 1999). Under statute, the militia of the United
States is divided into two classes: “the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and Naval
Militia,” and “the unorganized militia,” which generally includes “all able-bodied males” ages 17 to 44.
See 10 U.S.C. § 246 (2016).
272. See 7 CONG. REC. 3586 (1879) (Atkins amendment); for discussion, see Gary Felicetti & John
Luce, The Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight on 124 Years of Mischief and
Misunderstanding Before any More Damage is Done, 175 MIL. L. REV. 86, 109-13 (2003).
273. See Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, supra note 268.
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republican form of government. Instead, the PCA restricts law
enforcement activity by the military. The PCA governs military
interactions with the people in civil settings inside the United States,
powerfully resonating with the civilian legislative control and counterauthoritarian purposes of the Forces Clause.
The PCA retains its super-statutory normative sway despite exceptions
that provide the federal government significant leeway to use the armed
forces domestically. One exception is the statute’s exemption for cases
and circumstances “expressly authorized by the Constitution.” The scope
of any Article II presidential constitutional power implicitly referenced
here is unclear. But, of course, the PCA statute also reflects Congress
exercising its constitutional powers, here pursuant to the Clause.
The Insurrection Act is especially noteworthy as a statutory domestic
relative, antecedent, and modern exception to the PCA.274 It can find
significant constitutional textual footing in the Forces Clause’s External
Government power. Generally, the Insurrection Act governs use of the
military by the President in the event of uprisings and other disturbances
inside the country. The title and text of the original 1807 statute both
explicitly referenced the language of the Forces Clause.275 A century and
274. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 251-55 (2016). Discussed in BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 43-45, 53.
Congress recently renumbered the Insurrection Act within Title 10 of the U.S. Code. See National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000, 2497, § 1241(a)(2)
(2016) (10 U.S.C. §§ 331-35 renumbered as §§ 251-55, ch. 13). (Congress the following year designated
unrelated provisions concerning auditing as 10 U.S.C. §§ 251-55, as well, in ch. 9A. See National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, 1537-42, § 1002(b)(1)
(2017)). Another modern domestic relative of the Posse Comitatus Act is the Stafford Act. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5121-5207 (2013) (federal response to disasters), particularly § 5170b(c)(1) (President may direct
Defense Department to perform emergency efforts for up to 10 days “essential for the preservation of life
and property”).
275. See An Act Authorizing the Employment of the Land and Naval Forces of the United States,
in Case of Insurrections, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (1807). This 1807 law concerned domestic unrest and involved
federal regular forces. What came to be known as the Insurrection Act is a repeatedly amended
amalgamation of the 1807 statute and other laws, several of which concerned the militia. See An Act to
Recognize and Adapt to the Constitution of the United States the Establishment of Troops Raised Under
the Resolves of the United States in Congress Assembled, Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 95, 96
(repealed 1790); Militia Act of 1792, ch.33 1 Stat. 271 (1792); Calling Forth Act of 1792 (ch. 28, 1 Stat.
264 (1792), sunsetted in 1794 and replaced by the Calling Forth Act of 1795, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 424 (1795)).
The 1795 law was in turn amended – and the 1807 statute implicitly amended – by the so-called Lincoln
Law, which set out conditions under which the President could call out either militia or federal regulars
to counter “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellions.” See 12 Stat. 281 (1861),
discussed in BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 43-45, 67. The Lincoln Law was not formally a war
declaration, but some Declare War Clause authority may reasonably have operated in addition to First
Militia Clause and Forces Clause authority because the Lincoln Law provided authority for conduct of
what was plainly a war against the secessionist states. The Guarantee Clause might also be understood to
provide authority, to the extent one could argue that the secessionist states lacked “a Republican Form of
Government” due to slavery (but of course the Guarantee Clause along with the rest of the Constitution
went into effect with the understanding that slavery was legal).
A number of related laws followed after the Civil War. They enabled and often conditioned
use of federal regular troops domestically. For example, Congress invoked the language of the Forces
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a half later its text “land or naval force[s]” was changed to “armed forces,”
but the modern statute’s ability to find footing in the Forces Clause
endures.276 Section 252 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides in relevant
part that:
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions,
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of
the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the
United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of
any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers
necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.277
The statute’s state militia provision in Section 252 is plainly grounded on
the First Militia Clause.278 In contrast, Section 252’s operation regarding
federal regular troops (“such of the armed forces”) cannot rely on the
Constitution’s militia authorities, nor easily on the Guarantee Clause. The
First Militia Clause concerns only the militia, and the Guarantee Clause
in relevant part includes a requirement for state application for federal
help “against domestic Violence” before the President can act – a
requirement not found in Section 252. The Guarantee Clause is restricted
to “domestic Violence,” while Section 252 allows use of federal troops to
deal with a more capacious set of conditions: “unlawful obstructions,
combinations, or assemblages.”279
Section 252 is an enabling law, but the Insurrection Act also imposes a
limitation on the Commander in Chief: the President cannot employ the
armed forces against just any unrest that in his or her view amounts to
“unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion
Clause in a statute that made state or local racial discrimination unlawful and allowed federal judges and
marshals and the President to call out “the land or naval forces” and militia to enforce the law. See An
Act to Protect All Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and Furnish the Means of their
Vindication (Civil Rights Act of 1866), ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). For discussion of these Reconstruction
era laws and how they led to the first posse comitatus statute, see BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 13, at 6973.
276. See Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-1028, 70A Stat. 1, 15, §§ 331-34 (entitled an Act
“To revise, codify, and enact into law” titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code, entitled “Armed Forces” and
“National Guard,” respectively). By the 1950s the U.S. military also included the Air Force, and
accordingly the term “armed forces” had come to be used more commonly than “land and naval forces.”
277. See 10 U.S.C. § 252 (2016).
278. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
279. Of course, if a disturbance were denying a state “a Republican Form of Government,” or
operating in coordination with “Invasion,” the Guarantee Clause might provide authority to deploy federal
regulars without the state request mentioned in the second half of the Guarantee Clause in connection with
“domestic Violence.” See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The Guarantee Clause does not specify use of the
military, but force is also the most obvious way the federal government could displace a despotic state
government or protect states against invasion or domestic unrest.
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against the United States.” Rather, the President may only use force under
Section 252 where the federal laws cannot be enforced “by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings.” This is a significant, counter-tyrannical
limitation.
Finally, Section 254 also requires the President to
“immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their
abodes.”280 This is not a huge impediment to use of force, but is another
process requirement Congress has imposed on the Commander in Chief
before the part of the federal government most dangerous to liberty – the
federal armed forces – may be used inside the country.281
2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
FISA was enacted in 1978 in response to the Church-Pike
congressional investigations of intelligence abuses.282 It is by its terms
the “exclusive” authority for surveillance of U.S. persons for foreign
intelligence purposes, with review by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC). FISA has been heavily relied upon and
consistently reaffirmed – by Congress via repeated amendments, through
generally consistent presidential compliance (with the salient exception
of the immediate post-9/11 period), and via thick daily agency practice
involving agencies and the FISC. Thousands of particularized electronic
surveillance and physical search warrants have been issued by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court it created. Since the 2000s, FISA has also
governed daily bulk sifting, collection, analysis, and distribution of
trillions of electronic communications, including those of U.S. persons
280. See 10 U.S.C. § 254 (2016).
281. Note, too, Section 251. Like Sections 252-54, Section 251 involves both militia and other
(federal regular) armed forces. See 10 U.S.C. § 251 (2016). However, Section 251 concerns insurrection
against a state, while Section 252 concerns uprisings against federal authority and Section 253 concerns
defiance of federal law “[with]in a state.” Additionally, Section 251 is unique within the Insurrection Act
in requiring a state request, in accord with the Guarantee Clause’s stipulation. For that reason, Section
251 regarding federal regulars is best understood to be grounded primarily on the Guarantee Clause.
(Meanwhile, the First Militia Clause and the Guarantee Clause provide constitutional authority for the
militia aspects of Section 251.) Of course, federal regular forces operating pursuant to Section 251 would
still be subject to the law Congress using Forces Clause authority generally (e.g., the military criminal
code, and FISA).
If under 10 U.S.C. § 252 the obstruction or rebellion against federal authority comes from a
state government, the Fourteenth Amendment could be understood as well to provide some constitutional
footing for this part of the Insurrection Act. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. These parts of the
Fourteenth Amendment more clearly provide primary authority for the next Section, 253, which
references not only insurrection and domestic violence within a state but “conspiracy” and deprivation of
“any part or class of its people . . . of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution
and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse” to act.
282. See S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, Foreign, and Military Intelligence, S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976) [hereinafter the CHURCH
COMMITTEE REPORT]; REP. OTIS PIKE, CIA: THE PIKE REPORT (ed. 1997) (original date 1977) [hereinafter
the PIKE COMMITTEE REPORT].
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and others not suspected of any link to foreign powers or international
terrorist organizations.
Intelligence collection pursuant to FISA is vast, but the constitutional
conversation about FISA has been more limited. Discussion has focused
mainly on whether FISA is permissible in view of the Fourth
Amendment’s limits on searches and seizures, the President’s
Commander in Chief authority, or Article III’s requirements for federal
courts.283 In contrast, the question of the source of Congress’s authority
to enact FISA’s body of rules governing intelligence collection has been
relatively neglected. Sometimes, Members of Congress will invoke the
Forces Clause as authority for FISA-related legislation.284 Other times,
no particular Article I power is cited. Indeed, two of the three major
legislative reports regarding the original 1978 FISA statute – strong
legislative history – cited no enumerated power and instead invoked the
Youngstown framework to defend FISA’s constitutionality in the most
general terms.285 Where textual hooks are identified, analysis of the
legislative record shows that provisions other than the Forces Clause are
usually cited.286 Like the sponsor of the major post-Snowden FISA
reform bill that became law in 2015, the USA FREEDOM Act, defenders
of FISA’s constitutionality often rely on the Commerce Clause or the
Necessary and Proper Clause.287 Some rely on the Fourth Amendment.288
To be sure, it is not unreasonable to find footing for FISA in more than

283. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 95-1283, at 24-25, 111-16 (1978) (House committee report on original
FISA discussing Article II and Fourth Amendment issues, and minority Art. II and III objections); Letter
from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Sen. Charles Schumer 2 (July 10, 2006), http://lawculture.blogs.com/lawculture/
files/NSA.Hamdan.response.schumer.pdf (disputing constitutionality of FISA in view of Art. II); Stephen
I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and Article III, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1161 (2015) (discussing Art. III
concerns with FISA).
284. See, e.g., National Security Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 2453, 109th Cong. (2006); see also
S. 3876, 109th Cong. (2006); Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 3931, 109th Cong. (2006); see also
S. 3929, 109th Cong. (2006).
285. See H.R. REP. 95-1720, at 35 (1978) (Conf. Rep.) (FISA operates in Youngstown framework);
H.R. REP. 95-1283 (1978) (id., House committee report).
286. Article I, section 8 provisions other than the Forces Clause were cited in all of the statements
of constitutional authority inserted into the Congressional Record pursuant to House Rule XII(7)(c)
regarding the nearly three dozen bills to amend FISA introduced in the House from 2011-2016. Data set
of legislation on file with author. See also Part II.C.1 supra.
287. See supra note regarding congressional authority statements in Congressional Record
associated with USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) and other FISArelated legislation, where Art. I provisions other than Forces Clause are cited; S. REP. 95-701, at 16 (1978)
(Senate committee report on original FISA cites Art. I, § 8 and particularly Necessary and Proper Clause
as authority for FISA in Youngstown context); Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at
735-36 n.143 (citing Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, in addition to Forces Clause).
288. See, e.g., FISA Court in the Sunshine Act, H.R. 2440, 113th Cong. (2013), 159 CONG. REC.
H3928 (requiring transparency measures regarding secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
constructions of law, enabled by both the Fourth Amendment and the Commerce Clause).
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one provision of the Constitution.289 And as noted at the outset of this
article, the courts have made clear that a statute can find constitutional
footing on an Article I provision even if that provision is not cited by
Congress, if the provision’s terminology is not used, and if the real
purpose of the statute diverges from the reasons the clause was included
in the Constitution. Statutes are more legitimate normatively, however,
the closer they may be tied to the Constitution’s text and the ethos of
relevant provisions. With this in mind, the Forces Clause deserves to be
recognized as the best constitutional textual grounding for FISA.
First, FISA is not about commerce. It is true that FISA’s text references
“transmission of interstate and foreign communications,” and that the
Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause does provide
Congress power to permit government interception of phone calls.290 For
these reasons, the Commerce Clause reasonably offers some authority.291
But the Forces Clause is the best constitutional footing because FISA’s
primary purpose is not to regulate the economy. The statute instead
governs surveillance (primarily of U.S. persons, but also of non-U.S.
persons) for foreign intelligence purposes, by the military (in addition to
the FBI or other actors). At the time of FISA’s enactment and through
the present day, the vast majority of foreign intelligence surveillance has
been conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA), a component of
the Department of Defense, headed by a four-star general officer. The
NSA is a vital part of the “land and naval Forces,” providing signals
intelligence (SIGINT) to the armed forces under the Military Intelligence
Program (MIP) and to the President, National Security Council, Congress,
Justice Department, and other intelligence consumers through the
National Intelligence Program (NIP).292 FISA regulates and promotes
commerce only incidentally, by governing the companies and information
infrastructure through which communications flow and providing rules
that say that one’s commercial communications will not be surveilled
unless certain criteria are met.
FISA’s overarching purpose is to balance security and liberty as they
289. In addition to the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause (see supra), other
provisions sometimes cited in constitutional authority statements pursuant to House Rule XII(7)(c) as
authority for amendments to FISA are Art. I, § 1 (see, e.g., Government Surveillance Transparency Act,
H.R. 2736, 113th Cong. (2013), 159 CONG. REC. H4725 (2013)) and Art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (see, e.g., Presidential
Appointment of FISA Court Judges Act, H.R. 2761, 113th Cong. (2013), 159 CONG. REC. H4826 (2013)).
These vest the legislative power in Congress, and grant it authority to “provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare.” These broad provisions may reasonably be read to provide some authority for
FISA, but are not as squarely on point as the Clause in its External Government understanding.
290. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(l) (2015); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 327 (1939).
291. The legislative authority provided by the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause
is more important where FISA activity is being conducted by entities that cannot easily be considered part
of the “land and naval Forces,” such as the FBI.
292. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 1.12(b) (2008).
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pertain to national security.293
FISA permits collection of the
communications of U.S. persons by military and civilian personnel under
the ultimate (but importantly not immediate) supervision of the President
on a showing of probable cause that the target is a foreign power or agent
thereof.294 It also imposes court order and other requirements to protect
Fourth Amendment rights.295 FISA’s rules were imposed by Congress in
response to a history of unrestricted Executive branch national security
surveillance that involved well-documented privacy violations and other
abuses. These included dragnet collection of the communications of U.S.
persons by NSA without suspicion, and targeting of non-violent war
protesters, civil rights advocates, and political and bureaucratic
adversaries of senior government officials for surveillance.296 FISA, in
short, is a statute that precisely reflects the Forces Clause’s countertyrannical ethos and its mechanism (under the External Government
understanding) of limiting in a non-appropriations statute the operational
uses to which the President can put the land and naval forces.297
FISA does impose obligations on companies involved in inter-state and
international commerce and therefore, again, it is reasonable to see some
support for FISA provided by the Commerce Clause.298 But as a
normative matter, the Commerce Clause should be regarded as a
supporting secondary constitutional authority, for the reasons just
mentioned. Additionally, a FISA planted only on the Commerce Clause
would suggest that many of the military’s most sensitive and vital
operations could be restricted significantly for purposes of commercial
regulation. That may be the right answer, or it may not. In any event, the
External Government understanding of the Forces Clause is a stronger
foundation.
The Necessary and Proper Clause has been cited as constitutional
authority for Congress to regulate intelligence activities, including by the

293. See H.R. REP. 95-1283, at 22 (1978) (House committee report on original FISA states that bill
represents balancing of security and liberty); S. REP. 95-701, at 6-7 (1978) (Senate committee report
quotes President Carter to same effect).
294. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (2018). Foreign powers and agents thereof include groups,
entities, and persons involved with international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(b) (2018).
295. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.
296. See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT and PIKE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 282.
297. The Attorney General, Justice Department, and FBI have key roles under FISA. But the vast
majority of FISA collection is conducted by the NSA. The Justice Department and FBI roles in relation
to NSA collection are largely procedural requirements imposed by Congress and the courts. To whatever
extent this work and the reality that FBI and other agencies can conduct surveillance pursuant to FISA
might begin to stretch reliance on the Forces Clause, other clauses can be understood to provide
supplementary constitutional support. The point is NSA’s large role and therefore the prime reliance the
FISA statute must place on the Clause.
298. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part I, supra note 11, at 736 n.143.
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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in its report on what would
become the original FISA.299 But the Necessary and Proper Clause is
principally a general, catch-all, backstopping source of legislative
authority. The closer a statute is tethered to a more specific enumerated
power, the firmer its constitutional footing.
FISA can be understood to apply the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness and warrant requirements to national security
surveillance. But the Fourth Amendment is not an affirmative grant of
authority to Congress as are the enumerated legislative powers of Article
I, Section 8.300 The Fourth Amendment on its face also does not provide
authority to Congress to balance Fourth Amendment rights and
Commander in Chief powers. This is more easily understood as the work
of the Forces Clause.
In short, several provisions of the Constitution are relevant to FISA but
the Clause, in its External Government understanding,301 represents the
firmest constitutional grounding for statutory restrictions on surveillance
of U.S. persons for national security purposes by the intelligence
collection apparatus the President supervises.
3. Covert Action
Although there is no explicit mention of intelligence in the
Constitution’s text, there is no question that the collection, analysis,
dissemination, and consumption of intelligence, along with conducting
counter-intelligence (spy vs. spy) and foreign intelligence liaison
relationships, are constitutional. Intelligence is an inevitable incident to
military forces and diplomacy. Most intelligence activities – with the
FISA exception explained immediately above – therefore readily find
constitutional grounding in the Army, Navy, Militia, and Commander in
Chief Clauses, in addition to the nation’s foreign relations work under the
direction of the President. But what of covert action – that is, clandestine
direct action, sometimes called active measures – and particularly
Congress’s ability to control such “black ops” by national security actors
acting at presidential direction?
Covert action was an administrative creature under presidential control
for most of the republic’s history. It was carried out abroad and also
299. See S. REP. 95-701, at 35, 72 (1978).
300. When the Supreme Court invited Congress to enact what became FISA, the Court did not
specify the constitutional authority for such a statute. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (“Keith”), 407
U.S. 297, 323-24 (1972).
301. The Clause’s Internal Regulation power might apply as well, to the extent FISA is a set of
internal rules for a military SIGINT agency. It also includes a criminal penalty for violation. However,
FISA is more readily understood as concerning operations, which is the work of the External Government
power.
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within the United States without any statutory framework until the
National Security Act in the mid-20th Century. The 1970s saw revelations
of covert actions targeting non-violent protest inside the United States and
other First Amendment-protected political activity, and the 1980s IranContra scandal exposed accountability problems at the highest levels.
The modern covert action statute enacted in response imposes stringent
targeting limitations and process requirements that are explicitly binding
on the President.302
The statute begins prohibitively: “[t]he President may not” authorize
covert action unless the President takes a series of accountability steps.303
The President must determine any covert action is “necessary to support
identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important
to the national security,” put that determination in a written finding, report
that finding to the congressional intelligence committees (including the
legal basis for the covert action), and keep the committees apprised and
file notification of meaningful change to the covert operation.304 Defined
as “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence
political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended
that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or
acknowledged publicly,” covert action may not be “intended to influence
United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media.”305
Other national security clauses or the Necessary and Proper Clause
may reasonably provide Congress regulatory authority,306 but the Forces
Clause should be recognized not only as permissible constitutional
footing for this framework statute’s restrictions on the President, but the
covert action statute’s primary constitutional hook. The “land and naval
Forces” may reasonably embrace both military regulars and other
accompanying forces such as intelligence personnel. The statute
anticipates that military or non-uniformed intelligence personnel may
carry out covert actions.307 The Forces Clause is a more appropriate
source of authority for such operations than the Declare War Clause
because covert action is not necessarily war and need not involve force.
Influencing “conditions” is much broader, to include information
302. For discussion of what led to the modern framework statute, see REISMAN & BAKER, supra
note 13.
303. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a) (2014).
304. Id. § 3093(a)-(d) (2014).
305. Id. § 3093(e)-(f) (2014).
306. See REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 13 (mention of Clause along with Necessary & Proper).
307. The statute is activity rather than actor focused. The common but wrong perception that covert
actions are non-military and exclusively a CIA activity are grounded in an administrative authority. Exec.
Order No. 12,333 (2008) creates a presumption that the CIA will carry out covert actions, but with
exception – which was reportedly used in the most prominent U.S. clandestine operation in recent decades,
the 2011 joint CIA/military operation that killed Osama bin Laden.
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operations or even lethal action that does not rise to the level of armed
conflict. Additionally, this framework statute’s limitations strongly
reflect the civilian legislative control and counter-authoritarian purposes
of the Forces Clause. The statute’s restrictions and transparency
requirements on the President are among the most stringent in any part of
the national security legal regime, imposed in response to serious abuses
of executive power.308
Finally, military and intelligence activities have converged in recent
years, particularly in the area of clandestine direct action.309 The raid that
killed Osama bin Laden, for example, was evidently carried out under the
covert action authority with CIA direction, but on-the-ground and in-theair action was conducted primarily by the military.310 Meanwhile,
intelligence agencies actively assist clandestine military operations
conducted under the authority of the Defense Department, and the
Defense Department increasingly reports to Congress about such
operations in a manner increasingly similar to that Congress has required
for covert actions.311 As this military/intelligence convergence continues,
the constitutional legitimacy provided to the covert action statute by the
Forces Clause grows.
4. Interrogation
Collecting intelligence facilitates both covert and overt action, which
in turn may result in detention and interrogation of detainees. These
activities are governed and regulated by Congress pursuant to statutes that
find strong constitutional authority in the Forces Clause, among other
clauses. The statutory framework includes the Detainee Treatment Act,
the Military Commissions Act, and the collection of statutes that ban
torture.312
308. As noted in Part III.B above, OLC during the Reagan Administration believed that the Clause
would apply in what we conceptualize as an Internal Regulation sense to covert action, but denied any
External Government power from any Article I source. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. The
intelligence committees emphasized in response that they had never accepted such arguments. See H.R.
REP. NO. 102-166, at 28 (1991) (Conf. Rep.); see also Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb Part II, supra
note 1, at 1084 n. 589.
309. See Robert S. Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/50
Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 539 (2012).
310. See id. at 539-41; CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS 257-71 (2016).
311. See 10 U.S.C. § 130f (2018); Robert S. Chesney, Expanding Congressional Oversight of
Kill/Capture Ops Conducted by the Military: Section 1036 of the NDAA, LAWFARE (Dec. 8, 2016, 6:25
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/expanding-congressional-oversight-killcapture-ops-conductedmilitary-section-1036-ndaa.
312. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 180107, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574-2614 (2009) (Military Commissions Act of 2009). For the Detainee Treatment
Act and other torture statutes, and discussion of other relevant constitutional provisions, see infra note
313 and accompanying text.
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The torture ban finds strong authority in the External Government
power of the Forces Clause. It applies to the entire U.S. government, but
is focused on military and intelligence forces.313 It restricts what they can
do, and what the President can order them to do, regarding enemy fighters
and others from whom national security information is sought. The
original torture ban pre-dates 9/11, and has been re-enacted and
broadened twice since. The statutes include a ban on cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment, and generally restrict all U.S. government actors to
the U.S. Army Field Manual’s list of approved interrogation techniques,
none of which involve the use of force.314 Here again, the resonance of
this statutory framework with the legislative control and counterauthoritarian purposes of the Clause is strong. Short of loss of life, the
threats of confinement for national security purposes and torture are the
most serious predations against liberty an individual can contemplate if
faced with a tyrannous President in command of “land and naval Forces.”
5. War Powers Resolution
The War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973 is the framework statute
for use of force abroad.315 At its core, the WPR requires Congressional
notification when the President introduces U.S. forces into situations in
which hostilities are imminent, the withdrawal of U.S. forces after 60 days
(with an additional 30 day period to effectuate withdrawal) unless
Congress has declared war or statutorily authorized the military operation,
consultation with Congress throughout, and a ban on inference of
313. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A; 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006) (prohibition); Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1002, 1003, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005) (non-appropriations
law appended to the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006) (limiting Defense Department
interrogation to techniques in the Army Field Manual and barring “cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment or punishment” of any “individual in the custody or under the physical control” of the U.S.
government); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1045(a),
129 Stat. 725, 977-79 (2015) (extending requirement to follow the Army Field Manual to the entire U.S.
government). These statutes may reasonably be understood to operate in connection with the Define and
Punish, Captures, and Treaty Clauses of the Constitution, as well as the Forces Clause. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 10-11, 14; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also Bradbury memorandum, supra note 222, at 4-6 (OLC
in 2009 decided that Define and Punish and Forces Clauses provide Congress authority to govern
interrogation, disagreed with prior view that Captures Clause does not). Torture is barred and indeed a
war crime under international law. Articles 2 and 4 of the Convention Against Torture call on state parties
to enact laws to prevent and criminalize torture. See United Nations Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts. II, IV, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO.
100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
314. See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3: HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
OPERATIONS (Sept. 2006), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf (listing permitted interrogation
methods).
315. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548
[hereinafter WPR].
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authorization from appropriations.
Enacted over President Richard Nixon’s veto in response to the
Vietnam War and Nixon’s introduction of U.S. military forces into
Cambodia, the WPR’s constitutionality has been contested since it was
proposed.316 Its text cites the Necessary and Proper Clause.317 However,
the Forces Clause is the stronger textual grounding. First, the WPR is a
non-appropriations, non-war declaration statute that imposes legal limits
on the operational use of the armed forces by the President. This is the
essence of Clause’s External Government power. Second, the Necessary
and Proper Clause, as noted, is primarily a gap-filling statute. An
enumerated power that provides particular substantive authority for
legislation is firmer footing.
The Declare War Clause reasonably provides some support for the
WPR, but not exclusive nor even necessarily the best constitutional
authority. Of course, war is in the title of the WPR. It is risked by the
operations the WPR governs. However, the primary work done by the
WPR is the Forces Clause’s External Government work of limiting
military operations. In contrast, the primary work of a war declaration is
authorizing military operations and announcing the most intense state of
belligerence between international parties. The WPR also concerns
“hostilities,” a statutorily undefined term but one reasonably understood
to embrace military operations less intense than war.318 I therefore argue
that the WPR is best understood as a “Rule” Congress has written for “the
Government . . . of the land and naval Forces.” Separate congressional
action under the Declare War Clause is, by the WPR’s terms, a means of
releasing the President from the WPR’s strictures.
Executive branch interpretative precedents regarding military
operations in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011) and against the so-called
Islamic State (2014-present) have in recent decades served to limit the
WPR’s reach.319 All post-enactment presidents have disputed the WPR’s
316. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L.
REV. 101 (1984) (defending); Peter M. Shane, Learning McNamara’s Lessons: How the War Powers
Resolution Advances the Rule of Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1281 (1997) (defending); ROBERT F.
TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 107-33
(1983) (contesting); YOO, supra note 9, at 159-60 (contesting).
317. WPR, supra note 315, at § 2(b).
318. But see Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Testimony Regarding U.S.
Military Involvement in Libya, June 28, 2011 [hereinafter Koh SFRC Testimony] (arguing in defense of
the Obama Administration continuing U.S. military involvement in Libya beyond 60-90 clock by arguing
that the Libya mission was not sufficiently intense to trigger the WPR).
319. The Clinton Administration OLC interpreted appropriations for combat operations in Kosovo
in 1999 beyond the WPR’s 90-day clock as a constructive amendment to the WPR, despite the WPR’s
facial ban on inference of force authorization from appropriations in § 8(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1).
See Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 Op. O.L.C. 327, 339 (2000),
https://www.justice.gov/file/19306/download. The Obama Administration viewed military operations in
Libya in 2011 as too limited to be considered “war” and trigger the WPR’s restrictions. See Authority to
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constitutionality except Carter and Obama.320 However, all Presidents
since Gerald Ford have observed the WPR’s requirements the vast
majority of the time.321 The WPR remains the framework statute for use
of force – one for which the Forces Clause provides the best authority.
***
The statutory frameworks discussed in this Part are core elements of
the national security regulatory regime. They all resonate with the
Clause’s counter-authoritarian purposes, limiting what the national
security apparatus can do and what the Commander in Chief can
operationally order them to do. Each statute cited above relies on the
External Government understanding to check the military and the
President. The UCMJ and the statutes concerning intelligence collection
(FISA and the interrogation laws) protect the civil liberties of the people,
the NDAA provides the elected representatives of the people control over
the national security apparatus, and the Posse Comitatus Act, the
Insurrection Act, and the WPR ensure that Congress can write rules for
use of military force. These Forces Clause-based statutes do their work
without exposing Congress to politically toxic allegations of “de-funding
the troops” by denying or limiting funding for specific activities pursuant
to the Appropriations Clause, or by de-funding-by-legislative-inaction the
entire Army pursuant to the Army Appropriations Clause’s limitation on
Army appropriations to two years.322 The Forces Clause in its External
Government power is often overlooked as the basis for the

Use Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2011); Koh SFRC Testimony, supra note 311. With Congress
unwilling to act on the President’s request for new statutory authorization, and the President preferring
not to assert Commander in Chief authority, the Obama Administration relied on the 9/11 (2001) and Iraq
(2002) AUMF statutes as authority for operations against the so-called Islamic State. For discussion, see
Jack Goldsmith & Matthew Waxman, The Legal Legacy of Light-Footprint Warfare, 39 WASH. Q. 7, 1219 (2016), http://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/2016/TWQ_Summer2016_GoldsmithWaxman.pdf; Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53 HOU. L. REV.
971, 1021 (2016) (“Congress is unwilling to vote even to authorize an expanded war against ISIL that
most Members seem to support”).
320. See, e.g., President Richard M. Nixon, Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 1973 Pub. Papers
311 (Oct. 24, 1973) (arguing WPR unconstitutional); Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad
Without Statutory Authorization, 40A Op. O.L.C. 185, 190 (1980) (Carter Administration OLC finds 60
day clock constitutional); Robert Chesney, An Overview of Harold Koh’s Testimony on the WPR at
Today’s SFRC Hearing, LAWFARE, (June 28, 2011, 11:48 AM) https://www.lawfareblog.com/overviewharold-kohs-testimony-wpr-todays-sfrc-hearing (State Department Legal Advisor Harold Hongju Koh
testified that Obama Administration believes WPR is constitutional).
321. Presidents who dispute the WPR’s constitutionality have reported to Congress “consistent”
with the WPR. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33532, WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE (2012).
322. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. The Army Appropriations Clause
potentially functions as a last resort default off-switch through which each two-year Congress has the
ability to simply appropriate nothing for the Army and thereby eliminate it in at most two years, removing
the federal government’s largest land force from the hands of a tyrannous or otherwise unfit Commander
in Chief.
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constitutionality of these laws, and that should change. Other statutes –
for example on the military chain of command or force emplacement in
peacetime – might find root in the Clause, as well.323 The growing body
of congressionally-written rules for cyber operations are another
important and emerging example, as discussed below. The Clause is ripe
for constitutional rediscovery.
IV. THE CLAUSE REDISCOVERED: CONTEMPORARY IMPORTANCE
Several contemporary trends are increasing the importance of the
authority the Forces Clause provides Congress, and the statutory
frameworks that find textual footing in the Clause. That is especially true
regarding the Clause’s External Government power and the statutes that
reflect its exercise. Congress’s ability to write “Rules” for the national
security apparatus pursuant to the Clause takes on special salience in view
of current lawmaking dynamics that make legislation harder to enact,
change in the national security environment and especially its increasing
cyberization, and increasingly volatile U.S. policy and politics since 9/11.
Each trend resonates with larger global erosion in norms, increasing
contentiousness and conflict, and accelerating rate of change. Physics
teaches that as linear velocity, mass, and angular momentum increase, so
too does torque. As in a high-performance automobile or aircraft, the
crash risk created by rising torque makes restraints more important. So
too in our legal order. In our increasingly volatile age, the guardrails
provided by the Forces Clause’s statutory “Rules” are especially valuable.
A. In Context of New Lawmaking Dynamics

The Forces Clause and its statutes matter more because of an interrelated series of recent government lawmaking process trends.
Against the backdrop of enduring barriers to judicial review of national
security matters, Congress is legislating less, the Executive power is
growing, and creation of secret law has become regularized in all three
branches, including in Congress pursuant to the Forces Clause.
First, since the mid-2000s, the legislative process in Congress has
become characterized by what some scholars generously term
“unorthodox lawmaking.”324 Another fair characterization is that
323. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 162 (military chain of command, from President to Secretary of Defense
to combatant commanders of the unified joint warfighting commands), § 163 (Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is senior military advisor to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense, but is not in the
chain of command).
324. See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE
U. S. CONGRESS 52 (4th ed. 2012) (rate of bypassing of committees and other empirical data); Abbe R.
Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115
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Congress has become dysfunctional. It is less able to give legislation
and nominations thorough procedural review under the traditional
“regular order” and invest them with bi-partisan buy-in. As
partisanship has risen, transparency into legislative process has
increased; seemingly all issues have become nationalized and made
instantly accessible thanks to information technology; and Members
of Congress have become less willing to compromise and more
extreme in their tactics. Compromise legislation on major issues
facing the country has become harder to craft and pass. Filibusters and
holds have gone from rare exceptions in the U.S. Senate to formidable
counter-majoritarian barriers to a large number of bills, motions, and
nominations (and then both parties while in the majority have
successively narrowed long-standing Senate rules allowing the
filibuster, enabling one party to act on its own). The number of bills
enacted per session has plummeted.325 Those that do reach enactment
often have skipped many usual legislative process stages. Their
legislative history is tangled and gap filled.326 Annual funding
legislation is commonly enacted late or not at all. Brinksmanship has
driven up the number of omnibus bills – amalgamations of many bills
that are drafted, combined, and passed amid haste and disorder.
The net effect is that it has become harder for Congress to act.
Updating FISA after major surveillance scandals in 2005 and 2013, for
example, took two full years.327 Additionally, Congress’s inability to
do its regular appropriations work on schedule and its aversion to
“tying the hands of the military” during an age of endless war have left
Congress less deft in using its power of the purse as a check on the
COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1799-1800, 1803, 1839 (2015) (discussing tangled legislative history for omnibus
bills); Rudesill, supra note 44, at 365-66 (discussing the difficulty associated with understanding the law
and legislative history produced by unorthodox lawmaking as a form of secret law).
325. See, e.g., Drew Desilver, Congress Still on Track to be Among Least Productive in Recent
History, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/09/23/congress-still-on-track-to-be-among-least-productive-in-recent-history/ (analysis of
number and types of bills passed per Congress).
326. The legislative history since the late 1970s of three annual national security bills – the
Intelligence Authorization Act, National Defense Authorization Act, and Department of Defense
Appropriations Act – provide an illuminating case study in the legislative process’s severe disruption. See
Rudesill, supra note 44, at 367-90 (in-text discussion, and tables tracking the three Acts).
327. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (update to FISA
after 2005 leak of warrantless content surveillance); USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23,
129 Stat. 268 (update to FISA after Edward Snowden’s 2013 leak of FISC orders authorizing bulk
collection of telephony metadata); See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
without Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-usspy-on-callers-without-courts.html?_r=0 (original story reporting warrantless wiretapping outside FISA);
Secondary Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., on behalf of MCI
Communication
Services,
Inc.,
No.
BR
13-80
(FISA
Ct.
Apr.
25,
2013),
http://epic.org/privacy/nsa/Section-215-Order-to-Verizon.pdf (FISC order leaked by Snowden).
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Executive. The recent Iraq War, for example, was for most of its
duration enormously unpopular but never de-funded. Indeed, no
national security program of any prominence has been de-funded since
Congress’s action in 2003 to bar funds for the Total Information
Awareness domestic surveillance program.328 A decade later, a
left/right effort to de-fund the NSA bulk telephony metadata collection
revealed in 2013 by Edward Snowden failed in the House.329
Additionally, Congress has not simply stopped formally declaring
wars, but is unable to pass new authorizations for the use of military
force (AUMF) when abundantly warranted.330 An early bellwether
was Congress’s inability in 1999 to pass a war declaration, to pass an
AUMF, or to cut off funding for U.S. participation in NATO’s war
against Serbia to protect Kosovo. More recently, Congress has shown
no ability to pass a new AUMF explicitly authorizing ongoing U.S.
use of force against Al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, Somalia, and North
Africa (2010 onward); against Libya’s Qadaffi regime (2011); against
Syria’s al-Assad regime (threatened in 2013, and carried out in 2017
and 2018); and against ISIL (2014 to present). Instead, with
congressional acquiesce, administrations of both parties have invoked
the President’s Article II Commander in Chief power, and also invoked
9/11 and Iraq War AUMFs that are more than a decade and a half old
and have been relied upon for authority to fight ISIL and other entities
that did not exist when those statutes were passed.331
328. See, Congress Dismantles Total Information Awareness Spy Program, ACLU (Sept. 25, 2003),
https://www.aclu.org/news/congress-dismantles-total-information-awareness-spy-program-acluapplauds-victory-calls?redirect=national-security/congress-dismantles-total-information-awareness-spyprogram-aclu-applauds-victory- (praising de-funding of Total Information Awareness (TIA)); DOD
Appropriations Act for 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8131(a), 117 Stat. 1054, 1102 (2003) (statute defunding TIA); see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-283, at 327, 344 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) (report language regarding
TIA).
329. See H. AMEND. 413 to H.R. 2397, 113th Cong. (2013), 159 CONG. REC. H5028 (2013) (roll
call vote on de-funding bulk telephony metadata collection), https://www.congress.gov/
amendment/113th-congress/house-amendment/413/text; H. R. REP. NO. 113-170, at 11, 29 (2013) (Reps.
Justin Amash (R-MI) and John Conyers (D-MI) amendment to de-fund bulk telephony metadata collection
defeated in U.S. House 205-17).
330. The last war declaration was during World War II. See Act of June 5, 1942, ch. 325, 56 Stat.
307 (Declaring a state of war between the Government of Rumania and Government and the people of
the United States). The most recent AUMFs were passed in 2001 and 2002, regarding Al Qaeda and
others responsible for the 9/11 attacks and authorizing the invasion of Iraq, respectively. See
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Authorization for
the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
331. The Obama Administration unsuccessfully sought new AUMFs from Congress. In contrast,
the Trump Administration indicated that existing authorities are “sufficient” and that it “is not seeking
revisions to the 2001 AUMF or additional authorizations to use force.” See Charles Faulkner, Bureau of
Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Letter to Senator Bob Corker, Chairman, U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (Aug. 2, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3911844/8-2-17Corker-Response.pdf.
Regarding military operations against ISIL, the Trump and Obama
Administrations have invoked the 9/11 and Iraq AUMFs, even though ISIL often fights Al Qaeda and the
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In this context and where major laws are hard to pass, the statutory
frameworks grounded in the Forces Clause that are already on the
books and new updates to them – non-appropriations, non-AUMF
statutes that govern and regulate national security activities – grow in
importance.
Executive power growth makes these statutory frameworks matter
more, too, along with the Forces Clause that underlies them. Executive
power has been growing for more than a century, with acceleration in
recent years.332 The Executive branch has pushed against the limits of
Clause-based statutes discussed in Part III, via new interpretive and
practice precedents. The George W. Bush Administration did so (e.g.,
regarding surveillance and interrogation) under the aegis of its
expansive minority theory of executive power and in service of post9/11 urgency to collect intelligence. The Obama Administration
broadly interpreted the President’s authority to act (particularly in
Libya and against ISIL) after concluding Congress was incapable of
acting due to its politics.333 The Trump Administration has deployed
some of the same theories.334 The WPR has seen significant
interpretive narrowing, particularly regarding military operations in
Libya and against ISIL.335 The Executive branch’s resistance to the
government of Iraq. See April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities 42 Op.
O.L.C. 1, 11, 13 n.4 (May 31, 2018) (slip op.), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/
attachments/2018/05/31/2018-05-31-syrian-airstrikes_1.pdf (published Trump-era OLC opinion on legal
authority to combat ISIL), citing Authority to Use Military Force in Iraq (2014) (unpublished Obama-era
OLC opinion on legal authority to combat ISIL in Iraq); see also THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND
RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 15-16 (2016) (published Obama-era White House report),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/framework.Report_Final.pdf.
Regarding
strikes against Syria’s al-Assad regime, the Trump Administration has relied on an expansive conception
of the President’s Article II powers. See April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons
Facilities, supra; President Donald Trump, Letter to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore
of the Senate, April 8, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/letter-president-speakerhouse-representatives-president-pro-tempore-senate/. The Trump State and Defense Departments
additionally argue that at least the 2017 strikes on the Syrian regime for using chemical weapons were
authorized by the 9/11 AUMF as necessary to protect U.S. and allied forces battling ISIL. Pro-democracy
Syrian forces backed by the United States have been fighting ISIL and the Syrian government. See Mary
K. Waters, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Letter to Senator Tim Kaine
at 1-2 (Feb. 12, 2018), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4383185-Kaine-TrumpISIS-war-power-letters.html; David J. Trachtenberg, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
Letter to Senator Tim Kaine at 2 (Jan. 29, 2018), available at https://www.documentcloud.org
/documents/4383185-Kaine-Trump-ISIS-war-power-letters.html.
332. Factors certainly relevant include growth in the administrative state and rise of the “imperial
presidency,” increasing congressional willingness to delegate rulemaking to agencies and judicial
tolerance of such delegations, increasing partisanship, and court expansion of judicial power. For
criticism see SHANE, supra note 148, at 3 et seq.; LOUIS FISHER, SUPREME COURT EXPANSION OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2017).
333. See supra note 319.
334. See supra note 331.
335. See discussion above in Part III.B.5.
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Forces Clause’s statutes serves to underscore the importance of
existing statutory frameworks if the President is to be restrained
meaningfully.
In addition to Congress’s inability to use its legislative power and
expanding Executive power, there has been a third change in
lawmaking dynamics that makes the Clause and its statutes matter
more. Creation of unpublished national security legal authorities –
national security secret law – has in recent decades become well
established in all three branches of the federal government. These
include classified legislative addenda given the force of law by
Congress (a regular and expanding practice since the late 1970s),
secret presidential orders and precedential Justice Department
memoranda, and classified orders of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) created nearly 40 years ago.336
On the one hand, Congress can rely on Clause authority when it
writes classified addenda in the National Defense Authorization Acts
(NDAAs) and Intelligence Authorization Acts (IAAs). Congress’s
secret law can manage secret law in the other two branches, as well as
manage secret fact (classified offices, programs, operations, etc.).
According to media reports, Congress has used classified provisions to
govern lethal drone operations – to do the Forces Clause’s External
Government work in secrecy’s most deadly shadows.337
On the other hand, against the darkened backdrop of secret law and
secret fact, the Clause’s Public Law provisions provide an instrument
for policy change by the elected representatives of the people. The
Clause’s Public Law statutes also provide public standards by which
the legality of secret government activity can be measured – both for
holders of security clearances in classification’s darkest corners and
for the public when secret activities are revealed.338

336. See Rudesill, supra note 44 (study finding secret law claim credible regarding all three
branches); WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & THE POWER OF
THE PURSE 52, 65 (1994) (discussion of examples of Congress’s use of classified legislative addenda).
337. See Greg Miller, Lawmakers Seek to Stymie Plan to Shift Control of Drone Campaign from
CIA to Pentagon, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/lawmakers-seek-to-stymie-plan-to-shift-control-of-drone-campaign-from-cia-topentagon/2014/01/15/c0096b18-7e0e-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html.
338. Caveats are in order. One is that the observations above of course apply to all publicly
observable law that limits the Executive Branch. The Forces Clause and its statutes are especially
important, however, because they do such important work. A second caveat is that public statutes, if they
are to be meaningful, demand adherence to a Public Law Supremacy Principle: that any secret law is
subordinate to public law, and does not grow government authority beyond what it facially appears to the
public. See Rudesill, supra note 44, at 337-41.
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B. In Context of Change in the Security Environment, Especially
Growing Cyberization
While Congress has become less responsive and the U.S. political
culture has become more divided and acrimonious, the global security
environment has become more volatile. Compared to the relatively stable
American-designed post-World War II and post-Cold War orders, the
world is increasingly chaotic, dynamic, and perilous. The very nature of
war, conflict, and security are changing. The United States today faces a
national security environment dominated by disruptive trends. These
include protracted low-intensity conflict with a metastasizing and
adaptive terrorist global insurgency, and galloping growth in the varieties,
complexity, and accessibility of robots, from remotely piloted militarized
drones to autonomous weapons systems that potentially think and kill on
their own.339 As all aspects of security, society, and economics become
more cyberized – that is, computer dependent – the United States also
confronts a daily deluge of cyber attacks that straddle the blurry lines
among espionage, war, crime, and terrorism. According to the U.S.
military, permanent U.S. cyber superiority “is not possible due to the
complexity of cyberspace.”340 Meanwhile, congressional legislation is
not keeping up. As noted, the appropriations process through which U.S.
forces are funded and managed is often a (black) comedy of legislative
errors, missed deadlines, and panic-passed omnibus bills. Meanwhile,
force authorizations dating to 2001 (9/11) and 2002 (Iraq) are silent about
dramatically changed conflicts in Afghanistan and the middle east, and
about new technologies.
The changing nature of the national security context in which “the land
and naval Forces” operate is increasing the importance of the existing
“Rules” Congress has provided pursuant to the Forces Clause. Looking
to the future, to the extent that Congress does legislate, its Forces Clause
legislative authority will prove only more relevant and useful. Through
these authorities Congress can update the authorities, processes, and
organization of the national security apparatus without having to depend
on funding limitations via the disrupted appropriations process, and
without having to wait for legislation authorizing wars. Authorizing
armed conflicts or making major amendments to AUMFs written
pursuant to the Declare War Clause plainly now require a 9/11-scale
catastrophe, and a formal war declaration would require an even larger

339. See, e.g., Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record:
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (May
11,
2017),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/
SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf.
340. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12: Cyberspace Operations, at I-2 (2018).
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prompt.
Congress’s active government of cyber operations in recent years
provides a case study in the utility of Forces Clause authority. In the wake
of the United States engaging in the first publicly known major state use
of a cyber weapon against Iran’s nuclear program, and after creation of
the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), Congress in a series of
enactments has stipulated authorities, processes, and reporting
requirements for Defense Department offensive cyber operations.341
Congress has piece by piece built a structure similar in some ways to the
covert action statute, via a patchwork of provisions in annual NDAAs.
Congress in the NDAA for 2012 affirmed presidential authority to direct
the Defense Department to carry out offensive operations in cyberspace,
while also subjecting the Pentagon’s cyber weapons to the law of armed
conflict, to other existing Defense Department law and policy, and to
another Clause framework statute, the WPR.342
Congress has
subsequently underscored Defense Department authority to use cyber
capabilities to defend the United States – and U.S. persons.343 Creating
reporting requirements for military cyber operations similar to those in
two other Force Clause statutes, the covert action statute and the WPR,
Congress has also required the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress
on individual cyber operations within 48 hours and file quarterly reports
on cyber programs and their legality344 Most recently, Congress has
legislated that the Defense Department may “take appropriate and
proportional action in foreign cyberspace” against Russia, China, North
Korea, or Iran, if such a state is executing an “ongoing campaign of
attacks . . . in cyberspace, including attempting to influence American
341. U.S. Cyber Command has been operational for nearly a decade. President Trump announced
that it would be elevated to the status of a unified combatant command, on par with other warfighting
commands such as U.S. Central Command. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Statement by President Donald J. Trump on the Elevation of Cyber Command (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/18/statement-donald-j-trump-elevation-cybercommand.
342. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 954, 125
Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011); 10 U.S.C. § 111 note.
343. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1642(a),
129 Stat. 1116 (2015) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 394 (2018)). This statute was moved from 10
U.S.C. § 130g by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, §
1631, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018) [hereinafter 2019 NDAA].
344. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1631(a),
131 Stat. 1283, 1736-37 (2017) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 395, 396 (2018)). This statute was
moved from 10 U.S.C. §§ 130j, 130k by the 2019 NDAA, supra note 335, at § 1631 (report required
within 48 hours of on off-battlefield cyber operations, quarterly reports on review of legality under
international law of cyber weapons, and report within 48 hours on use of such weapons). See also National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 939, 126 Stat. 1632, 1888 (2013),
amended by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1632(a),
131 Stat. 1283, 1738 (2017) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 484) (quarterly report required on military cyber
operations, including their legality).
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elections.”345 Additionally, Congress provides that clandestine military
cyber operations may be conducted as a “traditional military activity,”
and therefore subject to military-related law rather than the espionagefocused covert action statute.346 Congress has also stipulated that the
military cyber operations it is governing may include operations that fall
short of “war”: operations that do not rise to the WPR’s threshold of
“hostilities,” are not “in areas in which hostilities are occurring,” and are
not uses of force.347
In short, rather than waiting for Congress to invoke its other
enumerated Article I powers via a formal declaration of cyber war, a
freestanding cyber AUMF, or funding restrictions, Congress has used
NDAAs to permit operations by the military’s cyber force subject to a set
of legislated rules. These include following other law (e.g., the law of
armed conflict), not applying still other law here (the covert action
statute), observing Congress’s stipulations even when the cyber
operations are legally and geographically not part of hostilities, and
providing Congress transparency regarding cyber weapons that will only
become more powerful and more potentially imperiling to liberty as the
world becomes ever more cyberized. None of the NDAA cyber
provisions cite constitutional authority for their enactment. But the
NDAA cyber laws – an emerging new statutory framework – are on their
strongest constitutional footing when understood as Congress making
“Rules for the Government . . . of the land and naval Forces” in
cyberspace, reflecting the Forces Clause’s External Government power.
As the threat environment, technology, and U.S. government
capabilities rapidly evolve – in cyberspace and other more traditional
domains – Congress will assuredly continue to refine its new cyber rules,
update the more longstanding statutory frameworks discussed in Part III,
and write new provisions as new issues are presented. With a need to
respond quickly to changing and perilous circumstances, a trend of
increasing Executive power, and enduring barriers to judicial review of
national security activities, one can also expect pushback by presidents
and agencies. This suggests renewed Youngstown-contextualized clashes

345. See 2019 NDAA, supra note 343, at § 1642.
346. See 2019 NDAA, supra note 343, at §§ 1632, 1642. The covert action statute excludes
“traditional . . . military activities” from its reach. See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e)(2) (2014). The 2019 NDAA
provision resolved a legal debate inside the Executive Branch. For discussion, see Robert Chesney, The
Law of Military Cyber Operations and the New NDAA, LAWFARE (July 26, 2018, 2:07 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-military-cyber-operations-and-new-ndaa.
347. See 2019 NDAA, supra note 343, at §§ 1632 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 394) (cyber operations
less than “hostilities” and off-battlefield), 1295 (general provision stipulating that the NDAA’s provisions
may not be understood to authorize the use of force against Iran or North Korea, presumably limiting the
cyber operations authorized under the NDAA to something less than a use of force regarding two of the
four countries listed in section 1642).
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between the Commander in Chief and the Clause’s External Government
power (perhaps in concert with congressional national security powers
provided by the Common Defense, Declare War, Army, Navy, Militia, or
Appropriations Clauses). In the process, additional practice precedent
will be set and the Forces Clause’s contours illuminated. In what is a
contest as much for public support as for judicial acceptance, Congress
will be helped by explicitly citing the Forces Clause as authority for its
enactments. Especially in these volatile times, the legitimacy of
legislation will be stronger if seen as reflecting use of enumerated
constitutional powers and embodying their animating ethos.
C. In Context of Volatile Politics and Policy
Congress’s declining legislative productivity and the evolving nature
of the national security threat environment resonate with a third
overarching trend that is increasing the salience of the Forces Clause and
statutes grounded on it. In a time of growing contentiousness and eroding
norms, the country’s politics and policy as they relate to national security
have become much more volatile. In this context, the “Rules” the Clause
allows Congress to write are functioning as stabilizing guardrails.
It is beyond the scope of this article to diagnose in depth the causes of
this contentiousness and volatility. Suffice for our purposes to note that
it correlates with a number of disruptive developments in the past two
decades. These include the arrival of a horrifying and enduring terrorism
threat on 9/11, U.S. involvement in two costly and still open-ended wars
thereafter, the most severe economic shock since the Great Depression in
2008-10 amid years of stagnation in economic prospects for most people,
and technology-driven revolutionary expansion in the amount and
interactiveness of information about public affairs. These globe-spanning
developments have especially impacted the United States because they
started here, and because they have disrupted the country’s long run of
global preeminence, prosperity, and political stability. Political swings at
the polls are now wider.348 Politicians and elected leaders say things and
suggest policies that for a long time had been outside the mainstream of
political discourse.
Volatility is making law more important, and especially statutes that
resonate with the Clause’s purposes in allowing the elected
representatives of the people to control the national security apparatus that
the Chief Executive wields.
348. For example, a majority of U.S. federal elections since the Iraq War began (2006, 2008, 2010,
2014) have been “wave elections” with one party overwhelmingly prevailing over the other, after a long
prior run starting in the late 1980s in which most elections were either on balance status-quo or closely
decided (1988, 1990, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002).
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A salient example is detainee treatment. The George W. Bush
Administration’s efforts after 9/11 to carry out trials and interrogation of
detainees – captured both domestically and abroad – were at odds with
longstanding detainee treatment norms and with statutes that find footing
in the Clause, particularly the UCMJ and original anti-torture statute. As
noted above, the Courts in Hamdan upheld the UCMJ in the face of
contrary presidential trial order and cited inter alia the Clause. Congress
– with backing from Bush’s successor, Obama – affirmed military justice
process protections and the torture ban. Obama’s successor, Donald
Trump, campaigned on bringing back torture. Once in office, Trump
faced Forces Clause-based statutory “Rules” for the “land and naval
Forces” that prohibit it. They keep the legal baseline centered where it
was before the alarming terrorist attacks of 9/11 and recent years.349
The bruising election cycle that resulted in Trump’s election coincided
with and has been followed by more domestic unrest with racial and
political overtones than the country has witnessed since the Civil Rights
Era and protests against the Vietnam War.350 The Posse Comitatus Act
and parts of the Insurrection Act, based in the Clause, would operate
regarding any new domestic federal military deployments, just as they did
in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Such Clause-based statutes keep the law
tethered to longstanding norms. That is important in the context of
frequent articulations of concern about an authoritarian turn in American
politics351 and polls showing declining support for democracy and regular
349. Trump repeatedly endorsed torture, even if it does not work because suspected terrorists
“deserve it.” See Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump on Waterboarding: ‘If it Doesn’t Work, They Deserve It
Anyway,’
WASH. POST
(Nov.
23,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2015/11/23/donald-trump-on-waterboarding-if-it-doesnt-work-they-deserve-itanyway/?utm_term=.fa9f1526cb9a. As President, Trump has appointed a Secretary of Defense and CIA
Director who are on record against torture. See Amy Davidson Sorkin, Mike Pompeo and the Question
of Torture, NEW YORKER (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/mikepompeo-and-the-question-of-torture (Defense Secretary and CIA Director opposed to torture).
350. Examples include race-related unrest in Baltimore, Maryland and Ferguson, Missouri prior to
the election, politically-related violence in Seattle, Washington and Washington, D.C., thereafter, and
violent clashes in Charlottesville, Virginia in August 2017 that involved neo-Nazis and individuals
violently resisting them. In contrast to this spate of violence, the 1992 riots in Los Angeles following the
Rodney King verdict provided an intense but isolated event.
351. Commentators concerned about a rising authoritarian tendency in American politics and
increasing potential for domestic unrest point to stoking of fear of foreigners and minorities, threats to
“get tough” with terrorists and other adversaries, demonization of urban elites, encouragement of violence
at political rallies, threats to jail political opponents, allegations of corruption against scientists other
professionals, and discrediting of the press and civil servants. Trump is not alone in doing these things,
but they are part of his style and consequently he has been a focus of sharp criticism from normally sedate
commentators. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Imagining a Trump Justice Department, WASH. POST (July 22, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/07/22/imagining-a-trump-justicedepartment/?utm_term=.a519f6d20751 (conservative legal thought leader describes Trump as a “fascist
thug”); Susan Hennessey & Benjamin Wittes, Is Trump a Russian Agent? A Legal Analysis, LAWFARE
(July 27, 2016, 1:46 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/trump-russian-agent-legal-analysis (centrist national
security experts view Trump as acting in the interest of authoritarian Russia); David Luban, The Case
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elections.352
Volatility has been evident in politics and policy regarding foreign
military deployments and traditional alliances, as well. President George
W. Bush ordered U.S. forces into Afghanistan and reduced them before
invading Iraq, President Obama withdrew from Iraq and surged forces
into Afghanistan before drawing them down, followed by President
Trump who campaigned on withdrawal from these conflicts but has
presided over expanded U.S. military operations in both theaters. Obama
involved U.S. forces in Libya and relied on covert action against Syria’s
al-Assad regime, while Trump criticized the Libya operation and potential
strikes on the al-Assad regime as a candidate, and then once in office
reportedly cancelled the covert action and launched overt strikes against
the al-Assad regime. Operating here are not simply the 9/11 and Iraq
AUMFs and the President’s Article II authority, but also the covert action
statute and WPR. Congress could go beyond these existing Forces
Clause-based statutes to provide additional “Rules” for the “land and
naval Forces.”
Pursuant to the Clause, Congress can also provide law to stabilize force
emplacements that undergird U.S. treaty commitments to its allies. After
seven decades of unwavering support for NATO by U.S. Presidents,
Trump has undermined confidence in the U.S. commitment to the

Against Serving, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/34404/case-servingtrump/ (left-leaning thought leader writes that “The nightmare scenario is that Trump and his allies aim at
an authoritarian Big Man presidency”). Trump has praised authoritarians who have used lethal force
against political opponents, journalists, and pro-democracy demonstrators. For coverage of statements
during the campaign, see Nicole Hensley, President Trump Defends Putin as a ‘Killer’ in ‘O’Reilly
Factor’ Interview, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 4, 2017, 11:27 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
politics/president-trump-defends-vladimir-putin-killer-article-1.2964475; Marc Fisher, Donald Trump
and the Expanding Power of the Presidency, WASH. POST (July 30, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/donald-trump-and-the-dangers-of-a-strong-presidency/2016/07/30/69cfc686-55be11e6-b7de-dfe509430c39_story.html?utm_term=.44dd9b499551 (Trump signals expanding executive
authority); Kerr, supra (Trump praised Chinese government’s 1989 bloody crackdown on pro-democracy
protesters).
352. See Maggie Koerth-Baker, Democracy, Meh?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 2, 2016),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/democracy-meh/ (roughly 30 percent of U.S. millennials think it is
imperative to live in a democracy, a decline from prior trends); Ariel Malka & Yphtach Lelkes, In a New
Poll, Half of Republicans Say They Would Support Postponing the 2020 Election if Trump Proposed It,
WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/10/in-anew-poll-half-of-republicans-say-they-would-support-postponing-the-2020-election-if-trump-proposedit/?utm_term=.dcedb50e24ca.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

87

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1

478

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

alliance.353 The reception in Congress has been chilly.354 Although other
members of the Trump Administration have worked to reassure allies and
facilitated a continuing U.S. military presence to counter Russia,355 if the
Commander in Chief were to overrule them Congress could via statute
pursuant to the Forces Clause legislate a ban on withdrawal of U.S.
forces.356
Legislation could provide “Rules” for the most powerful “land and
naval Forces,” tactical (short-range) nuclear forces in Europe and
strategic (long-range) nuclear forces based in the United States, both of
which are part of NATO’s deterrent.357 Following five presidents who
have kept U.S. tactical nuclear forces in Europe while working to reduce
U.S. nuclear forces overall, President Trump has both implicitly called
into question the future of the U.S. tactical nuclear emplacement in
Europe via his criticism of NATO, and explicitly called for expanding
U.S. nuclear forces overall.358 There is statutory precedent for
353. See Zachary Cohen, Michelle Kosinski & Barbara Starr, Trump’s Barrage of Attacks ‘Beyond
Belief,’
Reeling
NATO
Diplomats
Say,
CNN
(July
12,
2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/11/politics/trump-nato-diplomats-reaction/index.html (Trump criticism of
NATO undermining confidence in U.S. commitment to alliance); Rainer Buergin & Toluse Olorunnipa,
Trump Slams NATO, Floats Russia Nuke Deal in European Interview, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2017, 5:00
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-15/trump-calls-nato-obsolete-and-dismisseseu-in-german-interview (similar, before Trump inaugurated, with suggestions of deal with Russia on
European security).
354. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1248(a),
132 Stat. 1636 (2018) (affirming U.S. “ironclad commitment” to NATO); S. Vote No. 149 (passed 972), 115th Cong., 164 CONG. REC. S4868-69 (daily ed. July 10, 2018) (motion to instruct conferees on
NDAA to reaffirm the commitment of the United States to NATO); Joe Gould, Congress Would Stop
Trump from Leaving NATO, Key Senators Say, DEFENSENEWS (July 19, 2018),
https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2018/07/19/congress-would-stop-trump-from-nato-exit-keysenators-say/ (Senators support NATO and attempt to reassure NATO allies that Congress could stop
presidential withdrawal).
355. See, e.g., Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, Pence and Mattis Commit to NATO, But Ask Europe for
More Help, NPR (Feb. 18, 2017, 7:54 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/18/515921413/pence-andmattis-commit-to-nato-but-ask-europe-for-more-help (Trump cabinet members emphasize U.S. support
for NATO).
356. This would set up a Youngstown Category 3 clash, of the kind that continues to be disputed
and has been analyzed more generally by scholars including Barron and Lederman. Congress could
additionally or alternatively act pursuant to authority provided by the Appropriations Clause, and perhaps
the Common Defense Clause, as well.
357. See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE POSTURE
REVIEW § 9 (2012). U.S. tactical nuclear forces are operationally deployed in five European NATO
countries, while a strategic triad of bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarines
are operational from bases inside the United States. See Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, United
States Nuclear Forces, 73 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 48-57 (2017) (discussing current U.S.
tactical and strategic forces); Dakota S. Rudesill, Regulating Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 102 GEO. L.J.
99, 107-19, 141-43 (2013) (analyzing history, forces, and doctrine of U.S. nuclear capabilities).
358. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 22, 2016, 8:50 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/811977223326625792 (“The United States must greatly
strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding
nukes”).
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congressional rule-making regarding nuclear forces: Congress in the
1990s prohibited the retirement of nuclear-capable strategic bombers.359
Also, the WPR facially governs all “forces” by not stipulating it applies
only to conventional forces.360
In the context of President Trump’s exchange of nuclear threats with
North Korea,361 pursuant to the Forces Clause the Congress could enact a
115th Congress bill to prohibit the first use of nuclear weapons absent
specific congressional authorization in a war declaration, unless nuclear
weapons have already been launched against the United States.362 Of
359. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1302(e),
110 Stat. 2422, 2700-02 (1996) (barring retirement of B-52H bombers). The NDAAs for 1996 through
1999 also barred funding for retirement of planned strategic nuclear forces pending Russian ratification
of the START II treaty (which never came). See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1404, 110 Stat. 186, 490 (1996) (original force retirement ban); National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1302(a)-(d), 110 Stat. 2422,
2700-02 (1996) (ban, with waiver); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-85, 111 Stat. 1948, 1948-50 (1997) (ban, with waiver); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261, 112 Stat. 2171, 2171 (1998) (extending provision in NDAA for 1998).
The 1996 and 1997 NDAAs, like the potential statutes I postulate, do not direct the emplacement of forces,
but rather prevent their removal.
Congress in recent years has in provisions that are not funding restrictions required retention
of sufficient warheads to arm U.S. land-based nuclear forces fully. See National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1057, 127 Stat. 622, 864-65 (2013).
In addition to the Forces Clause, Article I’s Army and Navy Clauses would operate regarding
a bar on dismantlement of nuclear-capable missiles, submarines, and aircraft, and their warheads.
Congress would be insisting on them as part of the forces Congress is providing. See U.S. CONST., art. I,
§ 8, cl. 12, 13. These other clauses may operate too regarding statutes on force emplacement – operational
deployment – but this most clearly reflects the External Government understanding of the Forces Clause.
360. See WPR, supra note 315.
361. See Dan Lamothe, If Trump Wants a Nuclear Attack Against North Korea, His Military
Advisors Have Other Options, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
checkpoint/wp/2017/08/10/if-trump-wants-a-nuclear-attack-against-north-korea-his-military-advisershave-few-other-options/?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.d9df1b2a9e28 (quoting views that all presidential orders
on nuclear weapons must be followed, in wake of President Trump threatening North Korea with “fire
and fury” in response to its missile and nuclear weapons programs and threats to the United States and its
allies).
362. See Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2017, H.R. 669, 115th Cong. (2017);
Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2017, S. 200, 115th Cong. (2017). A somewhat similar
proposal was rejected by the Senate in 1972. See FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, WHO DECIDES? ix (Peter Raven-Hansen, ed. 1987). A variant of this idea was offered by
the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in 1971: absent a declaration of war, no first use without the
assent of a congressional committee. This proposal raises a number of interesting constitutional questions,
from whether nuclear weapons are constitutionally special to whether the FAS proposal involves a
legislative veto. For discussion of this idea’s constitutional aspects, see id. A variation on the FAS idea
would be for Congress pursuant to the Forces Clause write a rule for the nuclear forces it provides under
the Army and Navy Clauses: the affirmative assent to a presidential first use order by one or more of a
top military officer, the Secretary of Defense, or the Attorney General before the President’s launch order
is transmitted. See, e.g., Richard K. Betts & Matthew C. Waxman, The President and the Bomb:
Reforming the Nuclear Launch Process, 97 FOR. AFF. 119 (2018) (recommending the Secretary of
Defense and Attorney General must confirm the order and its legality). An order thus not confirmed
presumably would be an illegal order that must be refused. Presidential defiance would create a
Youngstown Category 3 dispute of the greatest severity.
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course, a Commander in Chief who wanted to use nuclear weapons first
might argue that an imminent threat existed even if nuclear warheads were
not incoming toward the United States. The President could also be
expected to argue that new threatening facts had arisen since the bill’s
enactment, and therefore the statute was no longer factually apposite and
the Commander in Chief power allowed a first strike.363 Resolution of
such a constitutional crisis in a manner that both protects the nation and
honors the Constitution’s counter-authoritarian ethos would depend on
the constitutional knowledge and ethical integrity of the President and the
Commander in Chief’s advisors and subordinates, considerations that will
be informed by a full understanding of the Forces Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
This article is focused on a particular, too often neglected provision of
the Constitution. It draws distinctions among clauses and powers. It is
an overdue inquiry, but being clause-focused this article also inevitably is
to some degree a formalistic account. One may reasonably view the
Constitution more holistically, giving primary effect to its purposes,
ethos, and interpretive history. The strongest constitutional analysis, like
the strongest statutory interpretation, draws both on considerations of
formal text and structures, and on spirit and gloss. Regarding the Land
and Naval Forces Clause, all of these considerations augur toward the
Clause vesting in Congress dual powers, having a broader ambit than the
uniformed military (notably, to include the non-military intelligence
enterprise), and reflecting counter-authoritarian legislative control over a
national security apparatus with powers of surveillance, covert influence,
detention, interrogation, and use of military force domestically and
worldwide, to include cyber operations and nuclear weapons.
The statutory frameworks at the heart of the national security legal
regime that find textual grounding in the Forces Clause are important to
the republic at any moment. There are constant and enduring operational
pressures and political incentives for the Executive branch to disregard
the law and its liberty/security balancing work. The statutory frameworks
grounded on the Forces Clause are of special importance, however, in a
time of chronic national insecurity: war without end against transnational
terrorist networks and within cyberspace, and the alarm and constant
engagement of the national security apparatus they produce. These
statutory frameworks safeguard liberty in the atmosphere of uncertainty
and fear that national insecurity, together with dysfunctional government
363. Essentially, the argument would be that the new facts put the President’s pre-emptive nuclear
strike in Youngstown Category 2 rather than Category 3, and the President could rely on Article II authority
against imminent threats as recognized in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
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and volatile politics, produces. Such anxiety was not, of course, unknown
to the Framers. As Justice Jackson wrote, the Framers “knew what
emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative
action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation.”364 The
Constitution they crafted includes checks on a chief Executive the
Framers both gave command of the federal military and viewed as
carrying inherent authoritarian risk – checks that include regular
elections, Congress’s power of the purse, the Bill of Rights, and the Land
and Naval Forces Clause.
This is accordingly a moment for the Clause’s constitutional
rediscovery, and particularly its External Government power. Nothing in
the text, in our founding history, or in subsequent interpretation of the
Constitution by the three branches of government precludes a sensible
reading of the Clause that encompasses grants of both internal and
external powers. On the contrary, the best reading of the constitutional
record is that the Clause does provide Congress dual powers. And as
Congress has used its constitutional powers from the Founding through
the most recent legislation, it has repeatedly written vitally important
statutes that find constitutional textual footing in the Clause – including
in its External Government power.
Courts ought to take up the Supreme Court’s implicit invitation in
Kebodeaux to construe the meaning of the term “Government” in the
Forces Clause. Courts should explicitly recognize the powers the Clause
confers over operations in the field, and over the intelligence portion of
the national security apparatus. But judicial rediscovery of the Clause
will not be enough. Clearer congressional understanding of the Clause,
and more consistent citation to it, also will not be enough. The vast
majority of national security practice escapes judicial review due to
secrecy and standing doctrines. It escapes congressional action due to
workload and other institutional challenges. Rather, our constitutional
order depends instead in the first place – and often the last – on the
integrity, knowledge, and constitutional values of individuals applying
law to fact in national security law’s informal practice settings.365 In tense
Situation Room meetings run by an inevitably action-focused and
security-focused Commander in Chief, to busy U.S. Capitol hallways, to
forces in the field facing little time and real peril – and from unclassified
conversations to briefings in classification’s darkest corners – leaders,
legislators, lawyers, and personnel in the field will serve their country
364. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
365. See BAKER, supra note 13, at 32-33 (discussing the roles of informal process and individual
integrity in making constitutional law meaningful in the national security context; “legal values as much
as the law govern the practice of national security law”).
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better to the extent they carry a richer understanding of the legal
architecture. That includes a rediscovered and fully appreciated Article
I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution. This article’s analysis allows
greater appreciation for the Clause’s constitutional values of counterauthoritarian legislative control over the national security apparatus.
Greater appreciation for and more frequent citation to the Clause in
connection with these values in turn puts the statutes – the “Rules” – that
rely upon it on firmer constitutional footing.
Congress’s authority to govern and regulate the land and naval forces
and control their Commander in Chief is contingent. The Forces Clause
does not stipulate a one-way ratchet toward greater liberty protections.
Congress could choose not to use the Forces Clause’s authority. Congress
could acquiesce to harsh presidential discipline of the military,
authoritarian employment of it against the people, or reckless use of it in
cyberspace or abroad. Congress could use the Clause’s authority to
weaken FISA, the Posse Comitatus Act, and other liberty-protecting laws.
Or, Congress could choose to use the Clause’s authority actively – and
more explicitly and consistently – to balance liberty and security
considerations in a manner that protects both. The Clause’s potential, like
the republic’s fate, ultimately resides with Congress and the love of
liberty among the people the Article I branch represents, governs, and
protects.366

366. Accord, Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We may say that power to
legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power
from slipping through its fingers.”).
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